ASA is pleased to provide the following CBMTS-Ind IV abstracts:

The CBMTS-Industry IV

“Third World Congress on Chemical, Biological and
Radiological Terrorism”

Dubrovnik, Croatia, 17-23 September 2005
Selected Abstracts:

• Pretreatment and Medical Therapy of Nerve-agent Intoxication

Pål Aas and Trond Myhrer
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Protection Division,
PO Box 25, NO-2027 Kjeller, Norway

          Prophylaxis and medical treatment are important in the protection against injuries induced by nerve agents. Following exposure there is a need for both immediate therapy as well as subsequent therapy given by medical emergency personnel if prophylaxis and initial treatment are insufficient. In a recent study, rats were challenged with relativelyhigh doses of soman (3-5xLD50, s.c.) without pre-treatment. The purpose was to examine the efficacy of autoinjectors with adequate anticonvulsant effects and autoinjectors with inadequate anticonvulsant effects followed by adjunct therapy. Additionally, anticonvulsant effects of the adjunct therapy alone were examined when given at an early stage after soman exposure. The results showed that combined i.m. injections of HI-6 (42 mg/kg), atropine (14 mg/kg), and avizafone (3 mg/kg) administered 1, 16, and 31 min after exposure to a soman dose of 4xLD50 completely terminated seizures (25% mortality rate). Animals challenged with 5xLD50 of soman all died within 10 min. When avizafone was deleted from a similar administration of autoinjectors, seizures induced by 3 or 4xLD50 of soman could not be terminated unless an adjunct therapy consisting of procyclidine (6 mg/kg), diazepam (10 mg/kg), and pentobarbital (30 mg/kg) was given. The mortality rate was high (78%). Administration of the adjunct therapy alone 6-16 min after 4xLD50 of soman stopped the seizure activity, but animals died within 24 h. Marked neuropathology was found in piriform cortex and amygdala, whereas the hippocampal CA1 field was effectively protected when both adequate and inadequate initial treatment plus adjuncts had stopped seizures 35-55 min after onset. Termination of soman-induced seizures at an early stage is crucial to avoid neuronal pathology.

• Antibiotic Resistance and Anthrax

Robert M. DeBell
The Titan Corporation,
11955 Freedom Drive, Reston Virginia 20190, U.S.A.

           Bacillus anthracis caused 5 deaths among 11 inhalational infections and 11 cutaneous infections during the U.S. attack in 2001. On April 2nd, 1979, an accidental release of a few milligrams of a weaponized preparation of B. anthracis took place over the city of Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union (FSU). This release, causing approximately 68 deaths, was sourced to a local military compound producing an anthrax agent to be used in the U.S.S.R. offensive program. For each of these situations, patients and exposed individuals were treated with antibiotics. Although it is not possible to determine the benefit to those individuals exposed, it is reasonable that such actions did reduce the number of infections and probable deaths. If the particular strains of B. anthracis that caused these incidents were resistant to the antibiotics employed, the numbers of infections and deaths would have likely increased. Because antibiotic resistance is easily achieved with genetic engineering, it is reasonable that an attack with antibiotic-resistant B. anthracis is feasible. The potential for increased casualties has been calculated using information about actual cases during the U.S. attacks; moreover, it is estimated that only ~70% of the infections can be prevented even with mass distribution of antibiotics within six days of initial exposure. The results of this analysis demonstrate that approximately twice as many infections might have occurred without the use of effective antibiotics, but that this result is subject to several factors including age, host susceptibility, and the numbers of spores inhaled. With the potential for engineered resistance to the latest generation of antibiotics, it is apparent that new clinical treatments may be needed to manage a potential BW attack with B. anthracis.

• Modeling of Biological Weapon Agents
Dispersion in a Bioterrorism Incident

Vladimir P. Resheti
Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research of Belarus,
Sosny-Minsk, 220109, Belarus

           A number of factors are said to favor the acquisition of biological weapons by terrorists, particularly by comparison with other weapons of mass destruction. These factors are related to the extreme toxicity of many biological agents. The small quantities of biological agents needed to cause the lethality, difficulty of their detection by traditional biosensor systems makes them very attractive for terrorists. This analysis presents the results of a computer modeling of the dispersion of the dangerous bacteria, which cause plague, Q fever, and tularemia, in a typical 50-story, high-rise building after an intentional release during a bioterrorist incident. The model simulates aerosol dispersion in the case of intensive, small-scale convection which equalizes the concentration of over the premises volumes. The model can be used to predict the time interval required for bacteria dispersion throughout a building after a terrorist attack in a high-rise building. The analysis reveals that an aerosol release of even a relatively small volume of bacteria during a terrorist incident has the potential to quickly distribute concentrations that are infectious throughout the building.

• Natural Toxins — Review, Recent Developments and Risks

P. Gopalakrishnakone
Venom and Toxin Research Programme,
Faculty of Medicine, National University of Singapore

           The BTW Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stock piling of biological and toxin weapons and on their destruction has listed the following toxins, bacteriotoxins (Botulinum toxin, clostridium perfringen toxins, staphylococcal enterotoxis, shigatoxins), phycotoxins (Anatoxins, ciguatoxins, saxitoxins), mycotoxins (trichothecene toxins), phytotoxins, (abrins, ricins) and zootoxins (Bungarotoxins). The biological aspects, biochemical characterizations and medical concerns about these toxins will be presented. Due to the recent surge in life sciences and biomedical sciences with more sophisticated technologies, many peptides and proteins are being reported daily. Improved synthetic methods of peptides make it possible to produce large quantities of peptides, in addition drug delivery systems are also developed to deliver peptides, orally as well as transdermally. These technologies and methodologies should be carefully controlled. The presentation also will review the new toxins as well as lethal toxins such as brevotoxins, conotoxins and other neurotoxins which should be controlled but without limiting the academic research.

 


For the Professional in Government and Industry with an interest in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense, Disarmament and Verification; Emergency and Disaster Medical Planning; Industrial Health and Safety; and Environmental Protection


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