Ed.Note: John Hart of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is well noted and respected as a researcher and analyst across the full spectrum of CBNRE. He is a member of the CBMTS and an ASA Correspondent for Science and Technology.

Russia’s Chemical Weapon Destruction Program:
an Update

by John Hart
SIPRI*

           Russia has the largest declared chemical weapon (CW) stockpile, consisting of approximately 40 000 agent metric tons of which about 4 percent have been destroyed to date. The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) provides the main impetus for destroying the stockpile since it requires the States Parties to the CWC to destroy any CW stockpiles that they may possess no later than 29 April 2012.

          Since the CWC's entry into force in 1997, Russia has not always given CW destruction sufficient priority in order to overcome bureaucratic, financial and other obstacles to ensure that a comprehensive CW destruction plan is adopted and implemented. In mid-2005, however, a number of developments occurred which show a renewed and focused effort to resolve operational-level difficulties. For example, at the June 2005 Russian CW destruction donors’ meeting in The Hague, Russia provided the most comprehensive and detailed presentation of its program to date, while on 24 October 2005 Russia released a revised CW destruction plan that contained further details.

          Finally, Russia's two main domestic non-proliferation priorities under the 2002 G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) are (a) CW destruction and (b) the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. In May 2005 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Efimovich Fradkov sent the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, an official letter stating that CW destruction is Russia's main priority.

Destruction plan and organization

          The current legal basis for the destruction of CW in Russia is the country's law of ratification to the CWC and the 1996 comprehensive CW destruction plan which was most recently modified in 2005.

          The body responsible for implementing Russia's CW destruction program is the Federal Agency for Industry, headed by B. S. Alyeshin, which also serves as Russia's National Authority to the CWC. Colonel-General Viktor Ivanovich Kholstov, Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for Industry, is responsible for CW destruction matters, including destruction assistance. Security at CW facilities is provided by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which also has public information officers stationed in the various regions where CW are located. Another key organization involved with CW destruction is the Federal Directorate on Safety, Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons, currently headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences Lieutenant-General Valery Petrovich Kapashin. This body has the main responsibility for the safe operation of CW storage and destruction facilities. A fourth body is the Chemical Disarmament Commission, which is headed by Sergei Kirienko and reports to the president's office. The commission has representatives at the seven storage facilities. Two or three advisers from the now disbanded Munitions Agency work in the Office of the Prime Minister. They follow CWC implementation and Russian CW destruction issues and facilitate CW-related work requiring the attention of Office of the Prime Minister and the Federal Agency for Industry. Finally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs plays an important role, partly by interacting with the OPCW and by sending representatives to meetings where Russian CW destruction assistance matters are considered.

Stockpile

          Russia's declared CW stockpile is located at seven sites: Gorny (Saratov oblast), Kambarka (Udmurt Republic), Kizner (Udmurt Republic), Leonidovka (Penza oblast), Maradikovsky (Kirov oblast), Pochep (Bryansk oblast) andShchuch'ye (Kurgan oblast). Some 7500 tonnes of the original declared stockpile consist of blister agents, sulfur mustard, lewisite and sulfur mustard-lewisite mixtures, and are/were located in bulk storage containers at Gorny and Kambarka. The remainder of the stockpile consists of three organophosphorus nerve agents - sarin, soman and V-type gas and are stored in approximately 4-4.5 million munitions.

Destruction technology

          Russia will destroy its organophosphorus nerve agents using a technology based on a two-stage, neutralization-based process developed by the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT). Other Russian enterprises are also involved in further developing and implementing the technologies, including the State Institute for Technology of Organic Synthesis (GITOS) and many other institutes.

          The destruction of G-agents (sarin and soman) essentially consists of neutralization of the agent by monoethanolamine (MEA) in the presence of water at a temperature of approximately 110°C. During the second step, the reaction mass is mixed with bitumen and calcium hydroxide heated to a temperature of approximately 135°C. The destruction of V-agents involves an initial reaction with a reagent called RD-4. The reagent, whose composition is a proprietary secret, will be added to the CW agent fill resulting in an autocatalytic reaction that will continue until the CW agent is largely consumed. After possible post-treatment with additional reagent, the reaction mass will then mixed with bitumen heated to approximately 135°C. The bitumenized final products will then be placed inside special containers for long-term storage.

          Russia will implement a single-step hydrolysis destruction method for all non-organophosphorus nerve agents to be followed by high-temperature “thermal” treatment of the munition bodies and associated dunnage (packing and handling materials). It will destroy lewisite using a sodium hydroxide (NaOH) in a water solution. The residual salts remaining after the evaporation process will be placed in long-term storage. Russia has indicated that it remains interested in extracting and purifying arsenic from lewisite hydrolysis products for use on the civilian market. However, it has yet to do so, probably at least in part because of the expense and effort involved in the purification of arsenic and questions regarding the profitability of such a venture. Sulfur mustard and sulfur mustard/lewisite mixtures will be neutralized using MEA.

          None of Russia's CW munitions have fuzes or burster charges. The munition bodies will be first decontaminated using the various chemicals described above and then decontaminated through high-temperature “thermal treatment.” Russia plans to sell or reuse the decontaminated scrap metal.

Destruction operations

          As of mid-2005, Russia had destroyed 330 024 unfilled CW munitions and devices (i.e., burster charges) (located at Leonidovka, Maradikovsky, Pochep and Shchuch'ye) and 3844 CW munitions filled with phosgene (10.6 agent tonnes). Large-scale destruction operations are currently taking place at Gorny only. As of November 2005, destruction operations at Kambarka were expected to start by the end of the year, while the start of destruction operations at Maradikovsky was expected to be delayed by several months (see tables 1, 2).

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Table 1. Scheduled start of operations of CWDFs and their capacity

Source: “Changes to be included in the Special Federal Program Destruction of Chemical Weapons in the Russian Federation, approved by Resolution no. 305, dated 21 March 1996, for the Russian Federation,” Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 639, 24 Oct. 2005 (in Russian); and author's compilation.

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Table 2. Planned schedule of CW destruction

Source: “Changes to be included in the Special Federal Program Destruction of Chemical Weapons in the Russian Federation, approved by Resolution no. 305, dated 21 March 1996, for the Russian Federation,” Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 639, 24 Oct. 2005 (in Russian).

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Assistance

          Russia's revised CW destruction plan puts the total cost of the program at 160.4 billion roubles (approx. $5.6 billion)and states that the total amount of international financial and technical assistance required will be 34.2 billion roubles (approx. $1.186 billion). The plan also estimates that up to 0.6 billion roubles (approx. $21 million) can be recovered by reusing destruction by by-products such as purified arsenic and decontaminated scrap metal.

          Russia has requested that at least 25-33 per cent of the total cost of its CW destruction program be covered by outside assistance and has indicated that outside assistance has covered approximately 7 per cent of the total cost. This implies that Russia would like to see the overall level of assistance increased by a factor of at least 2-3.

          Most CW destruction assistance to Russia is provided (a) through the US CTR program or (b) by the EU Member States through various procedures and mechanisms. The countries or entities that have provided or plan to provide assistance are Canada, the Czech Republic, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. The USA has, to date, provided the bulk of the destruction assistance, while most other assistance has come from EU Member States.

          Coordination of Russian CW destruction assistance includes: (a) Global Partnership coordination efforts, (b) Non-proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (NDCI) meetings, (c) regular Russian CW destruction assistance donor meetings in The Hague, (d) the Shchuch'ye Coordinating Working Group, (e) Russian—US executive review meetings (as part of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, (f) EU CODUN meetings and (g) ad hoc bilateral and multilateral contacts among interested states.

          The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was established by the G8 in 2002 at a summit held in Kananaskis, Canada. Participation in international cooperation for nonproliferation and disarmament assistance, including for Russian CW desruction assistance, was subsequently extended to include a number of other interested states. The NDCI, which was launched in 2001, consists essentially of periodic meetings of donors, potential recipients and invited guests who present information summarizing key aspects of the status of their national efforts inter alia to improve nuclear security, to ensure that biological expertise is not misused, to take into account export control-related matters and to review the status of CW destruction efforts. Russian CW destruction assistance donor meetings are held in The Hague four times per year and are timed to coincide during the period in which the OPCW Executive Council meets.

          The Shchuch’ye Coordinating Working Group consists of representatives of Canada, Russia, the UK and the USA who meet about four times per year to consult on CW destruction assistance matters pertaining to Shchuch’ye. Finally, EU donor countries also consider the status of Russian CW destruction assistance programs at meetings of the EU General Affairs Council’s Committee on Disarmament in the United Nations (CODUN). The meetings, which are held in Brussels, are attended by European arms control and disarmament officials in order to improve the coordination of EU policies in this area.

          Donor states and Russia have continued to discuss a relatively small number of assistance implementation issues, including Russian responsiveness to information requests, and access, liability and taxation issues. In the past, donor states have felt that they have received insufficient information of Russia's final CW destruction plan, including what specific assistance is desired. However, in 2005 there appeared to be significant movement to resolve funders’ basic desire for more specific information about the CW destruction program elements that, in turn, generated a degree of momentum. In principle, Russia will be able and willing to allocate at least 70 per cent of the cost of its CW destruction program.

          A major difficulty that has been identified by the Russian side is the fact that most assistance has been allocated on an annual basis. This, according to Russian officials, significantly complicates Russian CW destruction planning.

          Finally, it is important that the various political and technical aspects connected with the provision of CW destruction assistance be periodically and systematically considered by those involved in developing and implementing such programs. While an understanding of operational-level detail is needed, it is also important to ensure that difficulties in operational detail are not confused with problems that have fundamental policy implications.

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of SIPRI.