Celebrating 60 Years of CB Research at Defence Research Establishment Suffield (1941-2001)
by Dr. Paul A. D'Agostino and Dr. Cam A. Boulet

          Chemical and Biological Defence Section Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) is one of five research and development establishments within the newly created agency, Defence R&D Canada. Located 50 kilometers northwest of Medicine Hat, Alberta, DRES is focussed on providing the Canadian Forces with defence science and technology leadership in chemical/biological (CB) defence, military engineering and humanitarian de-mining. CB defence has been the heart of DRES since its inception as a test facility to address the threat of chemical warfare use against Canadian and allied troops during World War II.

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US Rejection of the Protocol at the Eleventh Hour Endangers Collective Security Against Biological Weapons
by Graham S. Pearson

           The Promising Scene for a Protocol The BTWC Protocol: The Final Stage (ASA 01-2) reported that Ambassador Tibor Tóth, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group had provided a Chairman's composite Protocol text to delegations on 30 March 2001, which is entirely based on the rolling text with compromises adopted to resolve the remaining differing views. The BTWC Protocol: The Chairman's Composite Text analyzed the composite Protocol text and reported on the twenty-third session of the Ad Hoc Group, which met in Geneva from Monday 23 April to Friday 11 May 2001.

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The 7th Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
A summary from the organisers
by Gertrud Puu and Kurt Persson

          The meeting in Stockholm from 15-19 June was a success. "All" were there. With 820+ delegates representing more than 40 nations, and with 80 exhibitors, the walls of the conference venue Norra Latin were sometimes bulging. As late as the beginning of May when the registrations were still relatively low, we would have never believed that we would once again break the record for attendance. Then with a large number of late registrations arriving daily, our administrative staff proved to be very flexible and professional as they solved the numerous problems that invariably occur. Success was assured because of them. (Continued inside)

A biochemist, molecular biologist and toxicologist, Dr. Portmann recently retired from the Spiez Laboratory. His comments highlight what current technology can and cannot do for the BTWC.

Proposed Declarations A Big Step Ahead: Technology for Verification is Not Yet There
by Rudolf Portmann

          The negotiations for an extension to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to develop a Protocol "to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention" has reached a critical point. The American have decided not to accept the current Protocol version, the result of long continuing negotiations since the Third Review conference in 1991. What is the crucial difference between the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the BTWC? It is the on site inspection by an international team.

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