. Chemical and Biological Terrorism in Latin America:
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

 

Mariano C. Bartolome
Maria Jose Espona

National Defense School
Maipú 262, Buenos Aires, Argentina

ABSTRACT
          A revision of the main global approaches towards chemical and biological weapons and their eventual use by terrorist groups permits the identification of two major conceptual mistakes. First, that the terrorist organizations that might use weapons with chemical and biological agents will use them to cause massive damage. Second, that there are no records in Latin America about organizations willing to use chemical or biological agents as weapons to cause massive damage.
          Both assertions prove to be false, given that in the intrastate conflict taking place in Colombia there are reports about the use of chemical and biological agents by the oldest terrorist group in the region, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARCs). This tactical modality is a result of the know-how transmitted by other insurgency groups elsewhere, particularly the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
          In our paper, we analyze the Colombian case, describing the conflict and its main insurgency player, the FARCs. We then describe three basic tactics of the use of chemical substances and biological agents by this organization: cyanide bombs; pollution of water sources with agricultural toxic agents; and bombs and ammunitions saturated with human feces. Finally, the conclusions will show the impact of these terrorist modus operandi in the evolution of the conflict in Colombia.

I. THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT
          For more than three decades, Colombia has suffered from a blood-shed domestic conflict. Three insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARCs)[1], the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-defenses of Colombia (AUC) are fighting against the State for the monopoly of violence and territorial control. Currently the insurgency is present in more than 70% of the country.
          The FARCs appeared in the mid '60s, with almost 15,000 active members distributing their activities in more than 60 "fronts" all over the country. The ELN, on a smaller scale, has 5,000 troops that are distributed in almost 35 "fronts". Finally, the AUC comprises several self-defense groups which emerged at the end of the '70s, because of the State's failure to provide peasants a proper level of security against guerrilla forces.
          Moreover, the Colombian conflict cannot be separated or unlinked from the drug-trafficking issue. The cocaine crop case and its processing and subsequent marketing in foreign markets began to be relevant in Colombia in the early '80s specifically via two organizations or cartels: the Medellin and Cali, respectively.
          Colombia currently produces 80% of the world's cocaine. It also supplies 70% of the cocaine and 65% of the heroine marketed in the USA, thus having a virtual monopoly on the US drug market. It is estimated that the revenues from drug-trafficking in Colombia represent from 3.5% (minimum hypothesis) to 6.5% (maximum hypothesis) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and are equivalent to 25% to 35% of the legal exports of the country.
          In recent years, the expansion of coca crops has been observed mainly in areas under guerrilla control. This is due to the fact that the FARCs collect taxes ("gramajo") from the drug-traffickers, for the protection of the crop. It also operates their own drug business using drug plantations and trafficking. The drug revenues obtained by this organization, according to various sources, are from US$ 300 million and US$ 600 million annually.
          In the late '90s, the control on a vast jungle area, the so called "Demilitarized Zone" and virtually a "State within a State" - equivalent to Switzerland's size - was granted to the FARCs by the then President Pastrana. Within this area are the major coca plantations, laboratories for processing and covert landing strips for distribution.
          In the year 2000, the Colombian Government's Executive Branch implemented a complex program to combat the drug problem - the Colombia Plan. This plan involved the eradication of the coca and poppy plantations with a crop substitution scheme; a direct fighting scheme against trafficking gangs and insurgency groups; and the enforcement of legal institutions (judiciary branch, police, etc.). The Colombia Plan is now in its stage of full implementation and has already achieved impressive first results.
          Recently, the President of Colombia closed the so called "Demilitarized Zone".

II. USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AS WEAPONS
          Historically, in the Colombian armed conflict, the first insurgent group to use banned arms was the ELN. Through the so-called Training Camps of Popular Arms (TAP), their fighters were trained with arms and non-conventional tactics by both local and foreign instructors who had earlier gained their expertise in countries such as Vietnam, Cuba and the Soviet Union.
          The FARCs followed this trend afterwards, although they chose an alternative source for specific knowledge, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA played a key role in the implementation and different uses of the "explosive cylinder" (adapted propane gas cylinders) as a main armament of the FARCs, evolving from explosive to incendiary modes and ending up in its use as a chemical weapon[2].
          According to a report made by the National Defense System of Information (SIDEN), the incendiary cylinders emerge in the Colombian conflict by the end of the 90's. In what could be the first attack of its kind, on March 24, 1998, the Puerto Lleras (Meta department) police department was attacked by the FARCs' force of 43 guerrillas who used the cylinders with glue and plastic substances which caused serious injuries to two children and an official.
          In similar events, the FARCs also used as explosives - white phosphorous, petrol and tar. Substances such as glue, tar or rubber have the effect of adhering in flames to the clothes or skin of the military, their vehicles or buildings[3].
          As regards the IRA, in mid August 2001, the Colombian army captured three members of this European organization and charged them with training fighters of the main guerrilla force of the country in the use of explosives and the construction of non-conventional weapons. The IRA members, who carried two false British passports and an Irish passport, had been in the so called "Demilitarized Zone" training the FARCs.
          On this occasion, the Chief of the Colombian Army, General Jorge Mora, found that the FARCs gave the IRA drugs, money and weapons in exchange for training. Although the weekly Voz, the voice of the FARC's, said that the IRA members had visited the area only to "talk and exchange opinions", traces of explosives were found on the clothes of the arrested members.
          The inquiry carried out by the Colombian authorities on this case, together with the one made at the same time by the Irish reporters, made it possible to establish that during the 90's, around 25 IRA members visited Colombia in order to train local terrorists in the use of explosives. According to the daily Evening Herald of Dublin, three FARCs defectors confessed to having been trained in explosive tactics by a five member - IRA cell. Three of them were arrested, the other two might have fled through Venezuela, and then returned to Ireland[4].

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: CYANIDE
          Records on the use of chemical agents for offensive purposes by the Colombian guerrilla groups, date back to December 2000. On that occasion, the ELN attacked the police department in Cajibío (Department of Cauca), with pipettes loaded with sulfuric acid and ammoniac. Two civilians and two uniformed officials died[5].
          The next year, the bombing carried out by the FARCs on September 2 at the location of San Adolfo (Department of Huila), 370 km from Bogota, might had been the scenario of the use of chemical weapons. In this case, four policemen died after inhaling a gas that a local military chief, Col. Francisco Caicebo, described as "toxic". Supporting such hypothesis, none of the corps presented external body wounds.
          The events in San Adolfo were clarified almost a year later, after many expert reports performed by Colombian and American governmental agencies. The reconstruction of the facts showed that when 20 policemen confronted a terrorist block, more than ten policemen were kidnapped after running out of ammunition. These policemen, who had inhaled toxic gases - that contained cyanide in the formula, probably cyanogen chloride[6]- during the confrontation were taken to a closed facility, where five of them were forced to drink liquids that combined with the gases generated pulmonary edemas. Four officials died, while five survived with permanent after effects.
          In addition, two days after the confrontation, the Colombian Army intercepted communications from the FARCs, where a guerrilla explained to his chiefs details of the attack with chemical agents in San Adolfo, receiving congratulations for these actions[7].
          Regarding the details of this guerrilla action, the expert reports confirmed that initially the FARCs had thrown against police facilities bombs, in the form of hand-grenades, composed of explosives and a compound of cyanide inside plastic containers. The Colombian Institute of Legal Medicine had detected in the autopsy of the officials who died in the confrontation a "chemical pneumonitis by exposure", adding in the report: "It is confirmed that the death was caused by the inhalation of chemical substances that produced the break of lung tissue, producing a pulmonary edema with a significant increase of size and weight".
          Moreover, the American Defense Department's Pathology Institute, while analyzing pulmonary tissue samples from the dead policemen, found that cyanide concentrations exceeded 5 milligrams. Concentrations of 3 milligrams are considered lethal[8]. Lastly, after all these expert reports were revealed, the Colombian Prosecutor's Office opened a case against the leader of the FARCs, Manuel Marulanda Vélez (aka "Tirofijo") and nine other guerrillas under the charge of using chemical weapons against State forces.
          Another different use of cyanide as a weapon by the FARCs is filling ammunition heads, specially made hollow for this purpose. Evidence of this methodology was obtained during "Pegasus Operation", a military action launched in late 2002 in the province of Soto (Santander Department) in order to find underground stockpiles of weapons belonging to many of the FARCs fronts. This ammunition, which contained the chemical agent, killed the victims[9].
          The most recent evidence suggest that the filling of the ammunition heads with chemical agents is a tactic that is now being adopted by the ELN. In mid-March 2003, 200 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunitions with these features were seized from this organization in Alto Basilio (Antioquía)[10].

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: AGRICULTURAL TOXIC AGENTS
          Both the FARCs and the ELN have used chemical agents as weapons to poison fresh water resources used by the civil population.
          On February 22, 2002 in Pitalito (Department of Huila), authorities found that the local water pipeline had been polluted with an unidentified but suspected chemical agent. The chemical substance, that had been delivered in one of the pipeline's inlets located in the spot named Bruselas, showed a high concentration of chromium, sodium and nitrate. The expert reports pointed out that the ingestion of this water would have caused serious damage in vital organs of the victim, possibly death, depending on the concentration of the ingested chemical substances.
          This attack did not produce victims, since local authorities had previously learned of the attempt via interception of the FARCs' communications, where the water pipeline had been declared a "military target" and could be contaminated. According to the manager of the public companies of Pitalito: "we avoided a catastrophe"[11] by taking swift actions.
          A second event of similar characteristics to the situation in Pitalito took place a month later in the town of Libornia, located at 100 km from Medellín. In the water tanks that feed the water pipeline, an important quantity of the toxic component parathion was delivered, a substance used to fumigate crops. The early detection of the attack prevented casualties, although the town remained 24 hours without fresh water while the tanks and pipelines were cleaned. As in the case of Pitalito, the attack was attributed to the FARCs[12].

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: HUMAN FECES
          There are records on the use of human feces as biological agents with offensive intentions, that date back to 1998. According to a report by the SIDEN, on March 6 of that year explosives were detonated, which were placed by ELN guerrillas near a patrol car of the Army in Cúcuta (north Santander). This resulted in the death of a soldier. The autopsy and other expert reports carried out by specialists from Legal Medicine confirmed that the attackers "used fecal material in explosive devices, causing a high degree of contamination in wounds"[13].
          In mid 2002, evidence suggested that the Colombian insurgence could employ rudimentary forms of biological weaponry. During the first days of June, in the context of an offensive action with bombs in the region of Cundinamarca, the police inactivated in Silvania a cylinder bomb charged with 5 kilos of homemade explosive R1, potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, sawdust, scraps of iron and "a mix of clay with human feces".
          The danger of these explosive devices are that, when exploding, they produce lethal skin and organic infections to the person affected by its splinters. For this reason, the police declared that if the bomb has exploded, it would have triggered "a tragedy of great proportions"[14].
          Human feces is also used in filling hollowed ammunition warheads. "Operation Pegasus", already mentioned in this paper, provided concrete evidence of this issue.

III. CONCLUSIONS
          By and large, this paper demonstrates that the two assumptions identified in the abstract are false; i.e., that a potential use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorist organizations should be a "massive destruction" modality; and that there are no records of Latin American terrorist organizations attempting to use chemical or biological weapons in order to cause massive damage.

  • Currently, the FARCs are a clear example of the existence of Latin American insurgent organizations inclined to an offensive use of chemical and biological agents, with intensity levels below "massive destruction".
  • More specifically, the meaning of this pattern of actions by the FARCs must be analyzed in four different levels, although interrelated: a tactical level, related to the development of the Colombian conflict; a legal level, related to the compliance of international rules; a technical level, referred to the chemical and biological agents used; and a psychological level, related to the effect in subconsciousness of the opponents to the FARCs.
  • Regarding the Colombian conflict, the use of chemical and biological agents as weapons by insurgent organizations has not shown any concrete benefit to its users. On the contrary, it has produced a degradation of the conflict and a greater damage, totally unnecessary, to the civil population.
  • Legally, the offensive use of chemical and biological weapons constitutes a clear violation of the rules in force in Humanitarian International Law, that were formulated to be applied in interstate armed conflicts, but which are also binding to all parties involved in internal conflicts.
  • Specifically, we observe a clear violation of sections 35 and 51 of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. The first prohibits the use of weaponry and combat methods that cause unnecessary suffering to its victims and generates significant damage to the environment. The second condemns indiscriminate attacks, referring to aggressions that do not affect only military targets, but also civil individuals or assets.
  • However, the Geneva Convention is not the only international institution violated by these actions. The same applies to the 1925 geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention.
  • From a technological point of view, the pattern of actions by the FARCs shows clearly that biological and chemical weapons could be used by subnational groups, without the possession of advanced technical skills and facilities and equipment.
  • The obvious physiological impact of the risk of being attacked with non conventional weapons is a fear factor that could paralyze the official response against insurgency groups.

REFERENCES

  1. Indeed, FARC-EP (Popular Army) name assumed in 1982 which confirms its offensive nature
  2. "Armas químicas: Lo último en degradación del conflicto" ("Chemical weapons: The latest in conflict degradation"), Vanguardia, September 10, 2001.
  3. Uso de armas químicas estrategia terrorista de las FARC y el ELN ("Use of chemical weapons: FARCs and ELN terrorist strategy"), National Defense System of Information (SIDEN), Ministry of National Defense of Colombia, May 29, 2002.
  4. "Tres presuntos guerrilleros irlandeses son arrestados en Colombia" ("Three suspected Irish guerrillaas arrested in Colombia"), CNN in Spanish, August 14, 2001; "Sospechosos del IRA visitaron Colombia para conversar, dice jefe rebelde" ("IRA suspects visited Colombia to Talk, saids Rebel chief"), CNN in Spanish, August 22, 2001.
  5. "COLOMBIA/N.IRELAND: More Links Drawn Between IRA and FARC", Emergency Response Research Institute (ERRI), 08 Jan 2002.
  6. The quantity of chlorine in this agent could justify the pulmonary edema, but not in itself the effects of the hydrogen cyanide.
  7. "Farc están usando armas químicas: FBI" ("The Farcs are using chemical weapons: FBI"), El Espectador, August 20, 2002.
  8. "Uso de químicos revelaría degradación del conflicto" ("The use of chemicals would reveal the degradation of the conflict"), El País (Cali), August 21, 2002.
  9. "La mala hora de ELN" ("ELN's bad time"), Revista Cambio, March 2003.
  10. "Brigada XI detecta químico en proyectiles decomisados al ELN" ("The XI Brigade detects chemicals in missils seized to ELN"), El Universal, March 27, 2003.
  11. "Ataque químico alarma a Pitalito" ("Chemical attack alerts Pitalito"), Diario del Huila, February 23, 2002.
  12. "Restablecen servicio de agua en acueducto envenenado" ("Water service restablished in poisoned water pipeline"), EFE, March 25, 2002.
  13. Use of chemical weapons..., op.cit.
  14. "Las Farc casi repiten tragedia en Bojayá" ("The Farcs almost repeat tragedy in Bojayá"), El Espectador, June 4, 2002.

KEY WORDS

Terrorism, Latin America, FARCs, chemical and biological weapons.

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