The Keynote Address by Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The OPCW, to the The 5th Singapore International Symposium On Protection Against Toxic Substances (SISPAT)

The Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Convention Posed by Non-State Actors and the Need for International Cooperation

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter
Singapore, 27 November 2006

Ladies and gentlemen,

          It is an honour to once again have the opportunity to address the eminent scientists, engineers, medical specialists and other professionals from government, academia and industry gathered here for the Fifth Singapore International Symposium on Protection against Toxic Substances (SISPAT). The Symposium is being held in conjunction with the First International Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives Operations Conference. This new Conference is a very welcome, relevant and useful complement to SISPAT's deliberations. The Government of Singapore should be commended for its effective support of this important conference.

          I would also like to thank DSO National Laboratories and Applied Science and Analysis for this invitation to address SISPAT, which is an important date on our calendar. The issues discussed in this forum are of vital concern to the OPCW - the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

          As I am sure you are aware, we have a mandate to eliminate all existing chemical weapons, to prevent new weapons from being produced, and to promote peaceful chemistry. We also are tasked to help Member States to protect their vulnerable populations against chemical attack. If ever a Member State is attacked or perceives threat of chemical attack, the OPCW stands ready to provide assistance.

The OPCW is an international Organisation, created by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). When the Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997, the OPCW commenced operation as an independent watchdog agency that monitors compliance with the Convention. We are now engaged in verifiably eliminating an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. This is a unique achievement in the field of multilateral disarmament.

          The OPCW is a relatively young organisation. In the past nine years, our membership has more than doubled. We now number 180 countries and we expect to see new Member States in the coming months. This steady growth in our ranks and in the OPCW's programme delivery is due to the international community's firm support for the Convention. These countries fervently wish to establish a world free of chemical weapons, in which chemicals are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

          The Convention is a complex and uncompromising document. In brief, the development, production, transfer, possession and use of chemical weapons is banned for every single citizen of every State that joins the treaty. Forever. No exceptions. Any weapons that do exist must be destroyed under the OPCW's on-site monitoring. All of the production facilities must be shut down and either destroyed or converted to legitimate purposes.

          The treaty is forward-looking. Chemical industry is producing an ever broader variety of new compounds. If certain chemicals are produced or used in sufficient quantity, an inspection can be triggered. States Parties have declared over 6,400 chemical factories that produce such chemicals or use certain technologies.

          We will inspect relevant industrial activity for as long as this treaty stands. Our work is global in scale and is undertaken in every country where inspectable activity occurs without discrimination. To secure the weapons, we count each and every one of the 8 million items - some as small as a grenade to massive ton-sized containers. The former factories have all been inactivated and we check routinely to make sure that these facilities can never again produce chemical weapons. Over 87% of these facilities have been destroyed or converted.

          Six countries have declared chemical weapons. All of these weapons are now secured and ready for destruction. By locking down the weapons, we have already reduced the risk of chemical attack considerably.

          The rest of the job requires an historical effort to safely and expeditiously get rid of 7 million kilograms of the world's most poisonous substances. About 1.5 million kilograms have been destroyed. The remaining 80% must be eliminated by 2012. It is a massive undertaking, yet, with a clear political will and focussed action, it can and must be done.

          Total destruction relieves us of a burden that has weighed upon the world for a half a century. This achievement offers hope for coming generations and improves our security significantly.

          Today, and in future, we will need to be certain that new weapons cannot be produced. About 98% of the relevant chemical industry now falls within the borders of the States party to the Convention. This broad coverage does provide some assurance that chemical weapons will not proliferate. Maximum assurance depends entirely upon each State Party's own perseverance in national implementation.

          About 40% of the OPCW's membership has legislation and measures in place that would allow authorities to detect, pursue, prosecute and punish a crime. They are able to identify industrial activity that requires declaration, and in some cases inspection. Finally, these authorities cooperate trans-nationally to be able to pursue a crime.

          At the moment, the OPCW is systematically closing the gaps among the remainder of the membership - country by country and law by law. We have a very clear success criterion- 100% effective legislation.

          Since 2003, we are implementing an Action Plan and a follow-up strategy. Now well over 100 countries have begun the exacting job of anchoring the Convention in the law of their land.

          Our effort to achieve effective implementation of this tough treaty meshes very smoothly with the UN's own effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. In its resolution 1540, all U.N. Member States are obligated to install the measures that the Chemical Weapons Convention foresees. This obligatory action applies to all nations, whether they have joined or have thus far remained outside the Convention.

          Together with the United Nations, the OPCW will create a safety net of prohibitions in the chemical field that can reliably constrain criminals' and terrorists' attempt to make or use chemical weapons.

          An important part of that safety net can be seen in our non-proliferation work: we travel the globe to make sure that the weapons are entirely destroyed and to be certain that toxic chemicals are used for legitimate purposes. In over 140,000 inspector days, our inspectors have conducted more than 2,600 inspections at over 1,000 sites around the world.

          When we verify compliance, we are constantly aware of a significant challenge: science and technology are advancing swiftly. At the same time, the global trade and manufacture of chemicals is developing at a fast rate. The OPCW must be able to adapt to these changes so that the verification regime can prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and the materials to make them.

          This challenge has become much more urgent since non-state actors have acquired the ability to inflict mass casualties. They must not be allowed access to these toxic compounds.

          We are all well aware that toxic chemical compounds can be acquired throughout the world. The know-how to produce simple chemical weapons has been known for decades and is widely available.

          The consequences of an attack with toxic chemicals could have gruesome, if not catastrophic, consequences, as everyone in this room is aware. Every State must establish the means to prevent such prohibited activity. We also must put in place the preventive measures needed to deal with such eventualities.

          Recently, the United Nations' General Assembly adopted its Global Strategy for Counter-Terrorism. That Strategy calls upon the OPCW to cooperate within its organizational mandate with U.N. Member States, in order to prevent chemical terrorism.

          We all have a duty to prevent such a catastrophe. The Convention now gives us the means to address the threat of chemical terrorism, by working effectively together in all regions and with all nations.

          We will not fulfil that duty if we do not instil a deep and unshakeable renunciation of poison weapons among the young. The next generation of scientists, engineers, and business people must never hesitate to prevent a determined criminal from making and using these weapons.

          The Convention cooperation with the science, to that end it foresees to established Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), working instrumental with International Applied Chemistry (IAC). This technical board provides advice to the Director-General on role of science, and also plays a crucial part in helping to keep track in development in the field of chemistry in general, and more particularly of those of a direct relevance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

          Moreover, due to the possible emergence of a new agents, and development in the science and technology, that has a large impact on the production technologies, verification, and methodology.

          Additional area, is the promotion of a greater commitment on the part of the scientific community exclusive use of chemistry for the peaceful purposes, and support of international peace and security.

          In that context, with involvement of the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), together with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, the OPCW is pursuing a chemical education and outreach project. We seek to establish general ethical principles and a code of conduct for the scientific community dealing with chemistry. The Code of Ethics is meant to become part of the university and post-graduate curricula in chemistry. uses of chemistry.

          Future generations must be fully aware of their responsibilities as scientists and engineers when dealing with materials that could present a danger to humankind. Scientists must establish norms that will stand the test of time and will anchor the chemical weapons ban in the consciousness of all those that deal with these materials.

          The emerging threats associated with non-state actor's use of chemical weapons have created a renewed interest in the OPCW's coordination of emergency assistance to States Parties. We act when an attack on a State Party is threatened or actually occurs. We are working purposefully to strengthen this capacity.

          National protection capacity and international cooperation are the core principles that underpin the OPCW's response to the risk of chemical attack.

          The OPCW is committed to address threats to peace and security. These threats call for rapid and coordinated responses at the national, regional, and international levels. The Article X which consists of Assistance and Protection has a remarkable role in this commitment. Assistance and protection is an indispensable part of the Convention:

          All States Parties have an abiding duty to protect the vulnerable for as long as chemical weapons exist. We all must be prepared to respond effectively because some States remain outside the Convention. We must be diligent in monitoring implementation and compliance due to the risk of non-state actors' access to these materials.

          In case of need, the OPCW will swiftly dispatch experts and equipment to determine the type of chemicals used, the extent of the support required and to coordinate all of the in-coming assistance that will be provided.

          The OPCW is also mandated to undertake an Investigation of Alleged Use. The procedures we employ allow for the acquired samples' use as evidence in court to prosecute perpetrators of such crimes.

          Through international cooperation, the OPCW can help to strengthen national protective capacity. We provide basic and specialized training to first responders so that any attack's consequences can be managed competently.

          Those consequences, as I mentioned, could involve mass casualties. An effective international response capability is absolutely essential if we are to be prepared for large-scale incidents. The OPCW Member States hold multi-national field exercises to test and raise our readiness to mount a major assistance operation.

          For instance in October 2005, we conducted the field exercise Joint Assistance together with the UN-OCHA, NATO and Ukraine. Joint Assistance brought to the field over 1,000 participants and a full complement of detection, decontamination and laboratory testing expertise and materiel.

          This exercise and more recently held in 2006 in Finland focused on a scenario in which terrorists acquire and use of chemical warfare agent and toxic chemiclas to cause mass causalities.

          Synergies and close coordination are essential in this important area, as we saw recently when the OPCW took part in an important exercise in Kankaanpaa, Finland.

          The exercise 2006 in Finland, took place under the aegis of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, participants from the OPCW joined forces with officials from the World Health Organisation, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, and several countries that are also States Parties, to hone skills, compare notes, and in fine work to be better prepared for emergencies.

          Our experience shows that coordinated international cooperation can provide the needed relief. The prerequisite for a successful operation is commitment: Member States need to provide the right resources at the right time and in the right place.

          Since the treaty entered into force in 1997, we have been delivering concrete assistance to over 2,300 first responders and civil defense experts to support national chemical weapons defense. The OPCW will continue to deliver that support.

          The OPCW has provided expert support for the development and improvement of national capabilities in assistance and protection against chemical weapons. Colombia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Palau, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Uruguay have recently benefited from courses the Secretariat has offered.

          After three years of intensive cooperation and joint work with the States Parties in Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met to assess, with Norway and Switzerland as sponsoring States Parties, the results of a phased programme of national and regional capacity-building.

          The OPCW has recently made an initial technical-assistance visit to Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru to make assessment of the national emergency response system elements for the purpose of expert advice on problems related to emergency response. The Secretariat will be looking forward to following up on these courses next year.

          The OPCW has organised jointly with the Governments of the host nations, international assistance and protection courses for training of first responders in Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Republic of Korea, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland, and I wish to extend our sincere thanks to these States Parties for their invaluable cooperation.

          The number of requests from the Member States continues to increase since the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Six Member States requested expert advice in 2004; 13 in 2005; and 25 till to date. The Member States are becoming more aware of the fact that their current national response plans do not take into account the possible use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

          The increasing demands from Member States for technical assistance to develop their individual and sometimes regional capacities against chemical weapons are clear indicators of the renewed sense of priority that they are giving to Article X.

          The growing number of assistance and protection programmes also indicates a steadily growing interest in the role of the OPCW as a credible provider of highly specialised skills. We will continue, to the best of our abilities and in accordance with the limited resources available to us, to provide this support to Member States.

          Protection is also dependent upon the Convention's universality: we will have a much greater assurance that chemical weapons use will be prevented when all States are Òon boardÓ. At the moment, we have 14 States Parties that have yet to ratify or accede to the CWC.

          Today, I believe we all share the very serious concern that undeclared stockpiles may be located on the territory of States that have not joined the Convention. That means that these States have not formally renounced their use, their manufacture, possession and transfer. It also means that we cannot inspect, and verify that the stockpiles, wherever they may exist, are secured and verifiable destruction is their next destination.

          In particular, we focus our attention on North Korea and the Middle East. These weapons are illegal and their use is reviled. Even retaliatory use is prohibited. It is simply illusory to believe that chemical weapons can be retained as a feasible military deterrent. A nation that respects international law cannot conscience the use of these weapons.

          To achieve universal membership, we help every country prepare for membership. To meet our goal of 100% effective national implementation, we provide every Member State the training and expertise needed to autonomously implement the treaty. The Member States have a right to expect effective support whenever required. In return, the Convention requires their resolve to apply the chemical weapons ban.

          In concluding, I wish to stress that international cooperation is the best and most responsible means we have to respond to the threat of chemical attack by any person or group, criminal or terrorist.

          Thank you very much.