The what, where, when, why, who of Iraq WMD

The Other Side of the Question:
A Side Not Answered

          Based on information available to the UN inspection teams in the early 90's after the ’91 Gulf War, comprehensive inventories of Iraq’s known weapons caches, as well as known weapons materials, were developed. These inventories were then thoroughly cross-checked with known imports of materials and what these materials would produce. Subtracted from these inventory totals were the CW weapon and agent totals of the UN destruction programs, as well as the totals involved in Iraq’s infamous use of CW against the Iranians and the Kurds. The remainder constitute a fairly accurate listing of weapons and materials not accounted for, and that is the listing with which ASA is deeply concerned. And we are talking about the weapons and materials that should have been accounted for, whether or not any production programs were reconstituted since the end of that first war. It is a given that 2 + 2 = 4 and it does not equal either 3.95 or 4.05.

          David Kay did the best he could in the situation he was in, and what he had to work or not work with, and with a heavy US government superstructure loaded with individuals - all seeking to be the very first to know if David found anything, anywhere, and at any time. But did David answer the other side of the question - NO. The other side of the question involves the not so obvious - the what, where, when, why, and who of Iraq WMD. Have we missed the obvious? Did we check the room next door? NO. If we go back to David’s old organization- the IAEA, we can perhaps glimpse an insight into why ASA says NO.

          On every major inspection of known, suspected nuclear weapon development programs, the IAEA came up with the very wrong answers including North Korea, Iraq, Libya and hilariously so - South Africa. It was only recent vintage IAEA that they began to get their act together when they were able to name Iran as being in violation and in being close to developing and producing nuclear weapon materials.

          South Africa, and not the IAEA, was the first to announce South Africa had not only developed a capability but that they had in fact produced six and were working on a seventh, nuclear weapon. The local joke in South Africa was that the IAEA inspection team was actually next to a door that led to the room where a weapon was then being assembled. When asked if the IAEA team even asked to go into this room - the answer was NO. And the escort team was not about to volunteer the information to the IAEA. The IAEA did not bother to check the room next door.

          Iraq was another exceptional failure, an abject failure. Unfortunately, we did find out how much a failure until after the ‘91 Gulf War. Iraq was very close to joining the nuclear weapons club.

          ASA does not dispute the possibility that Iraqi WMD may not exist. ASA does, however, emphatically state that until the right questions are asked of the right people and these people provide satisfactory and rather easily provable answers, we must declare that we do not know if WMD or their components exist or do not exist in Iraq. Anything less must be considered irrelevant and ignored. Why can’t we just say “We do not know?"

          We must start with this question “What could they achieve with their available material and expertise?” We must not look for a ‘Western’ standard in weapons development and production that may not exist in their environment.

          We must ask the questions on what was produced, what was destroyed, where was it destroyed, when was it destroyed, who destroyed the weapons/material, why was the material destroyed and under whose orders were the material destroyed. And then most importantly - check and verify with highly reliable and available testing equipment, the accuracy of the answers provided. No matter when the material was destroyed, weathering and time will not totally erase the signature, nor the intermediates, nor the precursors. Was this testing done, was it attempted, what were the results? No definitive answers - and really no answers on whether or not WMD or their materials exist in Iraq. Did David answer the other side of the question - NO. Did we check the room next door? Have we missed the obvious? UNKNOWN at best.

           Professor Marjatta Rautio, who formerly headed up Finland’s VERIFIN Program, and who was also a member of UNSCOM, believed test equipment available in the very early 90's was sufficient to verify the presence of CW material several years after their use or removal. ASA was to help prove Prof. Rautio was correct with the early and somewhat clandestine inspection of the Mostar CW production facility and as reported in this Newsletter many years ago. Did we actually test to verify destruction took place of all WMD materials or is that something we could only assume without testing - anyplace?

           The late Dr. Johan Santesson, one of the very best known and most widely respected scientists working in WMD, specifically CW, told ASA that when he was in Iraq after our first war against Saddam, he was appalled at the air traffic between the Baghdad civil airport and the Sudan. He told us how he would watch planeload after planeload of material being loaded on Suddanese “commercial’ flights and the UN would not permit him  to inspect the material that was leaving. And he had been told by his Iraqi sources that WMD material was probably being loaded. The UN would not permit him to inspect because these were ‘civil’ flights. Of course the Sudan since then has been implicated in almost every bestial act known to man but a block of UN delegates are sure the Sudan would never be implicated in WMD. Sure.

           Would the material go to Iran? No way. Iraq was confident they would see that material rain down on them in a very short time frame for the many years they murdered Iranians with Iraqi CW use. Iraq did offload over 30 of its Air Force fighters to Iran in that first gulf war and that was goodby Iraqi Air Force. Would the material go to Syria? Syria probably has enough of their own CW without having to worry about storing and maintaining this type material from Iraq.

           Possibly dissidents, al-Queida and that ilk in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, but Saddam could not trust them anymore than the West could. As has been shown in the recently released videos of previous high level Saddam meetings - Saddam and his minions were planning the resurrection of their WMD programs - and they had to have something to resurrect from. The other side of the question(s) still remains unanswered.