Dr. Slavko Bokan presented the following paper at the CBMTS Industry VI meeting in Cavtat, Croatia from 05-10 April 2009. Dr. Bokan previously held several high ranking BWC administrative positions, such as manager Eastern Block of Nations, and he is one of the most knowledgeable professionals across this area.
Explosive Developments in Biotechnology and the BTWC Role in Strengthening Global Safety and Security in Biosciences
LTC, Dr. Slavko Bokan, M.D.
(CMOD Ret)
The international community is confronted by a unique challenge in dealing with the threat posed by the potential use of biology and the life sciences for hostile purposes. Advances in a range of scientific disciplines (synthetic biology, synthetic genomics, biotechnology and nanotechnology) are coming together to offer new ways of doing things that could drastically alter the way we think about biology.
All advances bring with them the potential for use for hostile or malevolent purposes, as well as accidental or unexpected consequences. The ban of biological weapons is absolute - biology must only be used for peace.
Synthetic biology or biological engineering refers to the design and fabrication of biological components and systems that do not already exist in the natural world, and the re-design and fabrication of existing biological systems. It is an interdisciplinary field that includes biologists, engineers, chemists, and computer modelers. Synthetic biology is not genetic engineering; synthetic biology creates life-like characteristics through the use of chemicals. It is based on creating structures similar to those found in living organisms. There are many applications of synthetic biology, such as: autonomous biochemical sensors, biomaterial manufacturing, programmed therapeutics, designer agriculture.
Synthetic biology as a process depends upon: sequencing via polymerase chain reaction (PCR), modeling to design the components and behavior desired, fabrication using recombinant DNA to define the section of DNA desired, and automated systems (to read out or confirm the DNA). An additional three items will permit easier engineering or synthesizing: automated construction (synthesis), creation of standardized biological parts, and organizing or abstracting of DNA and other biological parts into hierarchies to make it easier to understand the pieces and use them as building blocks.
Synthetic biology has a powerful promise for the future and has already provided significant scientific, health, and economic benefits, but it is potentially an enabling technology for the de novo reconstruction of dangerous pathogens. Development of any oversight mechanisms must balance the need to minimize the risk of misuse with the need to ensure that science and innovation are encouraged.
The benefits of synthetic biology include developing new microorganisms to treat disease more effectively and creating new and less expensive medications. All the potential risks of synthetic biology are not known, but man-made organisms might behave in unexpected, and possibly harmful ways. If these synthesized organisms fall into the wrong hands, they could be used as weapons. If these organisms are unintentionally released from laboratories or containment, they may also harm the environment or human health. The ability to create artificial life has raised moral and ethical questions about how life is defined.
In many ways, synthetic biology is similar to nanotechnology in terms of its potential and also its risks. As with synthetic biology, nanotechnology offers many potential benefits, such as materials which are stronger, lighter and cheaper. Nanomaterials have the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease and can enter parts of the body not easily penetrated by normal large molecules; for example, using nanoparticles to deliver brain cancer treatment across the blood brain barrier and directly to the cancerous cells. Both synthetic biology and nanotechnology offer new ways to clean up the environment provide cheaper energy and make miniature machines and sensors. But, with both new technologies there are also many unknowns and therefore potential risks with nanotechnology. Some of the same properties that make nanomaterials useful also might make them harmful.
As we know, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force thirty four years ago. It is a simple instrument, only a few pages long, but its prohibitions are clear, succinct, categorical and definitive; but it is an instrument of principle rather than procedure. Relevant resources of biological and toxin agents, technologies and knowledge are more numerous and more widely distributed than their equivalents in other disarmament fields (chemical, radiological or nuclear). In the 1990s, negotiations were begun on a protocol to strengthen and verify the BWC, which would have added to the Convention the verification elements present in other regimes. After many years of work, this effort collapsed in disagreement and recrimination in 2001.
After the Fifth Review Conference in 2002, BWC States Parties established a work program for 2003 to 2005, at which they would work on several specific topics related to better implementation of the Convention. With that approach to the work, the necessary network of collaboration and coordination were developed into a flexible oversight and prevention of the biological and toxin weapons.
Experts from all around the world gathered to share experiences and ideas on how to deal with the threat posed by biological weapons. Officials from health, science and agriculture ministries made connections with their counterparts in defense, justice, foreign affairs and security agencies. All recognized that today the explosive developments in biotechnology represent a very serious threat and no government or international organization could hope to independently effectively monitor the tens of thousands of small biotechnology facilities in operation worldwide. Clearly, this is a problem that needs a collective, multifaceted and multidimensional approach.
The Sixth Review Conference States Parties of the BWC formalized the new approach which recognized the importance of safety and security of biological resources and cooperation with the scientific, medical, commercial and educational communities was initiated. The so-called 2007-2010 BWC intersessional process of the work started with significant involvement of NGOs, the scientific community, academics, commercial industry and civil society. A new synergy among key international organizations such as WHO, OIE, FAO and OPCW, and actors dealing with the BWC directly or indirectly, is crucial across the areas of disease surveillance, fighting chemical weapons, and opposing the threat of bioterrorism.
In such a vision, the BWC will be key, both as a clear and fundamental legal norm, and as a forum for coordination of the various activities. The Biological Weapons Convention will play an ever more important role in efforts to maximize the benefits offered by biotechnology while minimizing its potential for hostile use.
However, biological and toxin weapons are likely to become ever more attractive to terrorists because the advances in biotechnologies, including synthetic biology and nanotechnology, have increased opportunities to weaponize pathogens, e.g., by site-directed mutagenesis, elaboration of new types of virus and development of functional genomics. Also, there will be an increasing number of experts in biosciences because of these developments across the fields of biotechnology, pharmacological and health delivery industries. At the same time, despite the biotechnological advances, the difficulties in real time detection of biological agents used as weapons have not decreased.
The Sixth Review Conference in 2006 agreed that a concerted effort by States Parties is needed to persuade those states not party to the Convention - to join the Convention. Today the BWC has 163 States Parties and 13 signatories; 19 states have neither signed nor ratified the BWC.
Summary:
The dual use nature of many technological advances makes it possible that without such a convention and agreement, we may have to make choice between science and security or bioscience and biosecurity !
References:
- Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, President of the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC & Chairman of the BWC meetings in 2007.Strengthening a global biosecurity/biosafety framework and coping with the biotechnology revolution, Como, Italy, 25- 26 October 2007
- Piers Millet, Political Affairs Officer, BWC, ISU, Synthetic Biology and Engineering Life Science, BWC Meeting of Experts, August 2008, UN Office at Geneva
- Iain Gillesple, OECD Head of Division, Innovation with Security in the Biosciences, BWC Meeting of Experts, August 2008, UN Office at Geneva
- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website, http://www.opbw.org/
For information:
LTC Dr. Slavko Bokan M.D. (CMOD Ret)
Brune Busica 13, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia
Phone: +385 91 6637 287
Email: slavkobokan@hotmail.com
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