(The following report has been slightly edited and adapted for available space by ASA)

A Report from the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism:

WORLD AT RISK: Biological Proliferation and Terrorism

Biological science and technology today transcend borders. The more that sophisticated capabilities, including genetic engineering and gene synthesis, spread around the globe, the greater the potential that terrorists will use them to develop biological weapons. The challenge for US policymakers is to prevent that potential from becoming a reality by keeping dangerous pathogens - and the equipment, technology, and know-how needed to weaponize them - out of the hands of criminals, terrorists, and proliferant states. The Commission believes that much more can be done to prevent biological weapons (BW) proliferation and terrorism - even as we recognize it is unrealistic to think that we can completely eliminate the possibility of misuse. Accordingly, we recommend a number of initiatives to enhance efforts at prevention, in addition to existing programs by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security to mitigate the consequences of a biological weapons attack.

Recommendation 1: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic and international measures to prevent bioterrorism:

conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens and press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to discuss the norms and safeguards necessary to keep dangerous pathogens out of the hands of terrorists and to ensure that the global revolution in the life sciences unfolds safely and securely.
develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities, which will assist in analyzing a biological or toxin agent that has been acquired by a proliferant state or terrorist group, and can clarify where a breach in laboratory security has occurred; and, lead a global assessment of biological threats and engage in targeted biological threat prevention programs in additional countries.
tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Despite the inherent safety and security risks associated with high containment laboratories, such facilities in the US are not specifically regulated; they become subject to federal oversight only if they are government-funded or possess pathogens and toxins on the Select Agent List. Thus many BSL-3 laboratories that work with dangerous but unlisted pathogens, such as the SARS virus, operate outside of federal regulation and indeed even federal knowledge of their existence.
promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences community. Members of the life sciences community-universities, medical and veterinary schools, nongovernmental biomedical research institutes, trade associations, and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies- must foster a bottom-up effort to sensitize researchers to biosecurity issues and concerns.
enhance the nation's capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties. Because the risk of bioterrorists using anthrax is real and the timeline for responding to an attack is extremely unforgiving, the US must make a concerted effort to improve its capabilities in this area. Although our mandate is to examine preventive measures, the Commission believes that a substantially greater effort is needed to develop and make operational a response plan that can counter an anthrax attack effectively. This plan would also help deter such an attack by significantly reducing its probability of success.

Recommendation 2: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism:

press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity and to discuss the norms and safeguards necessary to keep dangerous pathogens out of the hands of terrorists and to ensure that the global revolution in the life sciences unfolds safely and securely.
conduct global assessment of biosecurity risks and lead a global assessment of biological threat. Engage in targeted biological threat prevention programs in added countries.
strengthen global disease surveillance networks. Global networks for infectious disease surveillance can provide an "extended defense perimeter" for the US by making it possible to detect and contain outbreaks of contagious diseases, whether natural or human-caused, as close to their onset as possible.
propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention for adoption at the next review conference in 2011. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) constitutes a standard of international conduct that should be universally supported. The collapse of the BWC Protocol negotiations in 2001 left the Convention without a clear direction for future efforts, a political vacuum that has been only partially filled by annual intercessional meetings. To signal the political importance that the US attaches to preventing biological weapons proliferation and terrorism, the new administration should consider sending a senior-level official to address the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011.

Ed.Note: This is a good, well written, well meaning and generalist approach to the problems as noted above. ASA agrees with the recommendations, as outlined, except where the report implies Anthrax as a "mass casualty" producer. The inside the beltway gang just can not let that irresponsible, misleading connection go. Too many start up companies may go down the tubes if they do.

09-1, Issue no. 130

For the Professional in Government and Industry with an interest in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense, Disarmament and Verification; Emergency and Disaster Medical Planning; Industrial Health and Safety; and Environmental Protection