An ASA Book Review by: Professor John Ellis van Courtland Moon

Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
by Judith Miller, Stephen Englelberg and William Broad
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.
ISBN 0-684-87158-0.
Bibliography. Index. Pp. 381. $27.00.

           Germs, a fascinating account and analysis of the bioterrorist threat, was written and released before the horrific events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax incidents. The accidental timing of its publication has contributed to placing it on the New York Times best seller list. The narrative is largely chronological, stretching from the end of World War II to the present. While the authors convey a sense of simultaneous developments, each chapter is skillfully focused. Chapter 1 describes a little publicized event: the 1984 poisoning with salmonella (of salad bars in Wasco County, Oregon, by the Rajhneeshees, a religious cult, an attack which made 751 people ill. Although the attack was non lethal, the cult fanatic, Ma Anand Puja, had ordered far more dangerous agents. The subsequent investigation did not uncover the causes of the subsequent illnesses until a year later. This incident provided a frightening forecast of the dangers posed by bioterrorism and of the difficulties in detecting and countering it in a timely manner.
          Chapter 2 deals with the US biological warfare [BW] program which was unilaterally abandoned by order of President Nixon in 1969; chapter 3, with the biotech revolution and the mounting suspicions that the USSR is cheating on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [BTWC]. Chapter 4 switches to Iraq and the growing concern in the late 1980s regarding her biological weapons program. The fear that Iraq might use BW agents in the Gulf War raised the controversial issue of vaccination, the debate over its wisdom and its risks which is continued in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 5, the authors review the investigations by the United Nations Special Commission [UNSCOM] into the Iraqi biological warfare program, the evasions and denials of Iraqi officials regarding their program and the mounting revelations of the secret Soviet BW program. The chapter highlights the rising fears of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Chapter 6 details the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in the Tokyo subway, which along with the Oklahoma terrorist act, leads to a heightened realization in the United States of its vulnerability to BW terrorism. Chapter 7 returns to the USSR biological warfare program and to the revelations of its extensiveness. For the first time, the "Toxic Archipelago" is exposed to Western views. In Chapter 8, UNSCOM, after the defection of Hussein Kamel, finally achieves a breakthrough and a reluctant admission from Iraq that it had pursued an extensive BW program. In Chapters 9 and 10, the emphasis falls upon the mounting concern with BW proliferation which finally leads to the Pentagon‚s decision to vaccinate all its military personnel and to President Clinton's decision to emphasize the BW defensive program. Chapter 11 centers on the defensive effort and its continuing frustration because of poor use of available funds. Chapter 12 looks towards the future, outlining projects started in the past that have continuing implications for biological warfare: the threats posed by the biotech revolution, the secretive US BW programs, only recently revealed in the New York Times, programs which could compromise the boundary between defensive and offensive research. The conclusion critically reviews the failures of the United States officials and planners to come to grips with the dangers posed by biological weapons, and proposes a series of steps to heighten the security of the country against biological attack.
           Recent events re-emphasize the concerns raised in this book. The alarm regarding the potential threat of biological warfare terrorism should have been heightened seventeen years ago with the Rajhneeshee incident, an alarm which should have been reinforced by subsequent terroristic events. If proper attention had been focussed over time, US preparedness would probably be far more advanced than it is now. As the authors demonstrate, the reasons are multiple and interrelated.
           First, the Rajhneeshee incident was low intensity. The attempts of Aum Shinrikyo to use biological weapons were a failure. It was easy to assume that future incidents would be similar. It should also be noted that even the recent anthrax incidents have claimed only five victims. The most horrifying terrorist attacks in the US have been waged with conventional weapons: the 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City and the September 2001 destruction of the twin towers in New York City. Second, intelligence on the BW activity of nation states is notoriously difficult to obtain. The failure of the Western governments to assess correctly the extent to which the Soviets were cheating on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or the advanced state of the Iraqi program bear testimony to this problem. The activities of terrorist organization in biological warfare are even more impenetrable than those of nation states. Aum Shinrikyo‚s efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons went unseen by even the Japanese police who were already concerned about their other criminal activities. Third, the problem of detection is still unsolved despite the mounting attention placed upon it. If an BW attack takes place, the first line of defense is identifying the agent used. Here the record is not reassuring. As the authors note, when the West Nile virus struck down a number of victims in New York City in 1999, the resulting disease was first identified as St. Louis encephalitis. In the 2001 anthrax incidents, delayed or faulty diagnoses lead to five deaths. Third, even when the BW threat emerged as a matter of major concern, even when funding for biological warfare defense increased significantly, money was not wisely allocated. A vast network of organizations got into the act, competing for resources and treading on one another‚s bureaucratic toes.
           Underlining these factors lay attitudes which subverted BW defense. Military officers dislike biological weapons and are skeptical that any adequate defense is possible against their use. The authors quote one officer's succinct judgement: "There is an in box, an out box, and a too-hard-to-do box....We saw it as a threat, but we didn't want to deal with it, to put together a war plan. It was too difficult." [p. 91] That attitude of distaste leads to unwarranted lethargy and a paralysis of action. Another inhibiting factor was the dominance of nuclear over chemical and biological [CB] planning during the Cold War. It lead to a prolonged lack of priority being awarded to CB within the decision making establishment. Finally, simple disbelief that anyone would resort to indiscriminate weapons which violated international norms, a conviction reinforced by the scarcity of incidents, lead to neglect of realistic attempts to deal with the threat.
           What is feared most still has not happened: the use of biological weapons on a massive scale, employing highly contagious agents like smallpox and unleashing an epidemic causing millions of casualties. As the authors query in their concluding chapter: "Is the threat of germ weapons real or exaggerated." [page 315] Their judgement: "Our answer is both." So far the BW nightmare scenario envisioned in the preparedness exercises described by the authors has not occurred. But the reassurances yielded by the past provide no certainty for the future. The unexpected can catch us before we have a chance to defend ourselves. Who before 11 September 2001 ever expected that terrorists would use airplanes as guided missiles? Who clearly foresaw that a terrorist or a group of terrorists would use the United States mail service rather than an aerosol to spread anthrax spores? Most disasters in history occur because of a failure of imagination on the part of those who are attacked. What is now clear is that fundamental barriers against terroristic attacks directed at civilians have been breached: the sensitivity against killing innocent civilians has been discarded and the prohibition against using a biological agent is at least weakened by the anthrax incidents.
           As yet, terrorists have not succeeded in causing massive civilian fatalities with weapons of mass destruction. Although Aum Shinrikyo successfully released sarin in the Tokyo subway, the attack caused only 12 fatalities. And, of course, they may never succeed in using weapons of mass destruction on a large scale. But, after 11 September, it would be wishful thinking to believe that a more successful attempt will not be made. Some of the new terrorists have both the will and the desire to use these weapons. The authors, therefore, conclude by recommending a series of steps to strengthen biological defense: the strengthening of the 1972 BTWC "by providing some means of enforcement" (p. 317), the mobilization of international law against traffickers in BW material, the tightening of rules governing the sales of biological materials by germ banks, tougher national laws, co-operative programs with Russia to prevent brain drain of BW experts from that country, the strengthening of the US public health system, openness in defensive BW work monitored by an independent oversight committee. They end with the warning more pertinent now than when the book went to press. "We remain woefully unprepared for a calamity that would be unlike any this country has ever experienced." (p. 320)

John Ellis van Courtland Moon
4 December 2001

ASA and our family of professionals thank Professor John Moon for another well done and thorough review and commentary on one of today's most talked about books of highest interest. And for Judy, Steve and Bill "Well done", you did get everyone's attention.