VETOXA: The Swiss-Albanian Project to Destroy Old Toxic Military Chemicals in Albania
Col. Alfred Madhi, Ministry of Defence, Republic of Albania
Dr. Ueli Huber, Spiez Laboratory, CH-3700 Switzerland

          The VETOXA project (Vernichtung toxischer Chemikalien in Albanien / Destruction of Toxic Chemicals in Albania) began with a phone call from Brussels to AC-Laboratorium Spiez (ACLS) in February 1998. ACLS was informed that NATO had located a waste disposal problem with toxic chemicals (including chemical weapons) in Albania and would be grateful if Switzerland could take care of this problem. With the approval of the superiors, employees at ACLS made reconnaissance trips to Tirana -- first alone, then with representatives from a potential industrial partner. This resulted in an offer by the company MGC Plasma AG (MGC) to use a plasma technique for the destruction of approximately 20 tonnes of critical chemical products. These were chemicals that were used for training in chemical protection and were stored at the site of the NBC Protection Regiment on the northern edge of Tirana (Table 1). They belonged to the former Albanian Army, which collapsed during the national uprising in 1997. The Swiss Federal Council approved the application for a project in the framework of PfP/EAPC and permitted the 2 million CHF requested in the offer.
          The start of the project was first planned for the summer through autumn of 1999, under the assumption that the workplace in the harbor area of Durres could be outfitted. On one hand, the Kosovo crisis, with its stream of refugees to Albania, and on the other hand hand, the completion of an agreement between Switzerland and Albania concerning the execution of the project led to considerable delays and to fundamental changes in planning the execution of this project. With urging from NATO, the workplace had to be shifted from Durres to Tirana, leading to considerable additional costs in the preparation of infrastructure and transport. In return, the risky transport of chemicals from Tirana to Durres, which the Albanian Army under the leadership of ACLS had agreed to take over, was eliminated. At the end of 1999, one could again discuss the start of the project more concretely. In the meantime, however, there were indications that MGC was getting into an uncomfortable economic situation, a fact which caused further delay. There was no other available alternative to the selected procedure within a useful deadline.
          A general contractor agreement between the Swiss Defence Procurement Agency and MGC was signed at the end of June 2000, still maintaining a cost ceiling of 2 million CHF. At this time, the first funds for preparation work were released. As announced, the technical procedure with new construction of the secondary combustion chamber and various modifications to the entire Plasmox facility required six months. In January and February 2001, the facility was tested in Muttenz and the electrical supply from a diesel electric generator was fitted. This was necessary since the Albanian electrical network for the operation of a high tech facility was too unstable and more importantly, not safe enough. The facility was then disassembled and packed into 15 containers and sent on its way to Tirana -- by train to Koper, SLO, by ship to Durres, ALB and by road to Tirana. From late autumn 2000 until the arrival of the containers in Albania on 19 March 2001, the workplace was prepared. Under the leadership of a construction engineer of the co-ordination office of Swiss Development Co-operation (DEZA) in Albania, Albanian companies provided concrete platforms for the facility, drilled a deep well, improved the access road to the regiment and provided internal connecting roads. In the autumn, there were already indications that considerable additional costs could be calculated. Therefore, on 8 January 2001, a supplemental credit for 0.9 million CHF was applied for and permitted on 16 May 2001.
          Transport and construction of the facility was a logistical masterpiece. On 14 May 2001, the secondary combustion chamber could be put into operation. By the beginning of July, the liquid chemicals (12 tonnes chloropicrin and approx. one tonne training mixture with a proportion close to 5% yperite) were burned in the secondary combustion chamber. The chloropicrin had to be mixed with about 30 % diesel oil. Both liquid products had to be transferred batchwise from the barrels into a feeding container first. The problem was the high temperature for this work, which had to be done with full personal protection equipment. Following that, the solid products ( 23,000 CW simulant containers with small quantities of CW agents and 15,000 tear gas grenades) were then destroyed in the plasma reactor. Unexpected major problems, created by the corrosivity of chloropicrin and its combustion products, forced frequent repairs in the exhaust area of the plant. During the destruction of the solid substances, there was the difficulty that the high oxygen content caused damage to the centrifuge in the plasma reactor, and the exhaust pipe was blocked primarily by potassium chloride. The wastewater from the gas washing system (basic quench and second scrubber, acidic first scrubber) could be processed with a relatively simple chemical procedure. Due to the resulting concentration of 10 to 15 % sodium chloride about 140 m3 of treated wastewater had to be transported to the sea near Durres.
          For the entire duration of the destruction, the chemicals to be destroyed had to be identified, and the compliance with the Swiss limits for air purity and outflow regulations for wastewater, had to be verified. For the analytical services in this area, the Central Army Chemical Laboratory of the Albanian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was called in. The laboratory had been previously equipped for these tasks by Spiez Laboratory or LS, new name for ACLS since 2001) and the personnel had been trained for this work. For the entire duration of the project in Albania, the analytical investigations were accompanied by personnel of LS, who were also designated responsible for the technical supervision and the controlling of the destruction and for the safety in handling toxic chemicals. With the support of the Albanian colleagues in the analytical area, a lasting effect beyond the conclusion of VETOXA was envisaged.
          The co-operation with the Albanian authorities (MoD and civilian authorities) was marked by a strong tendency toward bureaucracy. In this respect, the support of the NATO PfP Cell in Tirana and of the Albanian coordinator, Col Alfred Madhi, with his wide network of connections, were very useful. Besides laboratory analytics, co-operation in the project from the Albanian side was limited to a few logistical services (including delivery of diesel oil, transport of people and water) at modest levels and the positioning of 15 recruits as assistants. Their performance fell far below the expectations of MGC, so that the company had to employ far more of their own personnel, than planned and at short notice. This was essential in order to maintain a 24 hour operation, which was absolutely necessary during certain periods of the destruction campaign. Difficulties with Albanian logistics in the military, as well as civilian area, led to considerable loss of time. Nevertheless, both problems were only first recognized during construction and after the facility came into operation. Again, this led to considerable additional costs.
          On 1 September, the destruction of the last tear gas grenades by combustion was successful and accomplished within the foreseen time frame. Finally, the facility was cleaned and dismantled, again packed into transport containers, and on 1 October, loaded in Durres for the return journey by ferry to Koper. In the area of the NBC Protection Regiment, only 238 empty, perfectly cleaned chloropicrin barrels and the burnt out barrels of training gas mixture remained. All other solid remnants from the destruction process, the slag from the plasma reactor and the filter cakes from the processing of the gas washing water, were declared as special waste material and transported to Switzerland for professional disposal.
          During the summer of 2001, it became clear that the 2.9 million CHF credit would be insufficient to cover the costs of the general contractor. Unavoidable project delays and absolutely necessary additional work due to logistical problems in Albania -- above all, the unforeseeable extra demand for their own personnel -- made the costs run quickly higher. With respect to cost transparency, it should be mentioned that the Swiss DoD, in addition to the general contractor's contract, provided services exceeding approximately 2 million CHF, bringing the total cost for VETOXA to a sum close to 5.3 million CHF!
          In retrospect, the project can be assessed as difficult and complex. However, it brought valuable experience for planning future activities in this area.

Ed. Note: Our thanks to Dr. Ueli Huber (Spiez Laboratory) and Col. Alfred Mahdi (MOD Albania) for their very informative explanation of this critical chemical destruction event.