Note: Our ASA correspondent, Reginald Bartholomew, had received comprehensive information on this NATO study several months ago. From that information he prepared this article for release in this issue. Recognizing that Dr. Jan Medema was a leader in this study and comprehensive effort, ASA requested he ensure Reginald's information, which we were going to publish, was accurate and timely. It was and is.

On the Defensive Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A NATO Long Term Scientific Study

Introduction:
The last NATO Long Term Science and Technology Study (LTSS) on Defensive Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare was done in 1988, before the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, CB terrorism, NATO's Partners for Peace, the CWC, the BTWC and several other important sociological and political changes. Dr. Jan Medema wrote an addendum in 1991 highlighting some of the important changes from 1988, especially the increasingly diverse threat and the changes in biotechnology that increased the potential to manufacture BW agents with relative ease. No longer was a massive chemical attack a likely scenario; instead numerous countries possessed the capabilities to use biological and toxin weapons, which made predicting their use much more difficult.

In the present day context, three major areas were identified as data gaps. First, what are the concentrations of the different CB agents that pose challenge levels? Computer modeling and simulation of CB attacks could help to define these. Second, what are the human toxicities of the various chemical and toxin agents and what are the effects at low concentrations? As a corollary for the various biological agents, how many organisms are required to produce an infection? The third gap is the lack of capability to adequately detect CB attacks and give an appropriate warning. While of obvious importance for offensive policies, these three points are also critical for defense policies.

Objectives of the Updated LTSS:
In 1999, The Netherlands proposed an updated LTSS on the Defensive Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Dr. Medema was appointed to lead an Exploratory Team (SAS-E09) for this study. There were three major milestones for the working group on threat evaluations and exposure levels in 2000. For 2001, there was a meeting of the working group in the UK in January to finalize the working paper. In July there should be a multi-national exercise in the Netherlands and in August, the study report will be given to the SAS panel. The consolidated report is due July 2002.

There were both technological and military objectives for this study. The overall technological objective was to examine the threat forecasts for the next 10 to 15 years and identify technologies and means to support chemical and biological defense in the 2000s. Knowledge gaps and remedies to develop adequate defenses were also to be examined. Obviously this would require an updated CB threat to develop an updated CB defense. The threat evaluation was to look at the uncertainties in the threat analyses, the scenario analyses, hazard predictions and the implications of the CWC and BTWC. The group would take the 1988 threat analysis as a test case and new NATO partners will evaluate this from their own perspectives. The group will also look at the various computer models ideally to give NATO a suite of approved models, that can be used with different scenarios.

Common to all of these and critical to protection is knowing what the allowable exposure levels is for each agent and mixture. Without this, it would be impossible to use the computer programs for any meaningful result or to develop adequate protection and detection equipment.

The military objective of this study is guidance for military planners defending against CB weapons. Protection involves protective equipment, hazard avoidance, and medical counter measures based on a realistic threat. The eventual goal of the study is to develop a training system that integrates protective equipment, detectors and decontamination with operations. This will be the focus of the training exercise in August.

Content: The study, a multinational collaboration on a long-term vision on CB defense, follows the guidelines for a NATO LTSS. Since one of the goals was integrated CB multinational training, this CB warfare defense study obtains agreement at each step along the way to the training guide. The threat evaluation and identification of allowable exposure levels is the base of the study and were prepared by experts in each subject area. After preliminary views of these were established, different experts were invited to address hazard avoidance, contamination control, physical protection, medical counter-measures and training and simulation.

One of the objectives was to identify knowledge and data gaps. A Working Paper was sent to all the interested parties and discussed with the multinational parties in the exercise. The emphasis was to identify new approaches to fill in these gaps.

Outline of Working Paper:

Section 1. Chemical/Biological Threat Evaluation: Review of CB Threat, Gaps in and Validity of 1988 Review, Tools for Threat Evaluation (Scenario Analysis, Computer Modeling of CB Attacks, Hazard Area Prediction), Threat Reduction through CWC and BTWC, CB Terrorism, Hazard of Chemicals other than CWA, CB based Non-Lethal Weapons

Section 2. Exposure Levels to Chemical/Biological Agents: Estimates of Human Toxicity of Classical Chemical agents, Maximum Allowable Exposure Levels, Maximum Allowable Exposure Levels to Biological Agents, Knowledge Gaps in Toxicity of Chemical Agents, Knowledge Gaps in Infectivity of Biological Agents, Exposure Levels in Operations other than War, Guidance for Equipment Developers Developers

Section 3. Hazard Avoidance: Warning, Reconnaissance and Marking, Detection, Monitoring, Sampling, Identification

Section 4. Physical Protection: Respiratory Protection, Skin Protection, Collective Protection

Section 5. Medical Counter-Measures: Prophylaxis for Chemical Agents, Vaccination for Biological Agents, Diagnosis, Therapy for Chemical Agents, Therapy for Biological Agents, Casualty Management

Section 6. Contamination Control: Prevention of Contamination, Contamination Control after Interception of a Missile, Contamination Control after Destruction of a Stockpile, Decontamination of Personnel, Decontamination of Equipment, Residual Vapor, Aerosol and Contact Hazard, Decontamination/Weathering of Terrain

Section 7. Training and Simulation: Training: Physical Protective Equipment, Training: Hazard Avoidance, Training: Contamination Control, Training: Medical Counter-Measures, CB exercises, Simulation of CB Attacks, System Integration

Ed. Note: It is ASA's understanding that the Working Paper/Study Report is in coordination in draft with all of the members. On Reginald’s next visit to Mons or Brussels, he will endeavor to check on the progress of this report and what could be a significant advance in CBW defense thinking.

01-1, issue no. 82