Conforming to the CWC is not Easy and not Cheap

Barbara B. Price, PhD and Richard M. Price, Col. USAF Ret.

Introduction
          The ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC, and its entry into force on 29 April 1997, 180 days after the deposition of the 65th instrument of ratification, was a milestone in treaties and conventions for weapons. Most of us understand the CWC as a primary mechanism in the effort to restrict the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, WMD. Fewer people and governments appreciate that this treaty restricts trade in many chemicals to those countries that have ratified the CWC.
          Historically, chemical weapons have been regarded as relatively cheap to make and use, "the poor man's nuclear bomb." Changes in the political climate, including the level of acceptable risk, have made chemical weapons much more expensive to have and use. Additionally and since the 1980s, countries have been increasingly holding their militaries responsible for cleaning up chemical spills, leaks and disposal sites associated with previous military practices. Even without the CWC, many of the developed countries have been cleaning up their chemical act, including old chemical warfare agents (CWA) in bulk and in munitions.
           The CWC has further increased the liabilities, risks, and expense of owning chemical weapons. Not only are there costs to making the weapons, cleaning-up after producing, testing and using them and destroying them, now there the added are costs of treaty compliance. Table 1 summarizes some of these costs. Many of these costs had been increasing due to changes in acceptable levels of risk to the military and society. The CWC has been able to build on these changes in society's acceptable costs and risks. Without question, the CWC has been a political force to ensure that the goal of minimal increases in risk to civilian populations from exposures to abandoned and stored CW and bulk agents is realized. Table 1 summarizes the increasing costs of chemical weapons.

What does the CWC involve?
           As of 12 February 2001, 174 countries have signed, ratified or acceded to the CWC and only 19 countries have not signed. Of those latter, several are a concern (Iraq, North Korea), but some really have not put together the resources to either administer the CWC or do not feel they can afford the costs associated with membership in the CWC. Some of the added costs for CWC States Parties are listed by examples in Table 2.
           One of methods used to encourage participation in the CWC is allowing trade in restricted chemicals only between those states that have ratified the CWC. By signing and ratifying the CWC, smaller and lesser developed countries are able to get assistance both to set up their national authorities to administer the CWC and to protect themselves (equipment, resources, etc.) if they are attacked with or believe they are in danger of attack with CW.
           The CWC incorporates other innovations including

• provisions for inspecting chemical plants and facilities storing or destroying restricted chemicals and CWs,
• verification by analysis of the presence or absence of restricted chemicals and CW.

          The OPCW is the technical and administrative arm of the CWC. It is funded by the countries that have ratified the CWC. The budget for the OPCW in 2000 was $60 billion.
           There are only four declared possessor states, i.e., states that have ratified the CWC and declared that they have chemical weapons: US, Russia, Korea, and India. However, these are not the only states parties that are dealing with these issues and costs. Japan and China are working on the chemical weapons Japan abandoned in China during its occupation prior to and during WWII. Germany has been cleaning up old chemical weapons and agents since the end of WWII in Munster. Denmark and Belgium have been cleaning up old rounds of mustard and some nerve agents that were either dumped in the local seas or are still in the fields, including in those in Ypres, where modern CWs were first used in WWI.

Verification
           Verification analysis is the identification of CWA and their by-products and degradation productions. Verification analyses will play a role in inspections and alleged use and yet they are a minor cost in the overall costs of the CWC.
           The OPCW has put together very detailed analytical protocols, many built on the hard work of Marjatta Rautio and the University of Helsinki. As many of us know, the costs to acquire, maintain and operate the equipment and train chemists to perform the analyses are expensive. The OPCW also uses Round Robin tests to train and demonstrate proficiency. There are currently about 13 designated laboratories around the world that can be used to verify the presence or absence of CWA or their products in samples. These are laboratories that have currently demonstrated that they can identify the presence of CWA in samples from chemical manufacturing facilities, storage facilities and abandoned CW sites.
            It is worth considering several aspects of verification in addition to the verification analyses. Inspections of CW sites, facilities and industries that use any of the scheduled chemicals are the biggest part of the verification process and a big part of the OPCW's verification department.

• There are 33 declared storage facilities in the four Possessor States.
• There are 61 CW production facilities.
• There are 54 locations of abandoned CW in eight States Parties.
• There are 70,000 tons of bulk CWA and 8.4 million rounds of CW filled munitions.

Since the CWC entered into force four years ago, there have been

• 870 inspections
  - 540 at CW sites
  - 325 at chemical industries (for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals)
  - covering 416 sites.
• Only 46 of the 51 States Parties that have declared something have been inspected.
• 70% of the inspections have been in the US
• 1.4 million CW munitions have been destroyed (US, Korea, India, Russia)
• 5,000 tons of bulk CWA have been destroyed (mostly India)

Verification Analysis
           With all this activity, there have been NO samples sent for laboratory verification. (Note - this was written prior to the reported late March inspection and sampling at a UK chemical plant. Please see On The Street, p.15)
           Only a few chemical analyses have been done on field equipment or equipment at the inspected site. These verification analyses have been at destruction sites or at industries using Schedule 1 chemicals, where adequate laboratory equipment is available.
           Why not? Technically, it is very straightforward to analyze for the chemicals. There are many chemicals that need to be in the data base from all the degradation products, by products, isomers, individuals in the classes of chemicals, and of course the discrete organic chemicals. The equipment and protocols are there. It is even easier than USEPA analysis because, unless the site is a clean-up site, you do not have to worry about quantitation, just identification.
           Off-site laboratory analysis is very political. This is the reason the OPCW is encouraging more laboratories to seek designation. But even with a good geographical spread of laboratories, politically there are not yet good guidelines or even agreement within the member states of how to approach sending samples to off-site laboratories.
            Some of the questions and agreements concern:

• Sampling: Some of these protocols have been worked out, the technical ones. But if you look at the legislation to implement the CWC, there are usually provisions for the facility owner/operator to have a say in where the samples are taken and who will be around to witness the sampling. Will the member state allow the sample off-site? Out of country?
• Shipping: How shall the samples be sent. By air? When labeled as a potential CW sample, air carriers refuse to accept these. They do accept the Round Robin samples.
• Which laboratories?: Politically how will the OPCW select the laboratories to analyze the samples. How much negotiations and how long will they take? Are these negotiations to be done before the samples are taken?
• How many samples?: Two are required, by the CWC, but three will be used. This is to avoid a positive by one lab and negative by the second lab. Will three be enough?
• Alleged Use: If it is an alleged use situation, who is taking the samples? Who is protecting the samplers? Can you keep a chain of custody going in a conflict situation? If you wait until after the active conflict, when is it safe to take a sample?

Where do Verification Analyses Fit?
            In addition to the verification analyses during inspections and in cases of alleged use, there are other aspects of the CWC that will require verification analyses. These include analyses to confirm destruction and monitoring of exposure levels. In many cases, there will be a laboratory on site already doing the analyses for CW destruction or demilitarization. In most cases, it is unlikely that off-site analyses will be needed.
           For example, the Johnston Atoll (Kalama Atoll) chemical weapon destruction was finished during the first week in December 2000. This was done without any off-site analyses, but with inspection teams on site continuously during the destruction of the weapons. Now the plan is for the dismantling and destruction of the incinerator and the inspection team will remain until that is completed. No off-site analyses are planned. The land will be turned over to the US Fish and Wildlife Service as a bird sanctuary when the facilities have been closed, done in cooperation with the OPCW, USEPA and US Fish and Wildlife Services.
           In cases where the monitoring team is not satisfied or has concerns about the analyses being done on site, or where the local community is concerned, it is possible that samples may be sent off-site.

Do We Need Verification Analyses?
            Yes, we need the proven capability even if the off-site analysis is never done.
            Despite the current experience, we must remember the CWC is a very new treaty. Part of its important implementation is the verification analysis. Although we are still working and negotiating the specifics and the details, the verification analyses are an integral part of the CWC. It is one of the aspects of the treaty that can assure transparency and confidence building. And it is very necessary that there are laboratories around the world that can do the analyses.

Conclusion
           Neither the politics nor the technical aspects of the CWC are simple. In some ways the verification analyses are the easiest part. Taken together all aspects are very expensive, but so are the consequences of CW use. So it is very worthwhile and cost effective to work on prevention, as the CWC was set up to do. In the final critique, laboratory analyses may not be needed if we are able to reach real confidence between nations and transparency in chemical production and industry in all nations.

Note: This article was presented by the authors at the Pacifichem 2000 Conference in December 2000, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Table 1.

Table 2.

1. On Site Industry Inspections In the US these will probably number 18 for this CY 2000 and may increase to 36 during CY 2001. These inspections were primarily at plants producing, processing and/or consuming Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals. These inspections were successfully concluded.
            What do these inspections cost?

• a. The average cost to the US government per inspection is approximately $50,000, and
• b. The average cost to the participating industry varies from $6,000. to $107,000, depending on complexity, etc. This may decrease for individual inspections as both the government and industries learn what to do and how to do it.
• c. In the UK, the cost of compliance to industry is about $2.25million, industry cost per inspection $7500 to $60,000.

2. Each State Party must maintain a current chemical database, must file initial and annual data declarations with the Technical Secretariat, and must maintain a National Authority to meet, escort and provide assistance to the OPCW inspection teams. The UK estimates $825,00 per year for its National Authority.

3. Each State Party is obligated to provide assistance to other State Parties under Article X of the CWC. This assistance is to be provided upon a State Party's Declaration that they are either under attack or that they fear being attacked with Chemical Weapons.

4. The cost estimate to eliminate the US stockpile equates to approximately $500,000 per ton or $17 Billion.

5. The cost estimate to eliminate the Russian stockpile is estimated at $5.7 Billion, if the dollars could be found. This dollar cost must be compared to the Russian national debt service, which is approximately $17 Billion. Priorities for the Russian Demil program will not be very high.

6. There is a substantial cost associated with developing a regional infrastructure to take care of the health and social needs of the population living near the CW destruction facilities.

7. Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACWs) in China. This program is underway (read for example ASA Newsletter 00-6). The budget in Japan for this effort started with an appropriation of $8 Million in FY 99 and then $27 Million in FY 2000. Japan, with China, hopes to destroy the 700,000 ACWs by the 2007 mandatory date, as specified by the CWC. This will be a costly effort.

8. Clean-up. Costs associated with weapons destruction must include what will be in dollar costs, rather astronomical environmental clean-up programs for all storage and production facilities.

01-2, issue no. 83