CBMTS-Industry III
Second World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism

Sector I: Hazard Management
Chair: David Moore
Battelle Memorial Institute, USA
Co-Chair Filiz Hincal Hacetteppe
University, Turkey

This sector involved six separate sessions and a total of twenty-two podium and three poster presentations.

Session I-A chaired by Daniel Kolleck from Canada and Warwick Penrose of Australia focused on International organizations, treaties and programs related to chemical and biological agents.
          Brian Davey, Director of Health and Safety at the Organisation for Prevention of Chemical Warfare (OPCW) reviewed the history of the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC is the largest weapons treaty, with 153 ratified signatories. The goal of the CWC is a complete and verifiable eradication of CW agents. Chemical weapons are defined by the intent of the user as opposed to by chemical structure or origin and the CWC lists approved uses of specific chemicals. The CWC was not designed to cover terrorism though this is included in its intent. The CWC does provide a framework for each state to provide its own legislation empowering its legal agencies to intervene against potential CW terrorists. There is no call in the CWC for inspection of sites with industrial chemicals not covered by the CWC. However, should a terror attack on an industrial site occur, the resources of the OPCW would likely be mobilized, but this would not be automatic as would be the case in a conventional CW event.
          Doug Eaton representing NBC Team, Canada described some of the chemical agents of choice for terrorists and the countermeasures available to national response organizations. For example, cyanide is the agent of choice of Al Quaeda in its plans to attack infrastructure sites. The mechanics of cyanide dispersal involve either a burster charge or an aerosol can. Dissemination is easy and can be wide ranging with immediate effects. The containment tent and foam system developed by NBC Team, has been field tested and shown to be an efficient and relatively safe way to deal with cyanide dispersal devices.
          Pedro von Eyken's paper on 'Terrorism and the universal adherence to the Convention of Chemical Weapons' provided an insightful view of the diplomatic and legal approaches that can be used to ensure that this convention is adhered to worldwide. Terrorism has had its effect on every country and Argentina has not been exempt. Although there are bureaucratic and administrative reasons why some smaller countries have not joined the CWC, there are countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East that cannot use this excuse. In order for the CWC to achieve its mission, the need for continued diplomatic and legal pressure on those countries that have not joined has never been greater. The CWC has achieved much since its inception, and to truly reduce the threat of terrorist use of chemicals as weapons of mass destruction, then all efforts should be made by the existing 147 member states to ensure that this treaty is joined by every country worldwide.
          Jiri Matousek presented an analysis of content and function of a number of global agreements on combating international terrorism. Today's agreements trace their origin back 40 years to the days when airline hijackings were the modern form of terrorism. Todays agreements ratified by the UN and other regional cooperative organizations, make new efforts to address the methods of new forms of international terrorism.
          Guilherme Santana's paper 'An overview of poison centres in Latin America: Response, Capability and Structure' discussed ways to synergise the latent potential within the poison centre network of this continent. Although there is a diverse level of capabilities between the respective poison centres, increased collaboration between them is the first step to developing an integrated network. Once established, then this can form the platform where all Latin American countries will be in a sound position to detect and respond to emerging threats within this region.

Session I-B chaired by Cornelis Erasmus of South Africa and co/chaired by Zvonko Brigljevic of Croatia, continued the theme of national programs and five lectures were presented during this session.
          Janusz Kocik presented a report on the recent NATO Advanced Research Workshop conducted in Warsaw during January 2003, with the objective of building integrated preparedness against bioterrorism based on experiences of countries that are more advanced in these respects. Current developments were described, including continuous biological surveillance, real time epidemiology, effective risk assessment, laboratory networks, and training and education, to name but a few. It was concluded that building preparedness for response against bioterrorism is a complex issue, which requires integration of inputs from specialized institutions in many fields.
          Daniel Kolleck presented details of an assessment of the preparedness status of Canadian Emergency Departments to respond to chemical events. The survey showed a deficiency in preparedness, particularly in availability of appropriate equipment, antidotal therapy, decontamination capability, and in some instances, even knowledge of 'state-of-the-art' countermeasures. Significant deficiencies were also identified regarding response capabilities in the event of a major biological or nuclear incident, indicating the need to make more adequate provision for effective preparedness planning and execution in all these areas.
          Thomas Snitch gave an outline of the budget priorities of the US DHS (Department of Homeland Security) for the 2004 Fiscal Year. This budget amounts to a total of some $30 billion, and it was pointed out that Biodefence will be a key area for funding. Details of federal funding opportunities for Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs, as well as other similar programs were presented, which should facilitate long term R&D program planning. An appeal was made to CBMTS to publicize, recommend and report on findings and requirements, and to interested parties to apply for available funding.
          Ben Steyn presented an overview of the South African model for handling incidents of terrorism involving CB weapons or radioactive materials. Although technical expertise and essential equipment for management of such incidents do exist, these are limited in numbers and are scattered through various agencies residing in different government levels. First response teams with elements from all relevant agencies are therefore established in metropolitan areas to train and prepare to manage CBR incidents. Proper risk analysis will also be essential for alignment of preparations according to the perceived threat in order to enable the most effective response actions to be conducted.
          Staff Brig Zvonko Brigljevic described ratified international treaties and gave some examples of the implementation of Arms Control Agreements by the Croatian Verification Center. He outlined examples of bilateral agreements on demilitarization of border areas that include inspections from both sides. This exemplifies additional exploration of the Vienna Document as an arms control approach for possible support to border security between the countries in the South Eastern Europe region.

Session I-C was chaired by Tom Snitch of the USA and co-chaired by Cor Bellanger of Belgium.
          Maria Jose Espona from Argentina analyzed terrorist use of chemical and biological agents in Columbia. The organizations that have chosen to use these weapons were the FARC and the ELN and the agents that have been employed include cyanide filled bombs, contamination of water sources by agricultural toxicants and improvised explosive devices filled with human feces.
          Filiz Hincal from Ankara, Turkey presented the results of a poll of university students during the recent Iraq war regarding their perceptions of the risk and threat of CB terrorism and warfare. The students raised their concerns about the lack of proper preparedness in terms of both information and equipment.
          David Humair from Switzerland discussed the various faces, origins, actions and motivations of those who have used mass destruction. He also proposed solutions where the fight against weapons of mass destruction is only one aspect.

Session I-D was chaired by Hannu Salmi of Finland and co-chaired by Paul Tobin of the U.S.
          Cor Bellanger from Brussels, Belgium described the occupational health support of WMD inspections. Occupational health includes consideration of the human being, the environment, and the working conditions. In practice, however, WMD inspectors have additional problems: lack of preparation at home, stress of daily responsibilities and exhaustion added to physical and psychological stresses from outside, in addition to unique issues of being in a foreign setting such as safe drinking water and food, knowledge of local diseases, and absence of family and friends. First aid courses, safe working procedures, appropriate instruction and training, chemical exposure monitoring and medical follow up are recommended to minimize impacts of deployments.
          Damir Subasic, from Croatia presented information regarding the establishment of a Croatian national system for combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Many uses of nuclear materials in nuclear weapon development must be followed, but also many nuclear technologies. Prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials at the sources and during transport via border control is the best approach. The Croatian Ministries of Economy, Health, Internal Affairs and Defense all play a role and the Croatian program includes the following: nuclear materials inventory, physical protection via site security, export and import control, border control against illicit trafficking and specific equipment and related non nuclear material control.

Session I-E Chaired by Jack Woodall, Brazil, and Co-chaired by Evgeny Fokin, Russia
          Brian Davey summarized 6 years of experience with health and safety problems at the OPCW. In a total of more than 1500 inspections involving an average of nearly 60 man-days per inspection, not a single chemical accident or injury occurred, mainly due to a policy of staying out of harm's way as much as possible. Most of the medical problems with OPCW staff involved those common to all international organizations where staff have to adjust to the stresses of a different culture, including a different medical treatment regime, that of the host country. One important difference between the OPCW and other United Nations organizations is that responsibility for health and safety begins with the Director-General and devolves all the way down through the inspection team leaders.
          Eva Dickson, Canada, described the protective equipment used by first responders, usually fire-fighters, and results of realistic testing of its resistance to liquid and vapor of chemical agents. It is important to inform firefighters that they do not necessarily have a larger risk of life-threatening injury when battling a chemical hazard than when they tackle a routine building blaze. Pressure on areas such as the palms of gloves and the inner aspect of sleeves when dragging victims out of danger leads to leakage, and alternative methods of rescue are recommended. Further testing is planned on the protection level of suits against industrial pesticides.
          Zvonko Orehovec presented a highly professional 30 minute film featuring the ASSITEX Exercise held in Croatia. The exercise demonstrated the complexity of a efficient medical response to a terrorist use of CW agent. It showed how, with advanced warning of a terrorist event, portions of the OPCW framework and infrastructure can support the responses of a member nation.

Session I-F was chaired by Murray Hamilton, USA, and co-chaired by Rashid Khaydarov, Uzbekistan
          This session started with a presentation by Evelyn LeChene concerning the emergency preparedness, or lack thereof, among business concerns, particularly financial institutions. The theme of the presentation focused on the protection and education of the business's employees to prevent panic in the event of a serious emergency or terrorist attack. Ms LeChene identified 6 areas of particular concern for a business to pay particular attention to including: business continuity, evacuation procedures, continuity and recovery, accounting for staff, triage and safe areas, and awareness and primary first aid. The major conclusion was that there will be a "time gap" between the initiation of an incident and the arrival of formal government sponsored help (fire, police HAZMAT etc.) and that it is the ethical and probably legal responsibility of business to mitigate staff casualties during this time period.
          Peter Stopa gave a very efficient overview of detection devices for chem/bio weapons. For chemical, there is no single device for all agents and all physical states, but there are several different very good commercially available instruments/kits. Most of the different technologies (paper enzyme, ion mobility, SAW, passive IR, etc.) detect at or below the LD50 but the bottom line is that more than one system working in concert is required to cover the spectrum of all chemical agents. The problem of biologics is completely different because they are either solids or solids dissolved in liquid. Additionally, because the BW can be collected there is a forensic chain of evidence path that must be adhered to. Again, there is no one single technology that is best for all biologicals, but several (eg immunoassay, fluorometric techniques, PCR etc) are available and work relatively well albeit not in real time. Barbara Price volunteered that a comparison of the various technologies is available on the Internet at the Department of Justice (USA) Web site.
          Warwick Penrose gave a cogent representation of the steps involved in managing a radiological event. He outlined decision pathways needed to manage such an event including responder safety, containment, risk level and disposal options. He discussed the exposure levels and safe times and then showed several tables that help an incident commander decide when who and how to send into the hot zone. These guides were provided to the participants in hard copy.
          Ming Der Kuo gave an overview of the seminal case and subsequent spread of SARS from Guangdong province in China to the rest of the world. He discussed how SARS was introduced to Taiwan and other countries and emphasized the vulnerability of health care workers and their role in spreading this corona virus mediated disease. He then described the 3 methods used in Taiwan to definitively establish the diagnosis of SARS: Viral isolation and visualization (electron microscopy), detection (RT-PCR) and serology (immunofluorescent assays). His lab investigated the most sensitive indicator of SARS to use in detection assays and they determined that the nucleocapsid coat protein offered the best sensitivity.

Poster Session: Posters A Chaired by Peter Stopa, USA
          Poster Session A also dealt with Hazards Management. There was a breadth of posters that dealt with various aspects of the area. Posters were presented by Elena Boulanova, Diego Gotelli, and Bozidar Stojanovic. New efforts in modeling and computer-aided hazards management were presented along with the development of plans for updating response systems in response to attacks with biological agents. Hardware development and integration into response systems was also discussed. This session gave an overview of current trends in this area.