John Hart is an ASA Correspondent for Science and Technology and a CBW researcher with the SIPRI in Solna, Sweden. 

Russia’s Presidency of the 2006 G8 Summit
• Setting the Agenda •

by John Hart, SIPRI*

          On 20-22 April Russia’s Center for Policy Studies (PIR Center) organized and hosted in Moscow the conference: “G8 Global Security Agenda: Challenges & Interests. Towards the St.-Petersburg Summit.” Its purpose was to provide a forum for government officials, academics, international organizations, and other interested parties to debate the next G8 summit’s agenda (the G8 will next meet in St. Petersburg on 15-17 July). The conference, which was “on the record” and was attended by members of the press, also provided an opportunity for various officials to exchange views at the margins, including, for example, with respect to concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities. Approximately 220 participants from some 27 countries and 6 international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), attended. Participants included Deputy Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council N. N. Spassky, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei I. Kisliak, Germany’s Deputy Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament Rüdiger Lüdeking, and Ambassador Ali Ashgar Soltanieh -- Iran’s permanent representative to the UN and other international organizations in Vienna, including to the IAEA.

            The conference topics were selected and organized according to the areas that Russia has indicated that it would like the forthcoming summit to focus on. These are: (a) ensuring global energy security, (b) improving efforts to fight infectious diseases, and (c) improving the quality and effectiveness of national education systems and professional training. In addition, it has indicated that issues connected to counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, finance and trade, the development of the global economy, and protection of the environment should be considered. Finally, Russia has continued to indicate that its two main domestic non-proliferation priorities under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction are chemical weapon (CW) destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines

            The conference considered general international security challenges, biological safety and security, CW destruction in Russia, education and international cooperation, energy and international security, improving control and transparency in the field of small arms transfers, multilateral approaches to controlling the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear submarine dismantlement, protection of critical infrastructure, reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapon-usable materials and improving nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPCA), and security and development challenges in Central Asia and the Middle East. Although the meeting concluded by considering various policy proposals, the organizers did not issue a consolidated policy recommendations document.

            The consideration of biological matters was largely confined to disease preparedness and response which are broadly the same irrespective of whether an outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberate. Preventive measures against bioterrorism have included efforts to improve human and physical security at sensitive facilities and to consolidate highly dangerous pathogens at a limited number of more secure facilities. Within some contexts, discussions in Russia that cover both “biosecurity” and “biosafety” have not always been possible (the Russian word “biobezopasnost’” can mean either).

            Thus by focusing on “biosafety,” possible sensitivities associated with current or past biodefence programs in Russia can be avoided. There is also no implementing agreement between Russia and the United States in the biological area under the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Therefore, the US has cooperated with the ISTC for implementing international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance (INDA) projects in this area.

            The current status of Russia’s chemical weapon (CW) destruction program and international assistance was also reviewed. It was emphasized that the construction of all chemical weapon destruction facilities (CWDFs) must be completed by 2009 in order for Russia to be able to destroy its CW stockpile by 29 April 2012 and thus remain in compliance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations. The European Union is currently finalizing its 2007-13 budget which should include a line item for Russian CW destruction assistance. It was also noted that CW destruction has been one of the main successes of the Global Partnership program. Of the seven CW storage sites, destruction operations of the Gorny stockpile are essentially complete and destruction operations at Kambarka are underway.

            The nuclear field was perhaps the most important and difficult topic, largely due to developments in recent years that have placed increased strain on the main international arms control and disarmament instrument against nuclear weapons, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Partly as a result, there is significant international support for the view that no state -- with the exception of the “P-5,” the officially designated nuclear weapon possessors under the NPT -- should possess a complete nuclear fuel cycle. A number of proposals have therefore continued to be considered on how to preserve the right of the non-nuclear weapon states to have access to sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle elements for peaceful purposes that are under the control of an agreed multilateral mechanism. Much of this discussion has been conducted under the heading of “energy security.” Among the specific proposals raised at the conference was an idea to construct floating nuclear reactors aboard specially-designed ships that could then periodically set sail to various states wishing to use them. Ambassador Soltanieh issued a statement on global security threats in the field of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons that included a review of Iran’s implementation of the NPT to date. Several lively exchanges took place throughout the conference on this issue.

            It is likely that every issue that the participants of the G8 summit will consider has already been thoroughly analyzed by various bodies and individuals. Russia can maximize the chances for achieving a useful summit outcome partly by arranging the various overlapping agenda issues and statements according to the broad structure it has already set forth. The value of the summit will also partly depend on how well the participants are able to develop a focused political statement that, by virtue of having been endorsed by the leaders of the G8 countries, will automatically (and importantly) enjoy support at the highest political level. However, to be fully effective, this political commitment must also be integrated with the operational-level challenges of the programs and initiatives that the G8 states have put in place in order to fulfill their various commitments. Not infrequently, operational-level challenges can only be overcome if the key difficulties are clearly identified and passed up to the higher political level for resolution. Such a process will need to continue between summits, perhaps at the ministerial level. Finally, most of the broader international security challenges have no clear short-term solution and can only be constructively addressed through a process of sustained, longterm engagement by -- to borrow from the diplomat’s hand-book -- “the most interested parties.”

            The conference reports are available at URL <http://pircenter.org/index.php?id=105>.

* The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of SIPRI.