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Ed. Note: With pleasure we provide Dr. Medema's remarks on the 10th anniversary of the CWC. This Convention, the most comprehensive ever attempted, has been very successful with thanks to the leadership of Ambassador Pfirter and an outstanding staff that took on and very ably managed every challenge.The Academia Forum on the Occasion of the 10th Birthday of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)Jan MedemaOn 18 and 19 September about 200 participants gathered in The Hague to celebrate the tenth birthday of the CWC and to discuss how the baby has grown, what obstacles she would face in the coming ten years and what her future looked like. The keynote Speech was by the grand old man of chemical disarmament, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, also known for his role in UNSCOM. In his speech, taking place in the Ieper room in the OPCW building, he reminded the audience of some of the history of disarmament: the efforts after WW 1, the developments after WW2, and the 22 year negotiations in Geneva. Finally there was breakthrough because the US Reagan administration adopted the principle "trust but verify" and the former USSR (Gorbachev) demonstrated its willingness to get rid of the weapons by showing their CW arsenal in Shikany. The CWC was presented to the world in 1993 and ratified by 63 countries in 1997. In 2007, 182 nations are members of the OPCW. A few countries that matter, i.e., North Korea, Syria, Israel and Egypt are still missed, but the international community is working hard to make them members as well. This would make the CWC really universal. In 2007 1/3 of the CW declared stock has been destroyed. Even more when one would accept that incomplete destruction of CW stocks is no longer a viable Chemical Weapon. It is however the slow pace of the destruction, which is much more difficult and much more costly than anticipated, that forms the biggest threat to the CWC. If the nations do not meet the deadline of 2012 do we still have a treaty? Should we renegotiate the treaty opening up all other kinds of discussion points and discuss for another 22 years until a wise president comes along and says "trust but verify". Despite this dark cloud the CWC is clearly a success. Albania was announced as the first nation that has completed its CW destruction program. Although they may be in for some nasty surprises in the future (see elsewhere in this ASA Newsletter) who ever would have thought ten years ago that Albania would join the community of responsible states and abandon CW. Who would have thought that Libya would open his borders for inspection of its CW capability. It is clear that many of the former possessor states no longer have the political will and the military means to conduct Chemical Warfare. The threat of 100,000 tons of CW has been reduced to a few 100 tons in rogue states and kilograms in the hands of terrorist. Chemical Warfare has been reduced to incidents, which still could have devastating effects, especially from a psychological point of view if the protective shield is not maintained. As discussed in the 4 working groups another job for the teenage CWC is to reduce the possibilities for terrorist to acquire CW. Advances in science and technology might make life even more difficult. Already now, but most certainly in the future, it will be possible to synthesize complex very toxic chemicals which could be used as Chemical Weapons. Those chemicals fall under the multipurpose criterion of the CWC but are not on the schedules and therefore difficult to verify. Another advancing technology, nanotechnology may aid in the effective dissemination of agents making compounds that were thought to be not sufficiently stable suddenly a potential threat agent. Biotechnology is another well known trouble maker in this respect. One of the legal experts Barry Kellmann discussed the problem that the advances in science are so rapidly evolving that the law making, which was always somewhat behind, is simply to slow to deal with the problems. He suggested a licensing system together with reporting and inspections for all who want to do research in areas that may produce compounds that endanger life, illegal work in these areas would be a criminal activity. For those interested in his ideas Kellmann recently has published a book "Bioviolence". Because we do not live in a perfect world and because terrorist are difficult to stop my conclusion from the academia forum is:
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