21 Years Of CBW Protection: A Changing World

By Graham S. Pearson
Visiting Professor in International Security
Department of Peace Studies,
University of Bradford, West Yorkshire UK

Introduction
          The occasion of 21 years of the Swedish Symposiums on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents provides an opportunity to consider the changing world and how the perceptions of the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons have developed. Back in 1983, the Cold War was still intense and chemical weapons were recognised as being in the arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The main thrust of protection was therefore against traditional chemical agents -- mustard, nerve agents and hydrogen cyanide. Although the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) had been opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975, the first Review Conference in 1980 had seen major concerns about the Soviet Union following the release of anthrax from a facility in Sverdlovsk. Negotiations towards a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were underway in Geneva.
           Today, we live in a very different world. The Cold War has ended and there is immense cooperation across Europe and Russia. There were high hopes in the early 1990s for a new world order of peace and stability but this has unfortunately not been realised and we are now faced with an uncertain world in which there is greater concern about the potential use of chemical or biological weapons by rogue States or sub State actors and terrorist groups. The range of potential chemical and biological agents is now recognised as being considerably wider that 21 years ago and the technical challenge is thus greater than before -- for broad band protective measures effective against as wide a range of agents as possible. The need for effective protection against a wide range of chemical and biological agents is therefore greater than ever.\
          The CWC entered into force in 1997 and has made the world a safer place. However, the first Review Conference last year failed to face up to the potential threat to the Convention posed by non-lethal or less-than-lethal agents. The BTWC in the 1990s made significant progress and was almost at the point in 2001 on reaching agreement on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention when the United States at the eleventh hour withdrew its support and plunged that Convention into crisis. If the general purpose criteria -- which ensure comprehensive, all-embracing prohibitions -- in both Conventions are not maintained and reinforced, there are real dangers for peace and security -- and there will be much need for effective protection against chemical and biological agents.
          This paper takes into account the

• Developments in the 1980s

• The new world order of the 1990s

• Progress and reverses in the 1990s

• 11 September 2001

and concludes by taking stock and setting out prospects for the future.

Developments in the 1980s
          There was little public information or debate in the 1980s on chemical or biological weapons. There had been the UN Secretary-General's report on such weapons in 1969 and the World Health Organisation report a year later on the health effects of chemical and biological weapons. Attention was primarily focussed in the West on the Soviet Union and its major capability for offensive chemical warfare with the 1983 annual United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Statement on Defence Estimates stating that “The Soviet Union has a major capability in this field [chemical weapons]. Continuing R & D and production of chemical weapons is adding to their stockpile, already assessed to be over 300,000 tons. Moreover, Soviet forces are comprehensively equipped and trained to operate in a contaminated environment.” There was also concern about the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in 1979 on which the Soviet Ambassador at the BTWC Review Conference in Geneva in 1980 had said "The incident in 1979 ... had in fact resulted from an epidemic caused by the consumption of infected meat … it in no way reflected on the Soviet Union’s compliance with the Convention." In addition, there were concerns being expressed notably by the United States about chemical warfare in SE Asia and Afghanistan and the possible use of trichothecene mycotoxins in what became known as the yellow rain attacks.
          During the 1980s there was escalating use of CW during the Iraq/Iran war, which resulted in UN Security Council resolutions condemning such use and in 1985 the Australia group was established to harmonise export controls of chemical agents and their precursors among like minded States. The Soviet Union under President Gorbachev began to be more forthcoming about its chemical weapons capabilities with a visit by representatives from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the media to Shikhany in October 1987 and a bilateral exchange of visits between Porton Down and Shikhany in spring 1988. The images of CW use at Hallabja later in 1988 raised international awareness and a sense of urgency was given to the ongoing negotiations in Geneva of the CWC.
          There was an increasing awareness of the potential biological threat and the importance of broad band protective measures against the CBW spectrum was recognized.

The new world order of the 1990s
           The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought hope for a new world order in the 1990s. There was Security Council unanimity on the response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. President George Bush on 1 October 1990 in his address to the UN General Assembly said "This is a new and different world … The United Nations can help bring about a new day, a day when these kinds of terrible weapons [chemical weapons] and the terrible despots who would use them are both a thing of the past. It is in our hands to leave these machines behind in the Dark Ages, where they belong, and to press forward to cap a historic movement towards a new world order and a long era of peace.” However, he went on to caution that "The world remains a dangerous place; and our security and well-being often depends, in part, on events occurring far away. We need serious international cooperative efforts to make headway on the threats to the environment, on terrorism, ..."
          Following the Gulf War of 1990/91 in which there was no use of chemical or biological weapons, the Security Council ceasefire resolution 687 (1991) established UNSCOM to oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met at Heads of State and Government level for the first time and stated that "The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security." Although high hopes were expressed in the early 1990s that the new world order would bring a safer and more secure world this has regrettably failed to materialize.

Progress and reverses in the 1990s
          The CWC was completed and opened for signature in January 1993. It entered into force on 29 April 1997. This totally prohibits the development, production, retention and use of all chemical weapons through its general purpose criterion. The BTWC States Parties started the 1990s by establishing an ad hoc group of experts (VEREX) to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. Its report was considered at the Special Conference in 1994 which established an Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. This commenced work in January 1995 and by March 2001 had virtually completed its work with the issue of the Chairman's composite text. In July 2001 after some fifty of the 55 or so States Parties engaged in the negotiations had expressed their support for this composite text, the United States rejected both the text and the approach which had been followed in the negotiations for the past six years.
          The 1990s saw the continued increasing recognition of the importance of both chemical & biological defence; thus, Porton Down became the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) in April 1991 and in 1993, Edgewood Arsenal became the Chemical and Biological Defence Command (CBDCOM). The Fifth International Symposium in Stockholm in 1995 was on Protection against Chemical and Biological Weapons.
          President Yeltsin of Russia in 1992 admitted that the former Soviet Union had continued an offensive biological weapons programme which led to the US/UK/Russia Joint Statement in September 1992 of a programme intended to build confidence that the Soviet Union programme had indeed been terminated in 1992. A further development was the attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 using sarin and the subsequent discovery that the Aum Shinrikyo sect had also attempted, without success, to carry out biological attacks. This led the G7 Summit in June 1996 to state that “Special attention should be paid to threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes.”
          Late in the 1990s, in April 1999, the UK Ministry of Defence in a report on Defending Against the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons stated that “The potential threat from chemical and biological agents is now greater than that from nuclear weapons” [Emphasis added].

11 September 2001
          Following the attacks in New York and Washington, DC, there were anthrax letter attacks in the US in late September/October 2001 which resulted in 5 deaths and much disruption. However, thus far there has been no arrest of the perpetrator of these attacks. Following these attacks and those of 11 September 2001, there has been enormous attention paid in the United States to countering terrorism and bioterrorism preparedness. There has been global attention paid to the security of dangerous pathogens and toxins. It needs, however, to be borne in mind that CB materials or weapons are not necessarily the weapons of choice for a terrorist group. A balance needs to be struck between appropriate preparedness for the possibility of such attacks and appearing to be excessively scared by such prospects. In short, be prepared not scared. There is much to be said for building preparedness for terrorist attacks upon the preparedness that States should have for outbreaks of disease and for accidental releases of dangerous pathogens or toxic chemicals.
          Following 11 September 2001, there are some indications that the United States administration is shifting towards unilateralism rather than towards a multilateral international cooperative approach to facing the threats of the 21st century. These shifts towards unilateralism are illustrated by the US non-ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity (which has 188 States Parties and is effectively universal except for the USA), the US opposition to the Kyoto Protocol which most of the rest of the developed world has accepted and the US withdrawal of their signature of the statute creating the International Criminal Court. Despite the anthrax letter attacks in the US, there was no reconsideration of the US rejection of the BTWC legally binding instrument and it appears that the US administration is more focussed on what international regimes might do to the US and not on what benefits such regimes might bring to the US. There is also uncertainty in the rest of the world as to what the United States view is of the role of the United Nations. In contrast, virtually all other States around the world recognise that they live in a multilateral reality in which States have to work together for their mutual benefit and where the United Nations and international treaty regimes have a central role to play in achieving international peace, safety and security.
          Following 11 September, the international regimes for the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons have encountered difficulties. The BTWC Fifth Review Conference in November 2001 was suspended on the final afternoon because of a US proposal for 12 months and when it resumed it was unable to agree a Final Declaration and was only able to agree a modest inter review conference process focussing on national rather than international measures. The outcome in 2003 of this modest process failed to meet its mandate “to … promote common understanding and effective action”. The CWC held its first Review Conference in April 2003 and whilst it agreed valuable action plans to achieve universality and national implementation legislation in all States Parties, it was a missed opportunity in that its final declaration made no mention of “non-lethal” agents or law enforcement and the OCPF (Other Chemical Production Facility) regime was little addressed even though the crafters of the CWC had specifically written a requirement into the Convention to review the OCPF verification regime at the First Review Conference.

Prospects for the Future
          The past 21 years have seen immense developments. In 1983 the focus was primarily on Soviet Union CW with relatively little attention being paid to BW although concerns were being expressed about the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk in 1979 and the attacks in S. E. Asia later known as "yellow rain" and in Afghanistan. The 1980s saw increasing concern about the use of CW in the Iraq/Iran war although little international action was taken apart from the adoption of Security Council resolutions condemning the use of CW. The 1990s saw the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the change from a bipolar world to a monopolar world with the hope then of a new world order bringing peace and security to all nations.
          The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 saw a determined response by the United Nations and military action by a coalition of forces led by the United States. The ceasefire resolution SCR 687 (1991) created UNSCOM to oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and later in 2000, UNSCOM was replaced by UNMOVIC. 1993 saw the completion of the CWC and its opening for signature with its entry into force in 1997 making the world a safer place. However, 1995 saw the use of the nerve agent, sarin, by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in attacks in the Tokyo subway and it later became clear that they had also attempted to disseminate biological agents but without success.
          Subsequent to the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, there had been anthrax letter attacks in the US in late September/October 2001 which had caused four deaths and immense disruption. Bioterrorism has subsequently received immense attention and funding in the US. However, CB materials or weapons are not necessarily the weapon of choice for a terrorist group and preparedness for such attacks should be built upon preparedness for outbreaks of disease and accidental releases. The last few years has seen an apparent shift of the US towards unilateralism and away from multilateral international cooperation. The majority of other states around the world who believe in the multilateral reality of international peace and security need to find a common ground from which to stand up to the US to point out the undoubted advantages that all States, including the US, can gain through multilateral treaties.
          In considering the future, the key is to realistically assess the danger from chemical and biological weapons and to prepare accordingly. Prevention -- the total prohibition of both biological and chemical weapons with effective regimes to verify compliance -- should be the goal of all countries around the world. Both the CWC and the BTWC are continuing to increase the number of States Parties and thus to minimise the numbers that have yet to become Party. The First Review Conference of the CWC agreed an Action Plan for Universality and in March 2004 the OPCW reported that there were now 161 States Parties, 21 Signatory States and 12 Non-signatory States. The BTWC at the last Meeting of the States Parties in November 2003 had 151 States Parties and 16 Signatory States. Given the comprehensive nature of both Conventions and their relevance and applicability both to States and to sub-State actors, universality for the Conventions and for the national implementing legislation within each State Party has to be the goal.
          There is a real danger, however, that the general purpose criteria embodied in both the BTWC and the CWC and which ensures that the prohibitions are truly comprehensive embracing all agents both present and future, could be eroded through the current interest in non-lethal or less than lethal agent programmes. There is no other issue that has as much potential for jeopardizing the long-term future of the CWC and the BTWC. The States Parties to those Conventions need to be alert to this very real and present danger -- and take action before it is too late to prevent this potential erosion. The BTWC needs to be strengthened through a legally binding instrument to enhance the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.
          There continues to be a vital need in every country for all the elements of the web of assurance -- to assure the public that all reasonable steps have been taken both nationally and internationally. The web of assurance is made up of the following elements:

• International & national regimes that totally prohibit CBW
-- Required both for States and for individuals

• Controls of dangerous pathogens and chemicals
-- Address handling, use, storage and transfer both nationally & internationally

• Preparedness & broad-band protective measures
-- Preparedness both before and after release

• Determined national & international response to use or threat of use
-- Diplomatic action, sanctions, military intervention
-- Security Council P5 need to recognise their responsibilities and should put the global prohibition of weapons of mass destruction above their national interests

          A strong public commitment to such a web of assurance both nationally and internationally provides two immense benefits -- first to deter the would-be user and second to reassure the public both nationally and internationally that all reasonable steps are being taken to ensure their safety and security.
          There will be a continuing need for protective measures against chemical and biological agents for the foreseeable future -- and thus the International Symposia held every three years in Sweden will continue to serve a vital role in providing a multi-disciplinary forum for mutual exchange of information on protection against chemical and biological agents