John Hart is with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and he is also an ASA Correspondent for Science and Technology. John, who is very well known and respected around the world, is noted for his in-depth research and analysis across the spectrum of NBC issues.

Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Nonproliferation Workshop for Central Asia and the Caucasus

by John Hart (SIPRI)*

          On 20-21 September the conference “Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Nonproliferation Workshop for Central Asia and [the] Caucasus” was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The workshop was funded by the Canadian government through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and was organized by the Ministry for Public Health of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the M. Aikimbayev Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases (also known as the Almaty Anti-plague Institute), and the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). The meeting was held partly in order to provide nonproliferation training to government officials and public health workers of the region and partly to provide background for a forthcoming CNS study of the mainly non-Russian components of the Soviet Anti-plague System. The conference also helped those who were formerly a part of the Soviet Anti-plague System to strengthen their professional contacts.

          Almost 80 people attended the conference. They included representatives from the customs agencies of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, scientific and administrative staff from institutions that had been part of the Soviet Anti-plague System, and various representatives from outside the region, including the Canadian government, CNS, Russia’s Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the U. S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the U. S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation (CRDF), the ISTC, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Each of the customs agency officials and the anti-plague institute representatives gave presentations on the work of their respective organizations.

          On 22 September a number of conference participants, mainly those from outside the region, toured the Almaty Anti-plague Institute. Physical security has been upgraded in recent years largely through US assistance. This includes a barbed wire-topped fence, a metal gate, metal doors and an alarm system. The institute was founded in 1949. In the Soviet period, the main training of plague field specialists was carried out here, and the institute continues to provide training for medical specialists and technicians from all of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and elsewhere. It also produces diagnostic test systems for various pathogens (e.g., enzyme mediated immunoassay test kits). The institute currently has a staff of 140, of whom 52 are scientific researchers. In addition, 8 staff members hold doctor of science degrees, while 20 possess candidate of science degrees.

          In the 1890s the Russian government created a commission to develop and implement measures to fight plague. These measures included developing plague vaccines and treatments, taking and testing samples and killing animals that carried Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of plague. (Some rodents were reportedly killed with diphosgene.) A system of anti-plague research institutes and field stations was thus established under, first, Russian, and then, Soviet governments. Anti-plague institutes existed in each of the

          Soviet republics. According to a Russian scientist involved in Soviet biological weapon (BW) work, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 the system employed approximately 10,000 people. The anti-plague system is of continuing interest to those involved in implementing Cooperative Threat Reduction-type programs partly because elements of the system were used to support the Soviet BW program.

          To date, almost all of the assistance given to the anti-plague facilities has been provided by the United States. Anti-plague institute representatives stressed the importance of being able to meet the region’s human and environmental health needs where plague and other diseases that could be used for biological warfare purposes are endemic. (Some of the institutes have removed the word ‘plague’ from their titles. In part, this reflects the reduced incidence of plague and the fact that all of the anti-plague institutes also deal with other diseases.) Thus the ability of the various institutes to maintain their scientific and technical capabilities is complicated by the fact that most of their equipment dates from the 1950s, 1960 or 1970s and that their financial situations are quite poor. For example, the research staff, including the director, of one of the region’s anti-plague institutes earn the equivalent of less than $30 per month per person. This situation is likely to continue unless some outside assistance is earmarked for other areas than human or physical security. It was noted that the donation of even second hand equipment from the 1980s and 1990s would be greatly appreciated. Finally, any cooperative research projects with institutions outside the region should take into account the capabilities, interests and needs of the anti-plague system institutes.

          Much of the assistance to the region is being provided within the framework of the Group of Eight (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The partnership, established in June 2002, is funding projects on disarmament, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety through 2012. The G8 members and the European Commission are to allocate $20 billion, half of which is to be provided by the USA. Part of the focus of these and related efforts is to ensure: (a) that pathogen strains are catalogued and consolidated for storage at a limited number of secure locations; (b) that programs are put into place to evaluate potential risks posed by current and prospective employees at biological facilities; and (c) that all of the region’s governments have adopted and are effectively implementing national controls on the transfer of materials, technology and equipment that could be used to support prohibited BW programs or activities. Canada became a member of the ISTC in March 2004 and is currently evaluating how it can contribute to improving biosafety and biosecurity in the region.

          The periodic joint assessment and evaluation of perceived biosecurity threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus will, over time, promote the further political and economic integration of the countries of the region with countries and institutions outside it.

* The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of SIPRI.

Suggested reading;

          Averre, D., Luongo, K. N. and Martellini, M., Advancing Bio Threat Reduction (summer 2004), 37 pp. Findings of conference organized by the Landau Network-Centro Volta and the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC); available at URL <http://www.ransac.org>.

          Hirst, L. F., The Conquest of Plague: A Study of the Evolution of Epidemiology (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1953), 478 pp.

          Stavskiy, E. A., Cherny, N. B., Chepurnov, A. A. and Netesov, S. V., “Anthology of Some Biosafety Aspects in Russia (up to 1960),” pp. 29-91, in Richmond, J. Y. (ed), Anthology of Biosafety V. BSL-4 Laboratories (American Biological Safety Association: Mundelein, Illinois, 2002).

 


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