Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Reflections on the Wilton Park Conference: 9-11 February 2001.

by John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Professor Emeritus

          I. Participants and Setting: The conference on "International Co-Operation to Prevent CBW Terrorism", chaired by Dr. Richard Latter, the Director of the Wilton Park Center, took place at Wiston House, West Sussex, from 9-11 February 2001. Wiston House is a 16th century mansion overlooking the Downs. The variety of professions represented at the conference reflected the complexity of dealing with the possibility of chemical and biological terrorism. The participants included medical crisis managers, arms controllers, academics, government officials, police superintendents and constables, scientists, military officers, defense and foreign office officials, civil defense officials, international security analysts. They came from a wide-variety of countries ranging from Nepal to Sweden although the heaviest representation came from the United States and the United Kingdom.

          II. The Essential Problem: Low Probability; High Consequences: How real is the possibility of a chemical/biological [CBW] terrorist event? The arms control community is basically split on the question of the degree of the threat. The optimists argue that past historical experience, except for some low intensity instances, shows that terrorists are neither capable nor desirous of using these weapons to achieve their aims. They prefer the simpler weapon of dynamite. The "worst case" advocates, on the other hand, emphasize the numberless vulnerabilities of modern nations to unconventional terrorist attacks. Since it is possible, it will be done. The consensus of the conference is that these two schools of thought tend to reduce a complex problem into simple alternatives. The essential problem is that, although there is a low probability of a high intensity event, the political consequences of any CBW terrorist event are so high that advanced preparations to defeat or manage it deserve serious attention. Moreover, it is currently impossible to predict whether future developments, especially in the promising field of genetic engineering which could yield new weapons into unscrupulous hands, will make the terrorist use of these weapons more attractive and more feasible than it is now. Finally, globalization has increased the number of vulnerable targets open to terrorists seeking to inflict mass casualties.

          III. The Threat: Who are the terrorists most likely to resort to CBW terrorism? The threat could come from two different actors: state parties and non-state or trans-national organizations commonly defined as "new terrorists". This latter category includes far right fanatics, religious "end of the world" sects, racists and other, often trans-national, organizations determined to pull down governments or provoke an apocalypse. States, even those who harbor terrorists, are unlikely to use chemical or biological terrorism except in desperation when they feel that they have nothing to lose. In extremity, especially when faced with destruction, they might pull off "a mad dog" act. States normally seek to achieve definite, usually limited, political goals. Non-state group, like the IRA or some of the Palestinian opposition groups, also seek limited objectives. Currently, few organizations within the second category have the technical ability to do the job on a major scale. However, in the current "century of biology", we cannot assume that this situation will persist. The links between terrorist groups and criminal organizations, especially those involved in the narcotics trade, organizations already comfortable in the handling of dangerous and illegal products, increase the possibility that chemical and biological munitions could be easily and secretly transported as they are moved silently from source to target.

          IV. The Response: Prevention: What can be done to prevent the use of CBW terrorism? Essentially, counter-terrorism depends upon promoting an environment which will increase the chances that CBW terrorism will not take place. The threat calls for a flexible response utilizing the many tools at our disposal to complicate the task of the terrorist. The consensus of the conference was that inter-agency co-operation should be a priority concern. International co-operation can subsequently operate more efficiently if national governments get their act together. It is useful to consider what a terrorist needs to fight his war by a comparison with military operations. Seven factors essential or useful in war are also important for the success of a terrorist operation: a physical base which can range from a region to a complex of safe houses, a financial base, group cohesion, justification for the use of violence, logistical support, mobility and the ability to launch a surprise strike preferably on an unprotected target. Flexible response includes deterrence, economic measures including the interception of the terrorist supply network, the internal infiltration of terrorist groups, the strengthening of the norms against the use of poisonous weapons, the identification, isolation and apprehension of terrorists and defensive measures to protect attractive target sites. Two basic points should be emphasized. The foundation of any successful counter-terrorist program is superior intelligence and detection. It is imperative to develop the capability to anticipate the act, to identify the actor and the agent and to distinguish the attack from a naturally occurring epidemic. Second, deterrence is a dominant factor in all counter-terrorism measures whether economic, military or political and diplomatic. Deterrence is dependent on the identification of terrorist bases by nations under threat or attack and the conviction of the terrorist that use of CB weapons will lead to vigorous and effective retaliation. Economic measures can take the form of freezing the financial assets upon which terrorists depend, the imposition of sanctions upon nations identified as suppliers or promoters and export-import measures to deny a potential aggressor the precursors necessary for chemical and biological warfare. Such measures, which dry up the marsh from which the terrorist operates, are also useful in disrupting his supply or logistical network. The infiltration of terrorist groups is a difficult task especially in dealing with the new terrorists who operate with minimally identifiable ties to their sponsors. However, if successful, it could be used to promote dissent or defection within these groups, especially if some members have scruples or doubts about the use of poisonous weapons or if they are disaffected from the leadership. The strengthening of the norm against the use of CB weapons through treaty law and export-import controls can at least limit access to these weapons provided that it is accompanied and implemented by adequate verification measures, reinforced by the will to enforce the prohibition by the use of force. The proposed criminalization of CB activity would considerably aid the effort to apprehend and prosecute terrorists engaging in chemical or biological work. The problem is that international law, while appropriate as a means to deal with state parties will not deter irrational fanatics motivated by revenge or the hunger for overall destruction. Defensive preparations, including the provision of defensive equipment, the training of first responders and medical personnel, the carrying out of counter-terrorism exercises are essential to deterrence. Although no amount of defensive preparedness can cover all the vulnerabilities of a targeted nation, it strengthens deterrence by making the use of CB weapons less attractive. Passive defense should be accompanied by a commitment to active defense: a determination to pre-empt an attacker by striking first.

          V. The Response: Consequential Management: But what if it happens? In the case of a biological attack, the first task is detection. As one participant noted: "In such an emergency the best detective is the hospital doctor". The doctor must determine the answer to two basic questions. First, are the patients victims of a naturally occurring disease, a task complicated by emerging and difficult to diagnose diseases, or have they been struck by a man-made agent? Second, if a terrorist attack has occurred, what agent has been used? Correct diagnosis, of course, will depend on special training. In the case of a chemical attack, determination and detection would be simpler than in a biological attack. There would be no doubt that any attack had taken place and it would be easy to identify the agent. Even if the above questions are answered, intelligence agencies are left with a difficult task. Who is the attacker? If it is determined that the attacker is a state party or that a state party aided and abetted a terrorist group, what response should be made? Economic retaliation? Diplomatic pressure against the aggressor? Or the use of military power? If the attack has been carried out by a sub-national group, the problem of response becomes more complicated. It would then largely become a police task although national state security agencies would also be involved.

          VI. Problems: In handling any CBW terrorist attack, several problems would immediately emerge. All these problems should be carefully examined before any CBW event occurs and safeguards should be devised and put in place. First, the need to co-ordinate the work of different agencies. In the Oklahoma bombing, there was a conflict of priority between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was concerned with rescue and treatment; the Federal Bureau of Investigation with gathering forensic evidence. In the event of a CBW terrorist attack, where should line between police respondents and the military be established? Obviously, the concerned agencies should establish priorities, work out jurisdictional questions and design a co-operative plan. Second, conflicting national and international interests may well complicate any decision to retaliate. Concerned allies may be reluctant to support a strike against a proven terrorist country or base. Third, there is an existing taboo among certain professional organizations to confront the threat of biological weapons. The medical profession, biologists and the pharmaceutical industry ["We do not make profits to kill people"] are queasy about recognizing their responsibilities in countering what is still a hypothetical threat. Fourth, there is the crucial problem of panic. How do you manage a public stampeded by a CB attack? How does a government protect itself against an over-reaction which could threaten long-established civil liberties? VII. Conclusion: Despite the judgment that a CBW terrorist event has a low probability, it would carry high consequences even if it were done on a small scale and caused few casualties. The imperative for policy is to devise a prevention and consequence management program that steers between panic and complacency. As one participant warned, recalling the impact of the Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway, although the probability of a chemical or biological terrorist attack is low, "it only needs to happen once".

Editor's Note: Professor John Ellis van Courtland Moon is currently engaged in a study on the conflict between national security concerns and the taboo against the use of poisons in warfare.

01-2, issue no. 83