Health and Safety Issues During Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
Lessons learned during 5 years of OPCW operations

Brian Davey M.D.
Head, Health and Safety Branch
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Den Haag, Netherlands

INTRODUCTION
          The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has established an encouraging health and safety (H&S) record during its first five years of operational activity. By mid 2003, approximately 1,500 inspections, involving around 81,000 inspector working days, had been completed without serious injury or lost time accident. In the headquarters, one significant lost time injury has occurred in the nine years since Preparatory Commission and OPCW HQ activities commenced (related to manual moving of equipment).
          The activities and working environments of OPCW staff are relatively unique in international context, and the initial years have involved a steep learning curve with little guidance or precedent available from external sources. While the H&S performance so far has been encouraging, lessons have been learned which must be heeded, and there are new challenges on the horizon. This paper reviews the major achievements, and highlights areas for future attention.
          In an organisation whose staff operate regularly in hazardous environments, it is tempting to focus on the more obvious (and possibly, more dramatic) chemical weapons related hazards. In fact, from a risk management perspective, chemical weapons fall lower on the list of priorities that the OPCW Health and Safety Branch (HSB) has had to deal with. As is the case with most organisations, it is the more mundane but more prevalent hazards, (road safety, fatigue, trips and falls, etc) that have constituted the greater risk.

ACHIEVEMENTS
          While the most noteworthy achievement is the H&S record itself, an important contributing factor has been the development and implementation of a modus operandi based on the principles of risk management. A structured and documented planning process guides OPCW inspection teams through comprehensive preparation - identifying hazards, analysing the risk they present, and applying risk control measures. It is a deceptively simple approach, but effective implementation requires vigilance, discipline, and attention to detail. Inspection planning now incorporates this approach routinely. Regular H&S surveys and monitored implementation of corrective actions in OPCW premises bring the same principles to bear in the headquarters environment.
          The OPCW H&S Policy incorporates a crucial principle - responsibility for H&S starts at the highest level (with the Director General personally), and extends through the line management chain to operational level. Specialist H&S structures and personnel are provided - not to take over the process of risk management and H&S awareness, but rather to act as an advisory source and resource to assist line managers to implement the H&S responsibilities they carry for their own operational areas. This is a concept that needs constant reinforcement, and is the only way to ensure that H&S awareness permeates an organisation through all areas of activity, and at all times.

CHALLENGES
          Interaction with local medical services. An international cosmopolitan community such as that of the OPCW staff incorporates a wide spectrum of attitudes to and expectations of a medical care system (and indeed, all other social and community services). OPCW medical staff frequently observe that unnecessary frustrations can occur when patients are not fully aware of the modus operandi of their General Practitioner's practice on the one hand, and the overall National medical system on the other. Understanding of the nuances of the system can facilitate the services obtained. An integral and challenging feature of occupational health in an international environment is facilitation of staff interaction with the local services.
          Continuing Professional Development (CPD). Health and safety is a dynamic and rapidly changing field of professional activity, with advances in understanding, various relevant technologies, diagnostics, and treatment possibilities occurring continuously. There is consequently widespread international acceptance of the need for health and safety professionals to maintain their knowledge and skills actively on an ongoing basis. For medical professionals, most countries now require participation in a documented and accredited CPD program, as a prerequisite for maintenance of professional registration. Health professionals in the UN and related international system find themselves in a unique and unfavourable position. They are usually practising outside of their original National health-care systems (and are therefore unable to participate in Nationally accredited CPD activities). Due to the Diplomatic/International status of UN and other international organisations, they are also not part of the medical system of the country in which their organisation is hosted. Even if cross-accreditation of CPD activities from the host country's system to the National system could be obtained, language barriers are often a limiting factor in the utility of attending local CPD activities. This is a problem recognised throughout the UN medical community. After only a few years of international employment outside their own National health care regulation system, medical professionals may find themselves falling behind in their area of expertise, and under threat of losing National professional registration. While the problem is particularly acute for medical staff, a similar situation exists for all H&S staff. Together with the medical services of other interested international organisations, the OPCW is currently investigating the feasibility of introducing a purpose designed documented and peer-reviewed Continuing Professional Development program according to accepted international standards.
          Frequent travel. During the earliest days of planning for inspection activities, it was realised that limits needed to be set on the number of days that could be planned for inspectors to be away from home on mission status. A planning figure of 120 days was recommended as the average number of days that an inspector should be on travel status per year. An inevitable consequence of efforts to reduce costs in an organisation is a tendency to increase the number of travelling days for staff, and the OPCW has been no exception. From a health and safety perspective, frequent and prolonged travel has a measurable H&S impact on travellers and their families, with effects that grow with increased travel. The decision on a planning base for travel is a line management decision, weighing these H&S considerations against operational and other demands. Although there is no particular H&S or scientific significance to a planning figure of 120 days, adjustments to that figure should not be made lightly. Moving the planning average upwards will have relatively greater effects on the inevitable sub-group who will travel more than the average. If a decision must be taken to increase the average number of annual days deployed, it must be taken with the knowledge that negative H&S and social effects are likely to manifest in at least some of the travelling group of staff. Methods to ameliorate these effects should then be considered. These could include consultations with staff to identify those whose attitude and circumstances are more favourable for acceptance of increased travel, consideration of methods to distribute the "average" more equally over the total group, so as to avoid heavier loading of certain individuals, and consideration of methods to make travel less stressful (class of travel, stop-overs, communication with family during travel, post-travel leave days, etc).
          Living conditions on inspection sites. This is directly associated with the preceding issue. As the destruction programs of CW possessor Member States gain in momentum and scope, OPCW inspectors are spending more time on inspection rotations, where they live on-site for periods up to six weeks at a time. By their nature, such sites tend to be in remote locations, with limited recreational opportunities. Certain inspector groups (e.g. the Team Leaders and medical staff), are likely to be deployed more frequently at such sites. Prolonged travel away from home is already known to have adverse consequences for the H&S of travellers. If living conditions and recreational opportunity are limited, these effects will be accentuated. This issue has already been the subject of discussion between the Secretariat and involved Member States, and encouraging developments have occurred. As the number of sites increase, the momentum of initial discussions and expressed intentions in this area must be maintained.
          Detection and monitoring on destruction sites. Approved OPCW inspection equipment for detection and monitoring of chemical agents is better suited for immediate operational detection requirements than for fixed long term site monitoring. When staff are working and living for long periods on a site, chemical exposure concerns expand from the detection of higher level threats or releases, to include detection of chronic low levels of agent that might not be immediately noticeable, or have immediate health effects. Although no significant exposures of OPCW inspectors have yet occurred on such sites, incidents with exposure potential have occurred, and should be treated as reminders of the potential risks that are present. While it is feasible for the Technical Secretariat to be reasonably independent with regard to short term, acute detection requirements, it is extremely difficult to reach an adequate detection capability with regard to long term low level monitoring to accepted TWA standards (Time Weighted Average measurements for 8 hour working shifts).
          It is incumbent on States Parties to ensure installation, operation, and maintenance of such monitoring capabilities, to a mutually acceptable standard. The Technical Secretariat is actively exploring the possibility of additions to the approved equipment list, with a view to acquiring new detection and monitoring equipment that would allow supplementation of National systems on sites where concerns exist.
          Use of Health and Safety Equipment. The use of OPCW H&S equipment has been restricted on a number of sites, ironically, on H&S grounds. These incidents primarily involved site safety regulations which only allowed locally certified equipment to be used. There have also been occasions when local transport regulations have hindered the carriage of equipment with specific technical characteristics.
          Pragmatic solutions have generally been found to these problems, but in the process, inspection teams have sometimes been forced to adopt less than ideal working procedures. Inspection teams should not be expected to rely on a large variety of types of H&S equipment in different Member States, or on ad-hoc modified working procedures, due to usage restrictions imposed on approved OPCW equipment. This clearly imposes a safety risk, as adequate familiarisation and confidence with H&S equipment and drills is a crucial element in determining their effectiveness. It requires constant attention to ensure that the OPCW Technical Secretariat and States Parties to the CWC maintain a single common purpose with regard to H&S issues. Every effort should be expended to ensure that the best available H&S equipment is available for use by both OPCW and site personnel at facilities where chemical exposure risks exist.
          Non-chemical risks: Safety concerns during transit of inspection teams have been brought to the attention of several States Parties. These have involved issues such as safety and maintenance of vehicles (including aeroplanes), road safety awareness and habits of drivers, as well as food preparation and hygiene issues. The authorities of involved Member States have generally been receptive and co-operative in addressing such concerns. In an environment where more visible and "obvious" risks from chemical weapons exist, it is easy to forget the more common risks that our everyday environment can impose.

CONCLUSION
          The OPCW has a good safety record. This record, however, has been achieved with considerable effort, and active management of H&S risks by all parties - including site and support personnel of Member States, all inspectors and headquarters staff, as well as the Technical Secretariat's H&S specialist staff. Ongoing vigilance, comprehensive risk management, and a willingness to address new challenges are ongoing requirements to maintain safety performance at its current levels.

Ed. Note: It was great for all to have Dr. Brian Davey back with the CBMTS after an unavoidable schedule conflict held him back from the previous CBMTS IV.