Terrorist Profiles: An Analysis Based on 920 Chemical Incidents

Lena Melin
Swedish Defence Research Agency,
FOI NBC Defence
Department of Threat Assessment
S-901 82 Umeå, Sweden

Abstract
          One important part in counter-terrorism threat assessment is to know who the presumptive perpetrator could be.
          Is it the single individual, animal rights activist, religious sect, right-wing extremist or somebody else that pose a threat when it comes to biological and chemical agents? How sophisticated are the agents of choice and the dispersion techniques? What are the motives and who are the targets?
          The FOI NBC Defence database(1) consists of data on almost 1300 incidents involving biological(2) and chemical substances that occurred between 1960 and 2002 (April). The incidents include plans, threats, possession and actual use in more or less successful attacks. Based on an analysis of the 920 chemical incidents it is possible to draw some conclusions on different actors and to establish a pattern concerning motives and targets, the actor's criminal background and education put in relation to the grade of sophistication of the used chemical agents and dispersion methods.
          An analysis of the 377 chemical incidents that resulted in casualties shows that the most commonly used chemicals are easy to acquire. In specific geographical areas, some chemicals are preferably chosen before others and there is a correlation between the perpetrator's level of education and the choice of chemical agent.

General Description of the Database
          The data in the database are coded for a number of characterizing factors to facilitate analyses. For that reason, perpetrators as well as incident types and chemicals are divided into different categories. However, the incidents have not been grouped into the categories 'terrorism' or 'criminal act'. The reason for this is that there is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism. Using the EU definition in Council Common Position, almost every incident in the database could be considered as terrorism(3).
          The database consists of 920 incidents involving chemical substances. None of the incidents can be classified as military, state sponsored or performed by individuals acting in behalf of a government.
          Of the incidents, 377 (41 %) were attacks that resulted in casualties and 215 (24 %) incidents were attacks without casualties. Most of the latter failed because the dispersion methods were inefficient or low-toxic chemicals were chosen. There may be several reasons for the large number of 'successful' incidents. The primary reason is of course that those incidents are the ones that get media's attention. Other incidents that get publicity are those that are more spectacular.
          The rest of the incidents are threats to use toxic materials, (13 %), possession (12 %), claimed use (5 %), plans (4 %) and attempted acquisition (1 %). Claimed use or threats to use chemical material have mostly been directed towards food manufacturers and the motives are mainly economic extortion or to bring pressure for some other reason. Among the 110 incidents, classified as 'possession', it has been possible to determine how a person or group managed to acquire the chemical agent in only 51 cases. Theft (19 cases) and manufacture (12 cases) are the two most common ways.

Analysis of Incidents That Have Resulted in Casualties
          Most of the 377 'successful' incidents were small in scale with less than 10 casualties/incident, but a substantial amount, 39 incidents, resulted in 50 or more casualties. The majority of these took place in Asia (China, India, Vietnam and Japan) with the use of cyanide, pesticides or weed killers. Of theses incidents, 56 produced 10 to 49 casualties. Even if these incidents cannot be defined as mass casualties, they would most likely cause disturbances at the emergency room in a medium-sized hospital. An estimation of the total number of casualties is nearly 600 fatalities and more than 8000 injured.
          Many of the incidents are impossible to analyse because they were performed by unknown perpetrators and therefore with unknown motives. Other incidents have been covered inadequately in the media and the reports do not contain enough information for an analysis.

Perpetrators
          It would be logical to assume that the most 'successful' perpetrators are well-organized groups, with members highly educated in chemistry or having the appropriate technical skills to synthesize and disperse toxic material. This is not the case. Instead, single individuals and unknown perpetrators are responsible for almost 85% of the incidents that resulted in casualties. Studying the performance of the incidents, the conclusion is that most 'unknown perpetrators' probably are single individuals. Most of them are ordinary citizens, with no criminal record, attacking persons to whom they have some relation, (relative, colleague or rival in business or love) and with the use of chemicals that are easy to obtain.
          In the category 'single individual', there is also a new type of perpetrator, the juveniles. A total of 37 incidents were performed by persons under 18. Most juvenile perpetrators are teenagers, but the database includes some that are younger than that. The youngest perpetrators were three girls in California, USA, 8 - 9 years old. In July 2001, they tried to poison a classmate with rat poison because 'they didn't like her'. Of the 37 incidents, 33 occurred between January 2000 and December 31, 2001. The increasing number of juvenile perpetrators is alarming, especially since they succeeded in causing casualties on 19 occasions. The majority (81 %) of young perpetrators were in North America, the rest in Asia and Great Britain.
          Near Eastern Groups(4), for example Hamas, GIA and al-Qaeda sympathizers are well known for their numerous conventional attacks but a serious interest in biological or chemical agents have not been observed until recently. There is now indications, or rumours, that several of them have tried to get into possession of chemical agents. Since Fall 2001 there has been several reports from Israel about bombs containing nails, dipped in rat poison or other chemicals.
          Animal rights activists like Animal Liberation Front seem to have their strongholds in North America and Western Europe and there has been a number of claimed or verified cases of food poisoning, using chemicals like rat poison, oven cleaners and mercury. None of these poisonings caused any casualties.
          Right wing extremists seem to be interested in cyanide and toxins, especially ricin, but also other poisonous plants. So far, no reports have been made about any successful attacks.
          The category 'other groups' includes 'foreign terrorist organizations'(5) with the exclusion of groups belonging to the category 'Near Eastern groups'. Some examples are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The category also includes other nationalist, opposition and left-wing groups. A common factor among these groups is their political goals and motives found in the incidents. Like the Near Eastern groups, the majority of their attacks are conventional and the interest in chemicals has so far been limited to plans, possession, claimed and failed use. Only 10 % of the incidents were 'successful', resulting in only a smaller number of casualties.

The Choice of Chemicals
          Although there is a concern that individuals or groups could get in the possession of nerve or mustard gas, toxins and other extremely poisonous chemicals, most perpetrators tend to make an easy choice. Attacks with chemicals are mostly performed with the use of acid, household chemicals, pesticides, cyanide, arsenic, tear gas and pepper spray. The use of pesticides and cyanide in food or beverages has resulted in several mass casualty situations, especially in Asia.
          In an industrialized society, there is a widespread use of toxic chemicals, transported daily in large amounts on the roads or by rail. It is not unrealistic to illegally acquire large quantities of chemicals during the transportation or to steal it from an industry and there have been a few cases in recent years(6). After last years reports that al-Qaeda cells maybe planned to use hazardous materials trucks in terrorist attacks, the fear of such attacks will hopefully increase the security during road and rail transport.
          Bangladesh and India faces other problems, where (sulfuric) acid attacks against women are on the rise despite severe legislation(7). The acid is easily available from car repair shops, imported for industrial use or obtainable in other shops in small quantities. So is also the case in the rest of the world and acid attacks are reported regularly. In Sweden, where no chemical attacks at all were reported until 1995, there have now been several ones. Between January 30, 2001 and March 31, 2002, six acid attacks were reported. Some of the more exotic or unusual chemicals and toxins have been used by perpetrators who work at laboratories or within research(8). Others have managed to acquire small quantities of chemicals at their workplace or by theft from industries etc.

Dispersion Methods
          The choices of dispersion methods are without exceptions poor. The delivery methods that have been found include throwing the chemical out of a bottle or a jar, spraying, injections using syringes, rubbing it into doorknobs, pouring it into wells or mixing it directly into food or beverages. The Hamas' strategy to mix nails and chemicals in bombs will most certainly fail, because of the heat of the explosion. Not even Aum Shinrikyo managed to develop an efficient delivery system, in spite of the fact that many of their scientists were highly educated in chemistry. The hurdle was probably the lack of technical skills. A group that can recruit persons with those qualifications may pose a more serious threat.

Motives
          Among the incidents where a motive can be established, the most common ones are political, economic or revenge/hate. Groups that mostly have political motives are the Near Eastern groups, single-issue groups (e.g. animal rights activists and anti-sexist groups) and other groups (e.g. LTTE, FARC and other national groups). For single individuals and unknown perpetrators, the motives are mainly economic or revenge/hate.
          For the single individuals it turned out that there is a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim in 70 % of the attacks, with hate or revenge as the most common motive. In contrast, only 6 % of the unknown perpetrators seem to have some relation to the victim. Since almost 300 incidents are unsolved, it is impossible to establish the motive. For these cases, a motive can possibly be estimated by studying the target and the performance of the attack.

Where?
          Most 'successful' incidents have been reported in North America, Europe and Asia. When looking at the geographical spread of incidents, there is a lack of information on incidents in South America and parts of Africa. This can indicate that there are fewer biological or chemical incidents, that the local media do not cover this type of event or that smaller incidents have been mentioned in the local media but have not reached Europe because of a low 'media value'.
          In China, the use of toxic chemicals in food has become a major problem. Since January 2001, 11 food-related incidents have been reported, in which six resulted in 20 - 100 injured and in some cases a smaller number of deaths.
          So far, all chemical attacks can be classified as national terrorism. The first signs of international chemical terrorism were observed during the autumn of 2001 with revelations that al-Qaeda cells had plans to perform chemical attacks outside of their home base.

Conclusions and Possible Future Trends
          So far, the most 'successful' perpetrator has been the single individual, often with the possibility to get hold of highly toxic chemicals. Even if the dispersion methods are poor, in many cases the results have been 'cost-efficient' (many injured to a low cost and effort). The widespread media coverage last fall about the possibility of using crop dusters or transporting industrial chemicals in an attack can also generate new ideas among presumptive perpetrators. The new idea to use letters as the carrier of chemicals was introduced after the worldwide publishing of the anthrax letter attacks in September and October 2001. In November 2001, a cyanide-laced letter addressed to a New Jersey police department was intercepted by a post office. The letter contained trace amounts of copper cyanide blended into laundry detergent(9). Another incident occurred in UK in March 2002, when the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) sent out 16 packages to people with political connections. Tony Blair's wife, among others, has received aromatherapy oil bottles containing sodium hydroxide(10).
          In the last few years, there have been an increasing number of reports about groups like Hamas and GIA, who seek to acquire and release toxic material, so far without much success. In January 2002 there was a report that Israeli chiefs of intelligence believe that the military wing of Hamas is trying to acquire lethal toxins for use in future attacks and that 'Hamas is now trying to get hold of sarin and other nerve gases'.(11) On the other hand, when or if they succeed, there is a risk of spectacular attacks because of Hamas's willingness to sacrifice a lot of lives, including their own.
          Another alarming trend is the increasing number of juvenile perpetrators and the possibility for private persons to obtain toxic material. This should be prevented by harder regulations of the sale and accessibility of toxic chemicals.

References:

1. This database is continuously updated with new incidents. All information is based on open sources like newspaper articles, books etc.
2. In this paper, there is no analysis of the biological incidents. Because of a lack of time after September 11, 2001, no updating of the biological incidents has been made. The database will be continuously updated later this year with the possibility to make further analyses.
3. The FBI definition in the Code of Federal Regulations is "…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". Within the EU, a definition of terrorism can be found in Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, where the council of the European Union has accepted a common position. One of the paragraphs (Article 1, 3. (iii) (f)), deals with WMD terrorism as follows: "manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons". The full text can be found at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_344/l_34420011228en00930096.pdf.
4. As defined in K. Katzman, CRS Report for Congress, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001
5. As defined in Fact sheet: Secretary of State designates foreign terrorist organizations (FTO's), Office of the Spokesman, Washington DC, October 5, 2001.
6. On several occasions between 1998 and 2001, potassium and sodium cyanide were stolen from warehouses and factories in Japan. See for example 1 kg of potassium cyanide missing from Tokyo warehouse, Japan Economic Newswire, February 18, 2001. USA too seems to have problems with thefts, especially in rural areas. In 2000, a trailer with 20 barrels of potassium cyanide was stolen in New Jersey. The barrels were found ten days later in New York. Stolen barrels of cyanide found in NYC, APBnews.com, May 14, 2000. According to an article in Omaha World-Herald, twenty-four theft-related spills of anhydrous ammonia were reported in 2000. Joe Kolman, Ammonia thefts pose public peril, Omaha World-Herald, January 5, 2001.
7. According to Inter Press Service, UNICEF reported a rise from 47 incidents in 1996 to 230 in 1999 in Bangladesh. In May 2000 alone, there were 27 attacks on women in Bangladesh. However, the reported incidents account for only a small fraction of the attacks actually taking place. Under the 1995 Woman and Children Repression Prevention Act, an acid attack can lead to a long jail term and even result in capital punishment. Inter Press Service, Women-Bangladesh: disfigured by acid attacks despite tough law, June 19, 2000.
8. One example is John Buettner-Janusch who sent chocolate poisoned with atropine, sparteine and pilocarpine hydrochloride to a judge in 1987. The motive was revenge for the five-year prison term the judge imposed in 1980 after B-J's manufacturing of illegal drugs in his university laboratory. Another example: Poison candy sender's prison term cut in half, Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1988.
9. Ralph Siegel, Cyanide letter likely from domestic source; anthrax sampling done at 48 sites, Associated Press, November 4, 2001.
10. Myra Philip, Terrorists taken seriously as country waits for 13 remaining parcels; political activists on alert for deadly SNLA packages, The Express, March 4, 2002.
11. Israel - lethal toxins in hands of Hamas cause concern, United Communications Group, Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, January 2, 2002.

Editor's Note: Many thanks to the author for her excellent presentation of this paper at CBMTS IV. We look forward to her participation in the CBMTS-Industry III "Second World Congress on Chem/Bio/Radiological Terrorism" in Dubrovnik in 2003.