|
For the Professional in Government, Industry and
Academia with an interest in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense,
Disarmament and Verification; Chemical and Biological Terrorism; Emergency
and Disaster Medical Planning; Industrial Health and Safety; and Environmental
Protection.
ASA 06-1, Issue No. 112, February 24, 2006
|
(The below listed sampling of the over 110 CBMTS VI Abstracts received are provided to give the reader an idea of the breath and depth of presentations. Only the presenting author is listed.)
CBMTS VI, SPIEZ LABORATORY
Abstracts of Papers for Presentation: A Sampling
Spiez, Switzerland 30 April to 05 May 2006
1. Planning for Pandemic ‘Flu’:
An Organisational Perspective
Dr. Brian J Davey, M.D., Head Health and Safety, OPCW, Den Haag, Netherlands
There is growing international concern regarding the potential for a flu pandemic originating from the H5N1 avian flu serotype. Medical and veterinary public health authorities are essential players in prevention efforts. Should a pandemic occur, primary medical care providers will play a crucial role in diagnosis and treatment. The possibility exists, however, that traditional preventive and responsive resources may be inadequate and/or overwhelmed.
Full Article
|
(The following article from ASA 04-1 is edited and reprinted because of its relevance to information being released on Saddam and his views on his WMD and on terrorists’ activities in general)
The what, where, when, why, who of Iraq WMD
The Other Side of the Question:
A Side Not Answered
Based on information available to the UN inspection teams in the early 90's after the ’91 Gulf War, comprehensive inventories of Iraq’s known weapons caches, as well as known weapons materials, were developed. These inventories were then thoroughly cross-checked with known imports of materials and what these materials would produce. Subtracted from these inventory totals were the CW weapon and agent totals of the UN destruction programs, as well as the totals involved in Iraq’s infamous use of CW against theIranians and the
and the Kurds.
Full Article
|
Agro-Terrorism: A Scenario Based Case Study for Brazil
by Dr. Guilherme G. Santana, National Petroleum Agency, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Dr. Alexandre Rands, Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil
The use of chemical or biological weapons (CBW) targeting crops or livestock is not new. States around the world have developed capabilities for this purpose and there are recorded allegations, threats and confirmed incidents of deliberate use of CBW to destroy pre-harvest crops or livestock in all continents of the globe (some well-known “incidents” between 1915 and 2000 can be found at “Chronology of CBW Attacks Targeting Crops & Livestock 1915 — 2000” - http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/agchron.htm).
These attacks obviously had the intention to cause economic damage. Table 1 (pg. 20) displays States that have developed or are suspected of developing biological agents with anti-livestock or anti-crop properties (although zoonotic agents can infect both livestock and humans).
Full Article |
an inside look at ASA 06-1
| The Professional Library |
2 |
| CBMTS VI: Update |
3 |
| CBMTS VI Sponsors |
6 |
The JMCBR: annual update |
7 |
| The BioScience Review |
9 |
| Dr. Doctor named Meritorius Executive |
9 |
| Science highlights serious flaw at State |
13 |
| 5th SISPAT |
14 |
| DHS: CSAC - a new center |
14 |
| ON THE STREET |
15 |
| International China Biopharmaceutical Symposium (ICBPS) |
15 |
| Biological Espionage: A review |
21 |
| Medical Aspects of CB Terrorism |
22 |
| EPA/Battelle Design Test System |
23 |
| GAO reports |
24 |
| Focal Point News: The ASA/CBMTS family |
25 |
| NATO: Solving a serious problem |
27 |
| Industry Notes |
28 |
| Recent Contracts |
29 |
| BioScope‘06 |
32 |
|
|