Ed.Note: Captain René Pita is a professor at the Spanish Military NBC Defense School and a toxicologist with the Joint Assessment Team (JAT) - NATO Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion (NRF-5).

Al-Qa`ida and the Chemical Threat

René Pita, Ph.D.

           After the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the US there has been a perception that the risk of possible attacks with chemical or biological weapons, especially by groups associated with the al-Qa`ida terrorist network, is high. Surprisingly, the risk perception was higher than after the 1994 and 1995 sarin attacks in Japan, when a chemical warfare agent caused a large number of casualties. However, the mailing of letters containing anthrax spores, accompanied by images of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers, have increased the concern about chemical and biological attacks. This paper aims to analyze information from open sources about the possible use of chemical weapons by groups affiliated with or linked to the al-Qa`ida terrorist network

The al-Qa`ida manual, "Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants." Note the drawing of the sword through the globe with the text "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants."

Pre-9/11 Incidents

          • The first incident, interestingly, comes from the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center as it is sometimes claimed that cyanide was incorporated in the bomb. The mastermind of the attack was Ramzi Yousef, who fought in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union and was arrested on 7 February 1995 in Peshawar (Pakistan) while staying at an Usama bin Ladin guest house [1]. Although the terrorists had cyanide salt in their possession, cyanide was never detected in the attack. A detailed study of this incident also leads to the conclusion that the agent was not used [2].
          • Two publications, an al-Qa`ida manual and the al-Qa`ida encyclopedia, were discovered in 2000 [3]. These publications include chapters that deal with chemical and biological weapons, like the so-called “cookbooks” that are popular in “amateur terrorist” circles [4]. The manual was discovered by Manchester police in the UK, and the encyclopedia was found during a raid by Jordanian police on an Islamist cell that was planning attacks in Israel and Jordan.
          • The Daily Telegraph reported that six Algerians were arrested in February 2001 while planning to release sarin in the European Parliament building in Strasbourg, although no actual evidence of sarin was found [5]. Also in February 2001, The Daily Telegraph reported that British police foiled a plot involving sarin against the London underground [6]. Once again there was no evidence of the actual presence of the nerve agent.
          • Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian arrested by US authorities for carrying explosives which he intended to use in a bombing against the Los Angeles International Airport, explained in court in July 2001 that he had been trained in Afghan camps on how to prepare and use hydrogen cyanide [7]. He was told to release it near the air intake vents of buildings and had even participated in live training exercises using dogs.
          • Soon after the 9/11 attacks, US authorities reported that Muhammad Atta, one of the hijackers, had shown an interest in crop-dusting planes, which can also be used to disseminate chemical or biological agents [8].

Post-9/11 Incidents

          • Four Moroccans, members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting, were arrested in Rome on 19 February 2002. They had about 4 kg of potassium ferrocyanide that they intended to use to contaminate the water supplies in the area where the US Embassy is located [9]. However, that particular substance is widely used as a food additive (E 536), and because of its toxicological properties was probably not the best choice to use in a chemical attack [10]. It seems that the terrorists may have been attracted but misled by the “cyano” group in its chemical structure.
          • In August 2002 Cable News Network (CNN) obtained several al-Qa`ida videotapes in Afghanistan that revealed experiments with chemical agents on dogs. One of those tapes showed several men, apparently after having mixed several chemical reagents, rushing out of an enclosure inside which there was a dog tied up. Soon, a white vapor appeared and a few moments later the dog started showing the first clinical signs of exposure. The quality of the images is not good enough to allow viewers make a definitive diagnosis of the agent, but the videotape reminds one of what Ahmed Ressam said about his training with hydrogen cyanide in Afghan camps. Also, since October 2001, reporters and US forces in Afghanistan have found more copies of al-Qa`ida publications and class notebooks with chemical weapons information, as well as a well-known “cookbook,” The Poisoner’s Handbook [11].
          • Three members of the North African Front were arrested in the UK in November 2002 for allegedly planning to release cyanide in the London underground [12].

The procedure for obtaining ricin included in al-Qa'ida's manual
is a word-for-word translation from this "cookbook"

          • On 12 December 2002 The Washington Post reported that Islamic extremists affiliated to al-Qa`ida had acquired VX from Iraq and had smuggled it overland through Turkey [13]. Nevertheless, this article notes that “like most intelligence, the reported chemical weapon transfer is not backed by definitive evidence.”
          • Menad Benchellali (alias “the chemist”) was arrested in France in December 2002 in connection with a plot to bomb the Russian Embassy in Paris [14]. Later, investigators discovered that when he had returned from Afghan camps in 2001 he had started producing ricin. However, no traces of ricin were found when police raided his family’s apartment.
          • Ricin was allegedly detected in January 2003 in an apartment in the north of London, where members of an arrested terrorist cell linked to al-Qa`ida were living [15]. This finding turned out to be false as laboratory analysis of the samples did not identify ricin [16].
          • In March 2003 two vials in a self-check locker at the Gare de Lyon (Paris) train station tested positive for ricin [17]. Another vial allegedly contained cyanide salt. This incident seemed to be related both to the previous incident in London and to a pro-Chechen terrorist network that French police were investigating [18]. Later, French officials admitted that laboratory analysis of the vials did not identify ricin [19].
          • The ASA Newsletter of June 2003 reported that 10 letters with irritating agents such as phenarsazine chloride were sent to different embassies and official buildings in Belgium [20]. Law enforcement officials believed that militant Islamists were behind these actions.
          • On 14 November 2003 the following headline appeared in La Razón: “The FBI believes that the Salafists intended to mix napalm with sarin.” This was in reference to the chemical substances found in possession of a supposed al-Qa`ida-related cell whose members were arrested in Barcelona in January 2003 [21]. However, sarin was not present among the chemicals, nor were any of its precursors. More recently, it was made public that the Spanish cell, helped by other cells based in France and the UK, was planning a chemical attack against a naval base in Rota (Spain), used jointly by Spain and the US [22].
          • US forces in Iraq found seven pounds of cyanide salt in January 2004 during a raid on a Baghdad house that was purportedly connected with al-Qa`ida members [23].
          • On 30 March 2004 anti-terrorism police in the UK arrested eight alleged sympathizers of al-Qa`ida who were supposedly planning to use osmium tetroxide against Gatwick airport, the London subway, and other enclosed high-traffic areas, although they did not have the chemical when arrested. Osmium tetroxide is often usedas a stain in biology laboratories [24].

Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) seized by Jordanian authorities in April 2004. They were allegedly intended for use in terrorist attacks.

         • Jordanian authorities made public in April 2004 that they had broken up an al-Qa`ida plot to employ large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), such as sulfuric acid, cyanide salts and insecticides, against the US Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister’s office, and the headquarters of Jordanian intelligence [25]. In a confession shown on state-run television, the cell’s ringleader stated that the mastermind of the alleged plot was Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, al-Qa`ida’s “amir” in Iraq.
          • In July 2004 the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade claimed responsibility for the ricin “attack” on US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist’s office in early 2004, which it stated was a test for a future attack [26]. The credibility of this claim is questionable, however, since this same group has claimed responsibility for many attacks and incidents that it had nothing to do with, including the 11 March 2004 train bombings in Madrid and even the recent blackouts caused by power failures in the US and Canada.
          • Based on Iraq Survey Group investigations, the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction reported on 30 September 2004 that the al-Abud network, a network of Iraqi insurgents, attempted to produce tabun, nitrogen mustard and ricin from late 2003 to mid-2004 [27]. Although these attempts failed, they filled nine mortar rounds with malathion, an organophosphate insecticide.

      "Chemical laboratory" discovered by US forces in Fallujah (Iraq) on 23 November 2004 (US Marine Corps photographs). Potassium cyanide, hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, as well as different nitrates were among the chemicals found. These could be used to consrtuct improvised chemical devices (ICDs) called "Mobtakar".

          • In November 2004 US forces discovered “cookbooks” on how to make hydrogen cyanide and a “chemical laboratory” in a house in Fallujah that was allegedly used by terrorists linked to Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi [28]. However, the images of the “chemical laboratory” released to the media remind one of those seen in some homemade “amateur terrorist” videos, and are far from what a laboratory capable of making chemical warfare agents would look like.
          • In May 2005 Russian authorities made public that they had discovered a cache of TICs, which included a cyanide-based substance, during military operations near Chechnya’s border with the neighboring Russian republic of Ingushetia [29]. Russia’s Federal Security Service stated that a group of Islamist extremists, called Amanat Jamaat (Silence Association), planned to use the TICs in chemical attacks ahead of Victory Day celebrations. The attacks were allegedly organized by Abu Majahid, an emissary of al-Qa`ida in Chechnya.

Threat Analysis

          Since 9/11 the number of reports in open sources about incidents with chemical weapons and radical Islamist terrorism has increased. This may be a consequence of a real increase in the number of incidents, the high risk perception of possible attacks with chemical weapons, or a combination of both. Some of these reports have presented inaccurate or incorrect information that may contribute to creating an amplified and distorted risk perception, which may in turn serve to inspire terrorists or increase the psychological effects of a future chemical attack. Indeed, one of the objectives of using chemical or biological weapons in a military scenario is not only to cause physical casualties, but also to demoralize troops. Similarly, in a terrorist attack on civilians, one of the primary goals is to create a general sense of panic and fear.
          Thus far it seems that hydrogen cyanide (HCN), ricin, and TICs have been the chemical agents of choice for Islamist terrorists. Procedures for obtaining HCN and ricin can be found in al-Qa`ida publications that remind one of procedures included in the “cookbooks” purchased by “amateur terrorists.” In fact, the procedure for obtaining ricin from castor plant (Ricinus communis L.) seeds included in al-Qa`ida’s manual is a word-for-word translation from The Poisoner’s Handbook [30], copies of which were also found in al-Qa`ida’s training camps in Afghanistan. Luckily, the information on delivery systems in these al-Qa`ida publications is often inaccurate. Effective dissemination may be even more difficult than obtaining the agent, especially if the objective is to cause a large number of casualties.
Since it was first used in WWI, HCN, although easy to produce, has been a “bad”chemical weapon because of its low density, short persistence, and low thermal stability, all of which make it difficult to weaponize in munitions [31]. For these reasons, since then the use of cyanide as a weapon has been almost restricted to special grenades and mines. Improvised chemical devices (ICDs) for HCN, called “Mobtakar,” have also been developed by groups related to al-Qa`ida. If terrorist groups decide to use this agent, they would prefer deploying it in enclosed spaces and would thus need significant quantities of the starting salts and acid if they wanted to cause a large number of casualties. Transporting and mixing the reagents without being discovered constitutes one the biggest hurdles.
          Ricin is a phytotoxin that was part of different research and development programs after WWI, although its low thermal stability restricted its use in munitions [32]. The former Soviet Union developed a system which consisted of putting ricin inside hollow steel needles. These needles would protect the toxin from the thermal effect of the bombs and introduce it into the bodies of the victims [33]. Ultimately, this option turned out to be so expensive that the bombs were never produced. Ricin is solid at room temperature, and for this reason the best method of dissemination would be in aerosols using spraying systems. For good deposition and retention within the respiratory tract, and in order to be suspended in the air for long periods of time thereby exposing a large number of persons, these aerosols require generators that are not readily available to the general public, as well as a certain level of technical expertise. The ricin procedures described in al-Qa`ida publications are not capable of achieve a good final product [34].

One of the two fake "mercury bombs" seized by the Spanish National Police.

          At this time it does not seem likely that terrorist groups linked to al-Qa`ida have the skills and technical proficiency needed to make a “classical” chemical warfare agent or to disseminate it in an effective manner. The absence of successful Islamist chemical attacks up to this point seems to confirm these facts. However, their potential future capability should not be underestimated. The biggest worry, based on the information analyzed here, is that they are both interested in chemical weapons and actively trying to obtain them. As far back as 1998 Usama bin Ladin had stated that it was a “sacred duty” for Muslims to obtain weapons of mass destruction [35]. Acquiring these agents from black market smugglers or sponsoring states may be options that ultimately yield better results than adopting the crude procedures in the aforementioned manuals. For example, it is known that al-Qa`ida’s elite 055 Brigade was in contact with the Ukrainian and Russian mafia [36] and that, more recently, common Portuguese and Spanish criminals tried to sell two fake “mercury bombs” from the former Soviet Union [37], perhaps knowing of the interest of Islamist terrorists in “red mercury,” [38] a bogus substance allegedly used in fusion nuclear weapons [39]. Another concern is that terrorists will increasingly try to acquire chemicals that are not strictly classified as “classical” chemical weapons, but which could be equally effective. An attack against a chemical plant or transport vehicle may also result in the release of TICs, with potentially catastrophic consequences similar to the accidental release of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal (India) in 1984. Intelligence services and security measures are critical in the prevention and countering of chemical attacks, and, in case they do occur, governments must develop the capabilities to detect and minimize both their physical consequences and their psychological impact.

Acknowledgement. The author wishes to thank Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale (Senior Research Associate, WMD Terrorism Research Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA) for his critical review of this manuscript.

Notes and References

[1] Venzke, B. and Ibrahim, A., The al-Qaeda threat: An analytical guide to al-Qaeda’s tactics & targets, Tempest Publishing, Alexandria, 2003, p. 216.
[2] Parachini, J. V., “The World Trade Center bombers (1993),” in Tucker, J. B. (ed.), Toxic terror: Assessing terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge (MA), 2000, pp. 185-206.
[3] Gunaratna, R., “Al Qaeda’s organisation, ideology and strategy,” in Inside Al Qaeda: Global network of terror, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 70-72.