(Dr. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack an original CBMTS member and currently Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, The United Nations, New York, presented this paper to the 17th CBMTS meeting, the CBMTS Industry VI which took place in Cavtat, Croatia 05-10 April 2009. This paper has been updated to include the first CBTW experts' training course, which was held in Umeâ, Sweden from 25 May-05 June)
Preparing for and implementing the UN Secretary-General's mechanism for investigations of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons
Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Triggered by a request from any Member State, the Secretary-General is authorized to carry out investigations in order to ascertain the facts of the matter concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States.
The treaty framework establishing the prohibition of use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons are the Geneva Protocol (Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC, EIF 1975) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, EIF 1997). The CWC and the BWC also prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.
The CWC was the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction with an intrusive verification regime. This verification regime also includes special arrangements for alleged use investigations.
Both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC lack provisions for verification and inspections. Article VI of the BWC only provides for "any State Party to the Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council." Furthermore, the BWC also stipulates that "each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate to carry out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation." However, it should be noted that the Security Council has no standing investigative entity of its own.
The history of the Secretary-General's mechanism
The general mandate of the Secretary-General derives from the UN Charter. Article 99 stipulates that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. It is understood that under Article 99, the Secretary-General could conduct fact-finding missions.
During the late 1970s, allegations that chemical and toxin weapons had been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan were made. In 1980, the General Assembly, following yet another series of allegations, adopted for the first time a resolution1, calling upon the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation of such allegations with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts. The resolution authorized the experts designated by the Secretary-General to seek the necessary information from governments, international organizations as well as other sources, and to collect and examine evidence, including through on-site activities, with the consent of the States concerned.
The Secretary-General's mechanism to carry out prompt investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons was developed in the 1980s.
Within the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and following the reports that chemical weapons had been resorted to, experts assigned by the Secretary-General carried out investigations and concluded that such weapons had been used2. Consequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 620 (1988) condemning the use of chemical weapons and encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to the allegations of use. In 1987 and 1988, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to develop the technical guidelines to be applied for investigations with the assistance of the group of experts and to establish a roster of governmental experts and laboratories to be provided by Member States3.
The technical guidelines and procedures elaborated by the group of experts in 1989 were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in 19904. They cover, inter alia, how to ascertain the reports on alleged use; the preparation for and carrying out of the fact-finding mission and the technical relevant procedures, including for on-site and near-site investigations; the role of consultants, experts and laboratories, and the drafting and content of the investigation report. They also allow for a periodic review of the procedures as well as training to be made available by Member States. Several technical appendices were developed as part of the guidelines, including for the equipment to be used, model interview questionnaires for witnesses and/or victims and other questionnaires.
Since 1987, six investigations related to allegations of use of chemical weapons were carried out. Four of these investigations were carried out within the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Two investigation missions were carried out in 1992 in response to reports of alleged use of chemical weapons in Mozambique and Azerbaijan. No further investigations have been carried out under the mechanism since then.
Lessons learned from investigations
The designated experts for these missions effectively functioned as a team. The reports of the fact-finding missions conformed to an established format, methodology and modalities. The methodology of the investigations included:
(a) Interviews with government officials in order to obtain detailed information regarding the alleged use;
(b) Visits in order to examine evidence of weapons use and to collect samples for analysis in specialized laboratories;
(c) Clinical examinations and interviews with victims
Reinvigoration of the Mechanism
Following the entry into force of the CWC in 1997, investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons fall under the responsibility of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, in the case of alleged use of chemical weapons involving a State not Party to the CWC or in the territory not controlled by a State Party, the Organization would closely cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If so requested, the OPCW would put its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations5.
The investigation of allegations of use of biological weapons remains an almost uncharted area. Therefore, the current focus on updating the Secretary-General's mechanism is in the biological weapons area.
The absence of a dedicated inspection and verification agency for the BWC has been a source of concern for many Member States. Efforts to draw more attention to strengthening the Secretary-General's investigatory capability in the area of use of biological weapons have increased recently.
In 2004, the States Parties to the BWC recognized in the Report of the Meeting of States Parties that "the Secretary-General's investigation mechanism, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons."6
The UN Secretariat took the initiative to reinvigorate the Secretary-General's Mechanism by requesting Member States to submit names of experts and laboratories to be used in case of an investigation.
In September 2006, the General Assembly adopted the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy7, which specifically encouraged the Secretary-General to update the technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use as well as the roster of experts and laboratories.
The roster of experts and laboratories has since been continuously updated. For example, it currently comprises 96 biological experts from more than 50 countries and laboratories from some 30 countries. The roster incorporates key expertise, capabilities and skills required to conduct fact-finding missions and analyze samples taken during the missions.
An update of the technical guidelines and procedures was undertaken in 2007 by a group of experts from interested Member States and representatives of international organizations which resulted in revised technical appendices to the 1989 guidelines and procedures taking the advances in the biological area into account. The group of experts also recognized the potential role of the OPCW in the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons.
The findings of the group underlined the need for specialized training for the experts on the roster to be offered by Member States. The Government of Sweden in cooperation with the ODA, has now prepared and conducted for experts available to the United Nations Secretary-General, the first-ever training course On the Investigation of Chemical, Biological, Toxin Weapons Use from 25 May to 05 June 2009 in Umeâ, Sweden.
Funded by the Government of Sweden, the course was organized by the European Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Centre at the University of Umeâ, with the support and cooperation of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. These type training activities for experts on the Secretary-General's roster will increase the efficiency of the fact-finding team.
The ultimate objective for the efforts to reinvigorate the SGM is to create, based on the existing mandates, an effective and operational tool for investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. As the mechanism is impartial and draws upon the highest possible level of expertise and a cadre of trained experts, its value would be recognised by all Member States and the international community.
References:
- A/Res/35/144 C (1980)
- S/16433 (1984); S/17911 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 (summary of 1985 and 1986); S/18852 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (1987); S/19823 and Corr.1 and Add.1, S/20060 and Add.1, S/20063 and Add.1 and S/20134 (1988)
- S/Res 620 (1988); A/Res/43/74A; A/Res 45/57C;A/Res/44/115 B; A/Res/43/690
- A/Res/44/561 (1989) and A/RES/45/57 (1990)
- Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part XI,
Article E, para 27 and A/RES/55/283 (2001) -Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.23
- BWC/MSP/2004/3
- A/RES/60/288 (2006)
Ed. Note: ASA thanks Dr. Gabrielle Kraatz-Wadsack, a super scientist and most gracious lady for her time for this article.
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