This article from a report released by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in October 2003, documents a very disturbingly set of circumstances within the Department of Defense (DOD) for which the DOD must bear full responsibility. Can we criticize individuals, corporations and countries for specifically doing what the DOD has done to US national security across this arena? All of us thank GAO's Greg Kutz, Keith Rhodes and John Ryan for their excellent and in-depth analysis of a serious problem. ASA has edited, commented on and added to the below information.

The DOD Sale of Equipment to the Public that could be Used to Make Biological Agents

Col. Richard M. Price, USAF ret.

Washington, DC. Because of continuing concerns about bioterrorism and the potential for future anthrax attacks, GAO was asked to audit controls over public sales of excess DOD biological equipment and chemical and biological protective clothing that could be used to produce and disseminate biological warfare (BW) agents. GAO will issue a report with recommendations that DOD and its scientific community and the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, perform a risk assessment as part of its overall effort to develop and implement appropriate controls over sales of selected excess biological equipment.

What GAO Found
          Items needed to establish a laboratory for making BW agents were being sold on the Internet to the public from DOD's excess property inventory for pennies on the dollar, making them both easy and economical to obtain. Although some might argue that production of BW agents requires a high degree of expertise; public sales of these DOD excess items certainly increases the risks that terrorists could obtain and use them to produce and deliver biological agents within the US. Further, the possibility anthrax and other biological source agents could have fallen into the wrong hands due to poor controls at laboratories handling biological agents, as previously reported by GAO (and ASA) and other federal investigators, calls for an assessment of the national security risk posed by public sales of excess DOD biological laboratory equipment and protective clothing.
          As requested, GAO established a fictitious company and purchased over the internet, key excess DOD biological equipment items and related protective clothing necessary to produce and disseminate BW agents. In total, GAO spent about $4,100. to purchase these new and usable excess items, originally costing $46,960. GAO's investigation of several other buyers of the biological equipment items found that they in turn exported them to countries, such as the Philippines, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (Dubai specifically), Malaysia, etc., for further transshipment to other countries such as India, Pakistan, and other countries. As ASA has personally observed, there is no possibility, even for the excellent UAE security forces, to stop and inspect all transshipments from Dubai to Iran which is but a few miles across the Strait of Hormuz . High speed ‘cigarett boats' make the trip many times per day and carry cigaretts, bluejeans and liquor - why not other items of contraband? Once in the secondary market, the US does not have adequate controls to prevent their further sale to countries that are prohibited from receiving exports of certain US technological items subject to trade security.
          Before discussing the items for making biological agent, a review of DOD's excess sales of JSLIST protective clothing demonstrates a total indifference to common sense. JSLIST is the US universal, lightweight two-piece protective garment (coat and trousers) that help form the warfighter's protective ensemble and it is the current model protective suit used by today's US military forces. GAO looked at these sales of JSLIST during the period December 2002 through September 2003, i.e., very current sales. DOD had previously determined that its chemical and biological protective clothing and related gear should not be sold to the public and has declared that these protective suits and related gear are for DOD use only. Unfortunately, as demonstrated by GAO's purchases and by reviewing sales records, DOD had not implemented effective controls to prevent public sales of its most current protective clothing and related equipment. In fact during the period 1 October 1999 to 31 March 2003, the DOD sold over one quarter million protective suits to the public. Although DOD issued formal operating procedures for control and issuance of specifically designated chemical and biological protective suits in March 2003, the GAO was able to purchase these restricted DOD protective suits in April and June 2003. And GAO did monitor the continuing DOD Internet sales of these restricted items.
         There is a second problem with the sales of these restricted items. Although the items were not to be sold outside of the DOD, the GAO found that some of the suits that were sold were from the defective lots of uniforms that were previously identified from a manufacturer that had sold them to the DOD. The GAO found that some local law enforcement agencies had purchased these excess and defective uniforms and now their ‘first responders' were possibly put in harm's way. In fact use of these uniforms could cause serious injury or death. GAO believes that over 4,700 defective uniforms may have been reissued to local law enforcement agencies.
         A third serious problem with the sale of these restricted uniform items deals specifically with those uniforms containing infra-red (IR) technology. During FY 2002, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the State Department began working on a major national security policy initiative to ensure effective controls over items with IR technology. However, about half of the uniforms purchased by GAO in April 2003 and all 424 protective suits purchased in June 2003, contained IR technology. The GAO did contact DLA and requested policy information on these specific restricted items and GAO was told that the policy had not been finalized.
         On 12 April 2003 GAO purchased, via sealed bid, 58 used DOD CB protective suits for $292. including tax. The original acquisition cost was $2,410. On 13 June 2003 GAO using a fictitious End User Certificate, purchased 458 CB protective suits via sealed bid with a bid price of $750.00. The original acquisition cost was $35,380. A good deal. These restricted (to DOD use only) suits were listed as being in A4 condition which means good, serviceable condition and issuable to all customers without restrictions. The GAO actually received 424 of the 458 suits and 39 of these were new and in sealed packages. Emboldened - the GAO's fictitious company referred the discrepancy of the 34 (458-424 received) suits to the DLA Criminal Investigations Activity for investigation. An obvious result of all of these sales, besides the potential use by terrorists who are determined to take all actions against the US and its allies around the world, is that while we continue to spend millions of dollars on ‘new' uniforms, we illegally off-load millions of dollars of almost new uniforms via our excess sales to whomever has the pocket change to buy. And if the suits are DOD only, why are we selling used DOD suits?
         Perhaps even more disheartening than the sale of JSLIST uniforms is the sale of biological equipment that may be used by terrorists to help refine and manufacture biological agent.
         The biological equipment identified for use in this GAO case study includes biological safety cabinets, bacteriological incubators, laboratory evaporators and Laboratory centrifuges. GAO notes that neither federal regulations issued by other agencies nor DOD policies generally restrict DOD from selling these “case study” biological equipment items to the general public.
         The GAO, probably in deference to those that would minimize the impact of a terrorist individual or organization producing a biological agent, does point out that “Given the difficulty involved in producing and releasing high-quality agents that could cause mass casualties; experts told us it is more likely that terrorists could produce and disseminate a crude form of anthrax or biological agent.” The dissemination of even a crude form of anthrax, particularly the simultaneous dissemination at multiple locations, could result in widespread shutdowns, panic, possibly some infections and death, and major national security concerns.” Added to this scenario are those many reports from the GAO and other federal agencies that as of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the federal government did not have a complete inventory of biological source agents and laboratories did not have a complete inventory of the source inventory they handled. The GAO notes a possibility, confirmed by many, that anthrax and other biological source agents could have fallen into the wrong hands due to the noted poor controls in handling biological agents.
         The GAO found that much of the biological equipment needed to establish a laboratory for producing biological agents are among DOD excess property items sold to the public over the internet by govliquidation.com. GAO's undercover purchases of these DOD excess biological equipment (and protective clothing) and GAO's investigations of buyers of these items, demonstrate the risk posed by these DOD sales. Using their fictitious company, GAO purchased over the internet a large number of new and usable items including a biological safety cabinet, a bacteriological incubator, a centrifuge, and an evaporator. As noted before, these items were purchased for less than 1/10th the original acquisition cost.
         As GAO graphically illustrates, after protective uniforms are acquired, the terrorist would need to acquire a virulent biological source agent and growth medium. Can anyone doubt that this has not been possible? Reference the American grown nuts that acquired same from American Type Culture Collection in previous years. A biological safety cabinet would provide protection during production of the chosen biological agent and the bacteriological incubator would be used to grow the biological agent into a culture. The laboratory centrifuge could then be used to separate solid spores from liquid growing medium and the laboratory evaporator would be used to process biological agent into a dry form for dissemination. Working in his easy to obtain JSLIST protective uniform, the terrorist might then be able to improvise delivery devices to disseminate his newly developed biological warfare agent.
         The biological safety cabinet was purchased from govliquidation.com on 9 May 2003 for $317. as compared to its original acquisition cost of $4,342. It was listed as in good serviceable condition without restrictions as to use. However, upon inspection by GAO, the determination was made that this cabinet was in excellent condition and appeared to have been unused. DOD sold at least 18 of these cabinets from year 2000 through the first half of 2003.
         The bacteriological incubators purchased from the same internet site on 9 May 2003 for $55. (original acquisition cost $545). Listed as being in good serviceable condition without restrictions to use. DOD sold some 199 excess biological and bacteriological incubators during the same period previously mentioned.
         On 23 April 2003, GAO purchased a laboratory centrifuge for $450. (original cost $2,560). The cost was higher because GAO was bidding against another party seeking to buy the same machine. DOD sold at least 521 of these units during the previously mentioned period ('02 to md-'03).
         A laboratory evaporator is needed for processing agent into either liquid or dry forms for dissemination. In a lot bid to buy the evaporator, microscopes and other lab items, GAO lost out to a higher bidder. However, the GAO was able to buy the evaporator from the winning bidder for $425. DOD had sold at least 65 excess evaporators during the previously mentioned period.
         GAO was able to identify 176 internet buyers of these excess equipment. GAO's investigations identified a very large secondary market for used biological equipment (and protective clothing). GAO then selected 48 buyers for further investigation and then contacted 42 of them. Of these 42 buyers, 15 exported used laboratory equipment to countries around the world including Canada , Egypt , the Philippines , Malaysia , and Dubai (UAE). law enforcement officials have identified individuals in Canada , the Philippines , and Dubai that are known to be involved in transshipments to terrorist-supporting countries. These countries are prohibited from receiving certain US technology exports that are similar to the equipment used in this GAO case study. Transshipments are a major source of export violations. Of prime concern - use in the US .
         The report, GAO-04-81TNI, has much more and this is but an insight into a major DOD and US problem. And now if we listen carefully - we may hear the spin doctors tolling away at their latest cover.
         As a noted plague researcher is convicted for research practices not unusual before 9/11, one has to ask who is being held criminally responsible within the DOD for these illegal and dangerous sales of excess property.