Chemical Demilitarization in Russia: Major Changes Ahead
An Overview of the Russian CW Destruction Program

by Maria Katsva
Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia

Towards the end of the year 2000, major changes occurred within the Russian chemical demilitarization program and these changes willinfluence the future of this program.

Although Russia adopted the Federal program "On CW Destruction in RF" in 1996 and it ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, it was, because of a lack of funding, not able to destroy the 1% of its CW arsenal within the timelines established by the CWC. A lack of interagency coordination and a fight for funding negatively influenced the process for chemical demilitarization (demil).

Although foreign assistance was (and is) essential for the Russian CW destruction program, numerous pre-conditions for support and a lack of coordination of foreign assistance created problems in using this assistance for acceleration of chemical demil. As a result of this inability to fulfill obligations under the CWC, a possibility of Russia's withdrawal from CWC emerged. This damaged Russia's relations with international organizations, particularly the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The OPCW did not approve the extension of the CW destruction deadlines and US assistance was put on hold. Russia was blamed for doing little if anything on CW destruction, not only by international institutions but domestic ones as well. To compound the problems, old chemical munitions became obsolete and started leaking; particularly within the Penza and Kirov regions. With an increasing threat of terrorism, the situation was becoming dangerous. Urgent measures both on the domestic and international levels were now called for. As a result, the philosophy and concept of chemical demilitarization had to be changed.

What Has Been Done: Current Status
In 1996 Russia adopted the Federal Program on CW destruction in the Russian Federation (RF). Several legal documents were then adopted, including laws on:

1. destruction of CW,
2. ratification of the CWC, and,
3. social guarantees to the population working at CW production.

Locations for construction of CW destruction facilities were chosen (except for Pochep, Bryansk region), feasibility studies at Gorny and Shchuchye were developed and adopted, and those at Maradykovskiy developed. Technologies for CW destruction were selected and monitoring was undertaken. An investment basis for Pochep, Bryanskaya obl. has now been established and infrastructure construction at Gorny is close to completion. Most of the medical and environmental issues have been solved and an appropriate legal basis has been established.

However there was a lack of sufficient funding, and interagency coordination was weak. As a result, no facility has been built and the actual process of CW destruction did not start as projected. Construction has been started only at one facility, Gorny, Saratov Obl.. Feasibility studies at five facilities have not been finished, and a normative basis has not been worked out.

US Assistance
Since 1992, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement (Nunn-Lugar Program), the USA has been assisting Russia in its efforts to destroy the chemical weapons stockpiles and demilitarize its former chemical weapons production facilities . The total amount of pledged assistance is US$ 300.5 million. As of summer 2000, $192.1 million of this amount had been allocated. The US has provided assistance in the following three major areas:

• Assistance in the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in the town of Shchuchye, in the Kurgan region.

The US funds were to be used to finance the initial phase construction works. Russia has prepared the justification of investments and the feasibility study for this facility. In cooperation with American experts, Russian experts evaluated the two-stage chemical weapons destruction process developed by Russian scientists. The current focus is on designing and manufacturing chemical munitions dismantlement process lines, as well as on scaling up the chemical weapons destruction process for the facility in Shchuchye. Parsons of Pasadena, California, a well-known engineering and construction company, is acting as the US general contractor.

• Assistance in the demilitarization of former chemical weapons production facilities.

Aid is being provided for the "Khimprom" ("chemical production") facilities in the cities of Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk.

• Establishment of a central analytical laboratory to monitor activities in the field of chemical disarmament. This laboratory operates on the premises of the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow, the leading researcher and developer of chemical weapons destruction technologies (now this work is on hold).

Although there are some problems in US-Russian relations dealing with actual allocation of appropriated funding, nevertheless, the US remains the largest international donor for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program. In June 1999, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement was extended for another seven-year term by a Protocol, now awaiting ratification by the State Duma.

The resolution passed by the US Congress, in October 1999, to suspend funding for the construction of the Shchuchye facility has led to serious complications. The official reasons quoted in the resolution include insufficient funding by Russia for the construction of social infrastructure facilities in Shchuchye, delays in the allocation of land for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility there, and a reconsideration of the previous US assessment of the threat posed by Russian chemical weapons to US national security.

Cooperation with European Countries

• Germany has been providing assistance for chemical destruction in Russia since October 1993. The total amount of assistance allocated so far has been DEM 58.5 million. Substantial work has been carried out under this program to manufacture, test and deliver technological equipment to the chemical weapons destruction facility in Gorny, Saratov Obl., where construction is now nearing completion. However equipment has often not been used appropriately and was not accommodated to Russian equipment and buildings. Moreover, Russian personnel did not know how to use the equipment.
• Within the framework of our joint program with Sweden, initiated in 1993, the risk assessment of the chemical weapons storage facility in the settlement of Kambarka, Udmurtia, has been carried out. A Public Outreach Center has been set up there, and medical equipment has been supplied to the local hospital. The total amount of assistance provided under this program so far is SEK 4.4 million.
• Finland is about to embark on an assistance program that will include the delivery of an environmental monitoring system to the chemical weapons storage facility in the settlement of Kambarka. The total amount of assistance so far is FIM 6 million.
• The European Union has allocated funds to finance the demilitarization of former chemical weapons production facilities in Dzerzhinsk, in the Nizhni Novgorod region, and in Novocheboksarsk, Chuvashia, as well as the construction of the main CW destruction building and an environmental monitoring system at the chemical weapons destruction facility in Gorny, in the Saratov region. The total amount of assistance so far is EUR 15.9 million.

In late 1998 Russia signed an agreement with the Netherlands for the provision of assistance in the amount of NLG 25 million. The funds will be used to provide technological equipment for soil improvement at the Kambarka facility, and to finance the construction of some other top priority Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities. However, due to the differences in Russian and European states (particularly, Finland and Netherlands) legal systems, some of the agreement was hard to enforce.

• Italy has appropriated ITL 15 billion to assist Russia in the construction of social and engineering infrastructure facilities in the settlement of Kizner, Udmurtia, and in Shchuchye.
• Switzerland has been providing assistance by financing public outreach projects implemented in the areas in which chemical weapons destruction facilities are to be located. Approximately US$300,000 have been spent over the last three years. Those funds have been used to conduct public hearings in chemical weapons storage areas, to establish information centers, to publish brochures for the local population providing relevant information on chemical weapons destruction facilities to be built near the chemical weapons facilities, and to conduct research to assess the state of health of the local population, and the state of the environment in the chemical weapons storage areas.

Some countries promise financial support but do not allocate it; others provide very limited support. Some problems in bilateral relations occurred due to drawbacks of Russian legal system. It was only in 1999 that Russia adopted a law, exempting foreign aid from taxes; however, excise taxes have not been exempted.

Recent Developments
Recent developments cover both domestic structures and international assistance (attitude) in the area of CW destruction in Russia. The changing political and economic realities from those of 1996 requires changes in the whole concept of and approach to chemical demilitarization.

At the Russian government meeting on the FY 2001 budget, the head of the government declared that meeting the CWC deadlines on CW destruction was a number one priority. The FY-2001 budget includes an appropriation of 3 bln. roubles (about $108 mln.) as compared to 500 mln roubles (about $18 mln) allocated for this past year. The new chemical demilitarization program, although titled "amendments", assumes a total change of CW program; obviously, the developers of the program did not want to deal with the red tape and additional adoptions at the Duma with yet another program.

There are three main lines of changes: changes in structure and management; changes in technologies and procedures, and changes in ideology.

Structural Changes and Program Management
On October 6, the Russian President signed a decree on chemical demilitarization; assigning all responsibilities on chemical demilitarization to the Russian Ammunitions Agency (Rosboyepripas). Within this agency, there is a Department on Conventional Problems on Chemical and Biological Weapons. On February 5, 2001 Governmental Provision #87 on establishing Federal Office on Safe Storage and Destruction of CW was issued. Security Council meeting in January 2001 recommended establishing a State Committee on Chemical Destruction headed by ex-prime minister and presidential representative at Volga district Serguei Kirienko.

Initially the Ministry of Defense had been in charge of the Federal Chemical Demilitarization program. Later the Committee on Conventional Problems on Chemical and Biological Weapons was established. This Committee prepared Russia for joining the CWC. After joining the CWC it became the national body responsible for Convention implementation. After the restructuring of the government, the former Committee became one of the Departments of the Russian Ammunitions Agency (Federal Office on Safe Storage and Destruction of CW); the key structure on CW destruction.

There were several other agencies involved including the Ministry of Economy and a Committee on Chemical and Petroleum-Chemical Industry. With poor interagency coordination, the responsible agencies fought for funding and duplicated each other's work. As an example and in accordance with the conversion program, the Ministry of the Economy had to destroy special chambers in Cheboksary, and then the Defense Ministry had to re-build the same chambers for doing work on CW destruction. This prevented each other from getting the job done. Another reason for changing the body responsible for CW destruction was the difficulties foreign institutions had in dealing with the Ministry of Defense.

Increased lobbying on the process of transferring demilitarization functions from military bodies to civilian was one more variable for changing the program. Initially the ministry of defense was in general responsible not for disarmament, but rather for armament. After the collapse of the FSU, the Ministry of Defense became responsible for a number of programs on demilitarization. However over time, civilian agencies became responsible for disarmament, since it was hard to combine contradictory functions on both armament and disarmament within one defense body. The Minister of Defense also supported the idea of aborting disarmament functions from its Ministry. Having all the functions on CW destruction within one agency, particularly civilian and independent, seemed reasonable in terms of reducing the costs of the program.

Changes in Technologies and Procedures
The program constantly faces the dilemma of deadlines vs. reality. The way out seems to be at two levels: a time extension and a procedures change. The main idea is to make the implementation of the program cheaper.

At its last meeting OPCW members agreed on an extension of deadlines for the first stage of CW destruction for Russia. The new program suggests that only the first stage of CW destruction, detoxication, should be taken under the CWC. The other stages – bituminisation and burying the wastes should be taken outside the CWC deadlines as a part of national program. Another step to cost reduction of the program will be waste processing at one facility instead of the seven. Since these wastes will be less toxic and dangerous, it is possible to transport them in special containers to one facility, and work with them then. There should be a sufficient reduction in costs of the program, an estimated 1.5 to 2 times. There could be changes in technologies chosen for destruction of CW as well.

Changes in Ideology
One of the main challenges of the previous program on CW destruction was the requirement for destroying CW in the regions where they are stored and a prohibition on transportation. However this was the least cost-efficient option - it is very expensive to build seven facilities to include a social infrastructure, even more extensive than facilities, at seven locations, especially since there is not much CW at some of them. And, no country wants to support the infrastructure. Another problem which arises with this approach, and which Russia could face in the future is one it faces now with 'closed cities'. After CW elimination, whole towns will be out of a job.

However, the political and economic situation has changed. The regional authorities are normally centrist and are quite dependable (this can change from region to region); the population's main concern is not freedom but jobs; green and antigovernmental movements are not that popular anymore.

Thus, it is possible to reduce the number of locations for CW destruction. The US offered to reduce the number of locations up to one in Shchuchye. However, most probably, the number of locations will be reduced to four, in accordance with types of the chemical agents for destruction - in Shchuchye, Gorny, Kambarka, and one of the location with aviation munitions. Shchuchye will be used for destruction of organophosphorus agents, and those transported from Kizner.

Russian program's priorities for next year are to finish construction of the first phase of the facility at Gorny (with the assistance of Germany), and to start construction at Shchuchye (with US assistance).

One problem with constructing expensive infrastructure could be solved if personnel on CW destruction are hired on a temporary basis - a certain team of experts could work for a couple of months living at a specified hotel, and then another team replaces it.

International Assistance to the Russian Chemical Demilitarization Program
Although foreign countries and OPCW are worried about Russia's not meeting CW destruction deadlines, and do not want to support extension of deadlines, work at Shchuchye was escalated.

Initially construction was to begin on the destruction facility at Shchuchye in 2008, when Russia brings 25 mln.roubles annually into the infrastructure. US did not want either to fund infrastructure construction, or start working on destruction facility until Russia guarantees funding. Currently the issue of construction of a plant in Shchuchye is on hold by US Congress. On 14 November 2000 an amendment for the Bilateral Agreement was signed. It assumes allocation of additional funding for chemical disarmament to Russia. Although some media claim that the Congressional allowance for using these funds for construction facility at Schuchye has been received and the works are to start soon, it has not been received so far. The issue of CW destruction in Russia has been discussed at the very high level at millennium summit. However preliminary calculations for CW destruction facility at Shchuchuye assume totally about $ 2 bln., and the current aid and Russian governmental funding are not enough. Russia must allocate $950 mln annually to implement federal program by 2007 (or $475 annually, if the deadline is 2012). The current international assistance is about 6% of the required money.

The Director General of the OPCW suggested establishing a coordination committee on international assistance to Russia for CW destruction. This committee, on coordination of assistance to Russia, might include members of states-donors and Russian agencies. The main idea is to provide information sharing, prioritize aid, and attract new donors. However the Director General mentioned while talking to Russian Duma Vice-Speaker Seleznyov, that additional funding could be allocated (ex., by EU) only in the case of Russia's commitment to CW destructions and after Russia takes steps on implementation of CW destruction (particularly, updating the legislation, taking initial steps in real destruction of CW, following deadlines and providing mechanism of direct funding of contractors by foreign aid, without governmental involvement).

Russian Government claims that the facility on CW destruction at Gorny Saratov obl.will be in operation soon (currently it is under construction). So far, its construction was funded by Germany, but Russia expects that Great Britain and maybe other European countries will become the main sponsors.

Remaining Problems and Solutions
The key Russian problems are "time and money". Russia has not enough funding, either government or foreign aid, to catch up with the program. Although a large increase in governmental funding and making the issue of CW destruction a governmental priority, as well as international assistance could solve the problem, in reality, even appropriated funding does not necessary mean that the funds get allocated. And even if funding is enough, it should be coordinated. Reducing the number of Russian agencies in charge of CW destruction makes coordination easier, however, it does not mean that chemical demilitarization will move faster. Red tape, miscoordination and changes in Russian governmental bodies influence the rapidness of CW destruction.

All the alternative programs, which the Russian government suggests, i.e., long-term billion dollar credits, private funds and earmarked governmental funds, attracting private and corporate investors, writing and restructuring Soviet debt, are all helpless.

Since it is hard to increase funding, it seems reasonable to reduce costs through reducing the number of locations for CW destruction, and changing technologies and deadlines. Transportation through some regions to the location of CW destruction could meet with some protests, however, the population protest could be overcome if some benefits were promised.

Concentration at two locations, Schchye and Gorny, and finalizing construction there instead of working at all the facilities simultaneously, makes sense. It gives a start to the Russian CW destruction program. However if the idea of transportation is to be accepted, and at the same time the facility at Cheboksary could not be reanimated, there could be several installations built in Schchye. Schchye is further from locations with a high density of population, like the Central region. Obviously, if the infrastructure costs are high, it is easier to built infrastructure at one location, than in three. Changing technologies could also be problematic because of lobby for previous technology.

Although extending deadlines is not possible according to CWC, Russia has very low chances to meet the 20% CW elimination deadline. While claimed to be national priority, CW destruction could not become it - it will definitely be less prioritized than paying wages and struggling emergencies (ex., energy crisis). European assistance is small and not enough to cover construction of expensive sites, and the amount of CW which is supposed to be destroyed in Gorny is small. American assistance is tied to different political issues and mostly to the US foreign policy. Since Russia already ratified CWC (which was the main US concern) the Bush Administration is not inclined to provide financial assistance to Russia, or at least will be much harder on pre-conditions than Clinton Administration, and has already accused Russia of a hidden military program.

The chance that Russia will get expanded or even appropriated funding is quite slim. At the same time, US funding is concentrated not on destructing old-generation CW, which are leaking but relatively new. Russia is unable to cover its expenses, and coordination and accountability of foreign funding is weak so far. Some of the red tape was removed by reducing number of agencies, however the Security Council decision on establishing another body (State Commission) creates another red tape round. At the same time CW become more and more obsolete, leaking and poorly stored and guarded, and their destruction becomes an emergency rather than good will.

However, much depends on the agency in charge of CW destruction – Rosboyepripas (and Federal Office on Safe Storage and Destruction of CW). If the agency is strong enough, organized enough to generate government will to allocate funding, and would survive numerous governmental restructuring, Russia might accelerate the process of CW destruction.

Editors Note: Maria Katsva is Associate Director of the Center Program on Nuclear Security in the FSU. She holds an M.P.A. from the University of Georgia. Before coming to the University, Ms. Katsva worked with PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia as Research Associate and served as Associate Editor for the Russian journal, Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control). She also spent time as a visiting scholar at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Relations. She can be reached at: katsva@arches.uga.edu

01-1, issue no. 82