BTWC Meeting of Experts, Geneva
19 to 30 July 2004
by Graham S. Pearson
In the new process agreed at the resumed Fifth Review Conference in December 2004, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) agreed to meet annually in 2003, 2004 and 2005 to ‘discuss, and promote common understandings and effective action’ on one or two topics each year and that that annual meeting of States Parties would be prepared by a two week Meeting of Experts. The meetings in 2003 would be chaired by the Eastern Group (Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary), in 2004 by the Non-Aligned Movement (Peter Goosen of South Africa) and in 2005 by the Western Group (a representative of the United Kingdom).
The two topics to be considered at the 2004 two week Meeting of Experts in Geneva from 19 to 30 July 2004 were:
a. Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;
b. Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants;
The Meeting decided to consider the second topic during the first week and the first topic during the second week as this appeared to be a more logical approach."
Eighty-seven States Parties (four more than in the corresponding 2003 Meeting of Experts) participated in the Meeting of Experts. Four signatory States also participated: Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar and United Arab Emirates. Two States, Israel and Kazakhstan, participated as observers. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) made presentations and also participated throughout the meeting as they had participated through the invitation of the Chairman. This was a distinct step forward over the arrangements at the corresponding 2003 Meeting of Experts when several Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) were invited to make presentations which were outside the normal times of the Meeting and the IGO representatives were unable to be present during the Meeting.
In the opening public session, the agenda and programme of work were adopted which agreed that the topic on surveillance of disease would be considered during the first week and the topic on investigating alleged use of biological or toxin weapons would be considered in the second week. Opening statements were made by 18 States Parties (Germany, Libya, Japan, Venezuela, Russia, Iran, Cuba, China, Republic of Korea, India, Canada, UK, Pakistan, US, Malaysia, Peru, Hungary and Nigeria). The Netherlands (as the EU Presidency) briefly took the floor to welcome the Chairman and to say that they were not making an opening statement. Other States Parties made statements later during the closed working sessions of the meeting.
In the subsequent working session, presentations were made by the WHO, FAO and OIE. The ICRC and NGOs were excluded from these presentations on the basis that they were being made in a working session.
On the Friday afternoon, 23 July, there was an opportunity for ProMED and six NGOs to make short statements to the Meeting of Experts in informal session. The six NGOs who made statements were VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), INES (International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility), University of Bradford, BWPP (BioWeapons Prevention Project), SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and CBACI/IISS-US (Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute/International Institute for Strategic Studies – US).
By the end of the Meeting on 30 July 2004, 83 Working Papers had been submitted by States Parties (some 17 more than the 66 Working Papers submitted to the corresponding 2003 Meeting of Experts). These were submitted by Australia (10), Canada (8), China (2), Cuba (2), France (3), Germany (10), Hungary (1.5), India (2), Iran (4), Italy (5), Japan (2), Netherlands (6), Norway (1.5), Poland (1), Russian Federation (3), South Africa (5), Spain (1), Sweden (2), Thailand (1), Ukraine (4) and United Kingdom (9). In addition, two MISC papers were circulated: Misc.2 comprising the presentations made by the United States and Misc.3 comprising information submitted by Argentina on national and regional institutions and mechanisms for disease surveillance. The documents for the Meeting of Experts are being posted on http://www.opbw.org as they become available. All the Working Papers except for one, address one or other of the two topics for Meeting of Experts; the exception is WP.83 submitted by Hungary, which addresses the challenges of the second year of the follow-up process. This sets the new process in the context of the difficulties encountered in the Ad Hoc Group in July 2001 and then in the Review Conference of 2001 which had to be suspended for a year until December 2002.
In a significant step forward compared to the 2003 meeting of Experts, after the informal session on the Friday July 23 afternoon at the end of the first week, the Secretariat made available to delegations a chronological listing of considerations, lessons, recommendations, conclusions and proposals that had emerged from the considerations during the first week of the topic on surveillance of disease.
During the second week, the Secretariat again made available on Thursday 29 July to delegations a chronological listing of considerations, lessons, recommendations, conclusions and proposals that had emerged from the considerations during the second week of the topic on investigation of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.
Consideration was given to the draft report on Thursday 29 July and again on Friday 30 July. There was, as is usual, some tension between delegations as to the form of the factual report of the meeting with some States Parties being unenthusiastic over producing any more than an undigested collation similar to that which had been attached as an untranslated Annex to the report of the Meeting of Experts in 2003 and other States Parties expressing concern about the precise words which had been used by the Secretariat to identify the considerations, lessons, recommendations, conclusions and proposals that had emerged. Nevertheless, agreement was reached that the factual report should include an Annex II containing the "considerations, lessons, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions made by Delegations on the topics under discussion at the Meeting”. This Annex would be translated and issued in the six official UN languages. The items listed under Agenda item 5 (surveillance of disease) and Agenda item 6 (investigation of alleged use) in Annex II were clustered and thus developed from the initial chronological listings provided to delegations by the Secretariat. Although the precise wording in the report is heavily caveated to make it clear that the list was something produced by the Chairman at his initiative, the fact remains that there will be a far better starting point for the Meeting of States Parties in December 2004.
An analysis of the States Parties who had put forward items listed in the drafts of Annex II is shown in the Table. (available only in the ASA Newsletter subscription)
This shows that some 23 States Parties out of the 87 participating in the Meeting of Experts had been identified by the Chairman as having put forward items listed in the Annex. It should, however, be noted that these details are subject to change as the Chairman in the final session had invited States Parties to advise the Secretariat if there were any changes that should be made to the drafts of Annex II circulated on 29 and 30 July covering Agenda items 5 and 6 respectively.
Peter Goosen pointed out in his closing remarks on 30 July 2004 that much that had been presented during the Meeting of Experts was descriptive. He therefore urged all States Parties “to focus on what we have agreed to do and on what the Review Conference mandated us to do” namely to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action. It is evident that the list of items in Annex II will form a basis for the States Parties to prepare for the December meeting by considering in advance what language might be used at the one week Meeting of States Parties to express the common understandings and effective action that could be taken by the States Parties.
A further welcome innovation was the inclusion for the first time as Annex III of the factual report of a draft agenda and indicative schedule for the Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva on 6 to 10 December 2004. The schedule shows a General Debate on Monday 6 December followed by an informal session on the morning of Tuesday 7 December for statements by NGOs. Whilst the agenda and the programme of work will be formally adopted at the opening of the Meeting of States Parties, the indicative schedule provides a valuable opportunity to plan for participation at the Meeting of States Parties in December 2004.
Finally, in the closing session, the United States on behalf of the Depositaries announced that the dates for the 2005 Meeting of Experts would be 13 to 24 June 2005 and the Meeting of States Parties would be 5 to 9 December 2005. The topic for the 2005 meetings will be "the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.
Analysis. As might be expected, there was considerable attention given during the first week to the ways in which national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants might be strengthened and broadened. Equal time was given to disease surveillance of humans, animals and plants which was sound given the tendency all too often to focus almost exclusively on human disease surveillance with far less attention being given to animal and plant surveillance. The point was rightly made by a number of States Parties that the role of the Intergovernmental Organizations such as the WHO, FAO and OIE were to protect health and that such IGOs should not become involved in security issues and questions relating to possible violations of the BTWC.
In regard to the topics for the second week of enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, several States Parties considered that the existing guidelines and procedures set out for the Secretary-General’s investigations of alleged use set out in A 44/561 should be reviewed and revised since, for example, the list of experts and facilities available to the Secretary-General have not been updated since 1989. Moreover, the Secretary-General procedures predate the agreement of the Chemical Weapons Convention which includes procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons, including toxin weapons. There appeared to be a curious unwillingness by the Meeting of Experts to recognize that the Chemical Weapons Convention includes agreed procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of toxin weapons. Whilst it can be pointed out that the list of the States Parties to the BTWC is not identical to the list of States Parties to the CWC, a similar difference applies between the lists of States Parties to the BTWC and the lists of the Member States of the WHO, FAO and OIE. It would seem probable that if there were to be an alleged outbreak involving a toxin then if the State wishing to request an investigation was a State Party to the CWC as well as to the BTWC, such a request would be made to the OPCW.
It was also somewhat surprising that the United States in its opening remarks for the second week concluded by noting the international processes available for addressing allegations of BW use and suspicious outbreaks of disease were threefold: “resorting to the Security Council under Article VI, convening a formal consultative meeting under procedures developed to implement Article V, and conducting international investigations authorized by the UN Secretary-General.” and then saying that “The United States believes that all three of these mechanisms remain viable and that revisions to their scope or procedures are neither necessary nor appropriate.” [Emphasis added].
The experience gained since 1990 from the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and from the work of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC have demonstrated the vital importance if results are to be obtained that will stand up to international scrutiny of using trained qualified experts who have worked together in exercises under trained and designated chief inspectors as well as of an elaborated sampling and analysis procedure involving a chain of custody from the point of sampling to sample analysis using validated techniques in accredited and proven international laboratories. The existing Secretary-General procedure of 1989 in which States are invited to simply nominate experts and facilities is outmoded in the world of today. It also has to be recalled that investigations of alleged use can only take place within a State that has invited the UN Secretary-General to mount such an investigation.
In regard to Article V and Article VI of the BTWC, the procedures elaborated for Article V were invoked by Cuba in 1997. Because of the failure of the Fifth Review Conference in 2001/2002 to agree a Final Declaration, there has been no consideration by the States Parties of the adequacy or otherwise of the procedures followed under Article V in 1997. It could be argued that it would indeed be timely for the States Parties to review the adequacy of these procedures to implement Article V in the light of the experience gained in 1997. Article VI has never been used and there are no procedures that have been elaborated by the States Parties. As was suggested by at least one State Party during the Meeting of Experts, there could be advantage in consideration being given to what procedures might be appropriate for the implementation of Article VI.
In summary, the Meeting of Experts in July 2004 made significant progress especially through its decision to annex to its report the list of “considerations, lessons, recommendations, conclusions and proposals” prepared by the Chairman. This provides the States Parties with an excellent starting point from which to develop language to meet the requirement of the mandate for the Meeting of State Parties in December 2004 to ‘discuss, and promote common understandings and effective action’. It will be interesting to see whether the outcome of the December 2004 meeting lives up to the expectation that common understandings and effective action will be identified.
Editor’s Note: Professor Graham Pearson is the
Visiting Professor in International Security
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford, West Yorkshire
United Kingdom
Professor Pearson will in the 29 October issue (ASA 04-5) provide a complete BWC analysis "The Biological Weapons Convention: Its current situation and prospects for the future".
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