SISPAT 4: The Opening

His Excellency Rogelio Pfirter, Director General, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Professor Lui Pao Chuen, Chairman DSO and Chief Defence Scientist
Major General David Poythress, The Adjutant General for the State of of Georgia, USA

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

          It is a great pleasure for me to officiate at the opening of the fourth Singapore International Symposium for Protection Against Toxic Substances, and the opportunity once again to meet the many scientists and operational experts working in the area of chemical and biological defence, since our last meeting held in 2002.

Anxiety over chemical and biological weapons being used by terrorist groups
          The last time we gathered here in 2002 there was heightened anxiety over the possible use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorist groups following the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11th 2001 and the subsequent spate of anthrax attacks. This concern lingers on and has in fact, been exacerbated by other developments around the world.
         Over a period of six months from March to September of 2003, much of East Asia and Canada was plagued by a viral outbreak known as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS. Singapore was not spared. There was great fear of community spread of SARS and the region bore the brunt as commercial aircraft, hotels and restaurants were emptied out. While it was clear that SARS was a natural disease and not related to bio-terrorism, its impact on society pointed clearly to the severe consequences should a biological attack ever take place.
         In 2003, there were sporadic attempts by terrorist groups to use chemical and biological weapons in their operations. In April this year, the British security services reportedly, arrested terror suspects in London who were planning to make a bomb that would release a toxic chemical, osmium tetroxide. In the same month, the Jordanian authorities also thwarted a chemical bomb attack that could kill up to 80,000 people in Amman. The chemical bomb contained explosives and several types of toxic chemicals known to be notorious chemical warfare agents like cyanide, nerve and blood chemical agents.
         A toxin from castor beans, named ricin, became prominent after two men were charged for developing chem-bio weapons after police found traces of ricin in a raid on their flat in London. Ricin is 1000 times more toxic than arsenic/cyanide.

Singapore’s Response
         These instances reflect the growing potential of chemical and biological threats. Preparedness is paramount. We need to move forward quickly in building up strong preventive, protective and response capabilities as a vital strategy for national security. In this respect, the role of technology and the significance of R&D in chem-bio defence cannot be underestimated.
         R&D is critical in the formation of a wellspring of knowledge to boost the early detection, physical protection and remediation of toxic chemicals and biological organisms which are building blocks of such devastating weapons. Let me now turn to Singapore’s efforts and progress in this area.
         The significance of DSO’s R&D in building up the country’s chemical and biological defence capabilities
         Singapore’s R&D in chemical and biological defence is primarily undertaken by DSO National Laboratories. This R&D programme had a modest start in the late 1980s with the setting up of a small laboratory by a group of local postgraduate students who were interested in this area of research. Work began with a small laboratory equipped with basic analytical chemistry facilities to undertake testing and evaluation, and technical services for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in the early 1990s.
         Continued interest and support by the SAF in developing capabilities in tropical protective materials, water purification technology and rapid analysis of chemical agents, allowed the fledging group to embark on longer-term R&D. In the course of its work, the group from DSO actively collaborated with research institutes in Sweden, France, United States, United Kingdom and Australia.

DSO’s R&D programme in chemical and biological defence has yielded fruits over the years.
         Its scientists have made breakthroughs in the development of non-aggressive formulations for cleaning the environment of toxic chemicals and biological spores, and in creating protective materials which promises longer shelf life and do not degrade as a result of humidity. DSO’s research into medical countermeasures for chemical agents and toxins have led to power-free test kit prototypes which can screen for exposure to chemical attacks so that medical treatment resources can be focused on actual intoxication cases and not be confused with psychogenic ones.
         The DSO single portal of entry was operationalised when it was engaged after the September 11th attacks to screen for anthrax. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, the same BioSafety Level-3 (BSL-3) facility undertook the diagnosis of blood samples as a member of a clinical consortium of Singapore laboratories that helped in the fight against SARS.
         The formation of the Defence Medical Environmental Research Institute at DSO (or DMERI@DSO) in October 2003 brought together chem-bio experts from the Centre for Chemical Defence and the medical professionals of the former Defence Medical Research Institute to take on further challenges in environmental and medical aspects of chemical and biological defence.
         Despite its relatively short history of about ten years, DSO’s chemical verification laboratory is now benchmarked with seventeen other international analytical laboratories designated by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or OPCW.

Singapore’s efforts in implementing The Chemical Weapons Convention and collaboration with The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
         Singapore ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997. As a State Party, Singapore has fulfilled all its obligations as a State Party to the Convention. These include initial declarations and annual declarations of activities and facilities as stipulated by the Convention, enacting national legislation and declaring national programmes for protective purpose. Thus far, Singapore has smoothly facilitated routine inspections by OPCW inspectors in accordance with the requirement of the verification regime of the Convention.
         The Singapore National Authority has been working closely with the OPCW to encourage regional cooperation in efforts related to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has in the past, pledged assistance in this area by being part of the declaration network and sharing with neighbouring countries, Singapore’s system in implementing the Convention.
         A recent effort in Oct 03 is the joint organisation (with the OPCW) of the first regional meeting of national authorities of state parties in Asia. In meeting the objectives of the Convention, we have found our collaboration with the OPCW most useful.

Conclusion
          Singapore’s commitment to strengthening the international body of knowledge in the area of chemical and biological defence R&D is a key reason for the formation of SISPAT. This year’s symposium accelerates the building of international know-how further in the global response against chemical and biological terror, with the joint staging with the Chemical and Biological Treatment Series or CBMTS.
          I have been informed that a significant highlight will be the field demonstration on chemical, biological, radiological and explosive response that will be held on the afternoon of 9th December. This demonstration is jointly organised by the Singapore Armed Forces Chemical Biological Radiological Explosive (CBRE) Defence Group, and the Civil Support Team of Georgia, US.
          In the demonstration, local and overseas operational experts will showcase the use of technologies in early warning and trigger of chemical, biological and radioactive contamination and the necessary response measures that should be taken to disable such weapons. Having a field demonstration of this nature amidst the technological and scientific presentations of SISPAT is a good way to highlight the important synergy of R&D with chemical, biological and radiological defence efforts. This demonstration will allow both sides to share their operational knowledge in responding to chem-bio threats.
          Finally, I wish all of you a fruitful symposium and our guests a pleasant visit to our sunny island state.

Thank you.

Editor’s Note: The SISPAT 4 with CBMTS was indeed a very impressive success as it brought together almost 400 professionals in science and medicine from 37 countries. These professionals, representing almost every facet of government, academia and industry, had provided over 100 papers which were presented both from the podium and from posters.

          Dr. Lee Fook Kay, Chairman of the SISPAT, will provide a summary of the presentations as well as an overview of this outstanding symposium in the February issue of the ASA Newsletter, ASA 05-1. We will also provide a pictorial review of the SISPAT 4 in that issue.
          The Symposium was well enhanced by a pre-symposium workshop on the issues involved in pharmaceutical and medical supply stockpiling. This workshop was exceptionally well attended with 200 participants.
          Another very well received component of this SISPAT 4 was the joint demonstration as mentioned by the Minister of State in his Opening Address. This involved the Singapore CBRN Group and the 4th WMD Civil Support Team. Their speed and precision in working together was a pleasure for all of us to watch.