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The CBMTS IV - a continuation
Spiez, Switzerland, 28 April - 3 May 2002.
We were
able to close this outstanding meeting with a discussion on the
possibilities for and future direction of CBMTS meetings. The
baskets of topic areas will be expanded to include the objectives
of further analyzing possibilities and developing conclusions
and concrete recommendations on the most feasible approaches at
the national, regional, and international levels to:
- develop comprehensive, effective pharmaceutical stockpile
programs
- develop, train and equip emergency response groups
- develop international and regional centers that concentrate
on emerging and re-emerging infections and early warning of
bioterrorism events
Dr. Bernhard
Brunner, the Director Spiez Laboratory, announced he had approved
our request for a fifth international CBMTS meeting to be held
(cont. p. 3 - CBMTS IV)
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ASA had requested Dr. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack
to provide this mini-review of Iraq's capabilities and known
BW program. Lest we forget and whether there is war or not,
we must all be reminded what is there and what Saddam's capabilities
are. We must face realities. Dr. Kraatz-Wadsack is the former
head of UNSCOM's BW inspection program. She was later with
UNMOVIC and is now with the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin.
Dr. Kraatz-Wadsack's response to ASA's request follows:
Iraq's BW
programme
By Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack
Berlin, 21 August 2002. In 1991, when Iraq made its declarations,
it denied any offensive BW programme. It was only in late
August 1995 that Iraq acknowledged BW weaponization. Iraq
subsequently stated that it unilaterally destroyed its filled
weapons and bulk agents in contravention of the obligations
that Iraq's weapons stocks be destroyed under international
supervision. Some sampling and analysis at destruction sites
and remnants do not support Iraq's account of filling, deployment
and destruction of munitions and weapons. Iraq's statement
that the BW programme was 'obliterated' in 1991 is contradicted
by later evidence of the retention of suitable growth media,
BW facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel
as an intact entity, and the essential technical knowledge.
Full Article
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Terrorist Profiles: An Analysis
Based on 920 Chemical Incidents
By Lena Melin
Swedish Defence Research Agency,
FOI NBC Defence
Department of Threat Assessment
S-901 82 Umeå, Sweden
One important part in counter-terrorism threat assessment is to
know who the presumptive perpetrator could be.
Is
it the single individual, animal rights activist, religious sect,
right-wing extremist or somebody else that pose a threat when
it comes to biological and chemical agents? How sophisticated
are the agents of choice and the dispersion techniques? What are
the motives and who are the targets?
Full Article
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Argentina: Response to a Chemical-Biological
Attack
By Maria Jose Espona
Presidencia de la Nacion
Buenos Aires, Argentina
mjespona@hotmail.com
During the last decade, Argentina has suffered two major terrorist
attacks with conventional explosives against: the Israeli Embassy
(1992) and the Argentine - Israeli Mutual Association (1994),
events that had a significant impact in the civil society. Considering
this background - and even evaluating the probability of a terrorist
attack with chemical and biological weapons as very low- the
Argentine government has developed a response plan to face that
kind of threat. This paper describes the (cont. p. 11 - Argentina
CB)
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