NATO Advanced Research Workshop

Scientific and Technical Implications of the Implementation of the BTWC Protocol
by Graham S. Pearson

Warsaw, Poland. A NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) entitled "Scientific and Technical Implications of the BTWC Protocol for Civil Industry" was held in Warsaw, Poland on Thursday 2 through Saturday 4 November 2000 under the co-directorship of Col. Prof. Krzysztof Chomiczewski, Commandant of the Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Warsaw, Poland, and Col. Prof. Henri Garrigue, Conseiller Militaire chargé des questions biologiques, Représentation de la France à la Conference du Désarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. It was attended by 49 individuals from 17 countries, of which 23 came from 8 of the original NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and United States) and 23 came from 6 of the new NATO countries and cooperation partners (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation and Slovakia) and one each from Brazil, South Africa and Sweden. 25 of the experts from 14 of the 17 countries represented came from government departments or agencies engaged in the negotiation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) Protocol or the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Representatives were also present from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as well as from National Authorities established to implement the CWC.

The workshop was designed to focus on the scientific and technical implications of the implementation of the BTWC Protocol for government, biodefence facilities, academia and industry. As the negotiations of the BTWC Protocol are close to completion with widespread agreement that these should be completed before the Fifth Review Conference to be held in Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, in order to focus attention on the implementation of the Protocol rather than on the resolution of the remaining square brackets, for the purposes of the Workshop a clean text was provided which was based on the latest version of the Protocol text (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/52 (Part I) dated 11 August 2000) with the square brackets removed as proposed in the University of Bradford Evaluation Paper No 19, September 2000. (Both documents are available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc)

The Warsaw ARW was structured to facilitate discussion of the essential elements of the BTWC Protocol in such a way that the requirements detailed in the Protocol could be considered from the point of view of the key constituencies involved -- government, biodefence facilities, academia and industry. The workshop had the following main sessions:

Session I. The Emerging BTWC Protocol. The first session set the scene for the workshop by outlining the background to the ongoing negotiations of a Protocol to strengthen the BTWC, comparing the Protocol to the CWC, which is the regime of particular relevance to the BTWC and its Protocol as both address dual use technology, have a general purpose criterion and address toxins. The session showed that the basic architecture of the BTWC Protocol and the CWC is the same although the Protocol is considerably more elaborated throughout than the CWC.

Session II. Implementation: International Organization and National Implementation. An overview was presented of the importance of the future Protocol to avoid biological weapons continuing to be the weak link in the non-proliferation regimes that are vital to counter weapons of mass destruction. A valuable oversight of the experience of the OPCW in implementing the CWC which focussed on lessons for the BTWC Protocol was presented by a representative from the OPCW. This was complemented by a presentation by a National Authority of the national implementation of the CWC which identified the importance of planning and flexibility as being key to successful implementation.

Session III. Mandatory Declarations & Declaration Follow-Up Procedures. An outline of the principal elements in the Protocol for mandatory declarations and declaration follow up procedures was followed by presentations which addressed the implications of these protocol requirements for government for research and development facilities, for biodefence facilities and for industry. This was then followed by a presentation which outlined the lessons which had been gained from carrying out practice visits in both government and industrial facilities.

Session IV. Facility & Field Investigations. An outline of the principal elements in the Protocol for facility and field investigations was followed by presentations which addressed the implications of these protocol requirements for government and for industry.

Session V. International Cooperation and Assistance. An outline of the principal elements in the Protocol for international cooperation (Article VII) and assistance (Article VI) was followed by presentations which addressed the implications of these protocol requirements for government, for research and development and for industry.

Session VI. Incentives and Safeguards. An outline of the obligations and rights within the Protocol was followed by presentations on the government and industrial perspectives regarding incentives and safeguards in the Protocol.

Session VII. Awareness Raising and Outreach. The importance of awareness raising and outreach had been identified in several of the earlier sessions and this penultimate session considered the provisions in the Protocol for public information and then considered the importance of outreach to all the relevant constituencies in States Parties. A final presentation by a participant from the NATO WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) Centre outlined the approaches being taken within NATO to raise awareness of the dangers posed by WMD and how these dangers can be countered.

Concluding Remarks. The final session was a summary presentation on the outcome of the Workshop in regard to its theme of the scientific and technical implications of the implementation of the BTWC Protocol for government, biodefence facilities, academia and industry was presented.

Overall, the Workshop was extremely timely. It enabled participants, who brought a wide range of expertise in different areas, to have an outstandingly informed discussion about the implementation of the BTWC Protocol. The participation of representatives from the OPCW and from the National Authorities set up to implement the CWC in several countries in the Workshop was especially valuable. This provided the opportunity for all participants to gain a first hand insight into the experience of OPCW and the National Authorities which was extremely relevant in considering the implementation of the BTWC Protocol. The participation by representatives from the CWC National Authorities was enhanced as it was evident the decision has already been taken in some countries to collocate the National Authority for the BTWC Protocol with the National Authority for the CWC.

The Workshop was notable also because the participants were present in the Field Cathedral of the Polish Army in Warsaw at 0830 on the morning of Saturday 4 November 2000 for the service during which a plaque was unveiled to commemorate the contribution of Polish General K. Sosnowski to the inclusion of a ban on bacteriological weapons in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It was a real honour to be able to be present at this historic occasion marking the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The Emerging BTWC Protocol
The CWC is a particularly relevant regime to the BTWC and its Protocol because of the close relationship between chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) and their overlap in respect of toxins and bioregulators. Both the CWC and the BTWC have general purpose criteria and both address dual use materials and technology. There are, however, differences as well as similarities between the CWC and the BTWC Protocol. The differences, largely reflect the existence of CW stockpiles and CW production facilities, which need to be destroyed under verification, and can be summarised as follows:

The similarities can be summarized as follows:

The similarities can be summarized as follows:

CWC	BTWC Protocol
Mandatory Declarations	Mandatory Declarations
Routine inspections	Declaration follow-up
Challenge Inspections	Facility investigations
Investigations of alleged use	Field investigations
Article X Assistance	Article VI Assistance
Article XI Technical Cooperation	Article VII Assistance
Article VIII Organization	Article IX Organization
Article VII National Implemenation Measures	Article X National Implementation Measures

Consequently, if the CW and CWPF elements of the CWC are excluded, it is apparent that the basic architecture of the CWC and the BTWC Protocol is the same. It was also noted that the declaration requirements in the BTWC Protocol have been developed from the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 and extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991 for the provision of information on:

1. Maximum containment (BL-4 ) facilities
2. Current biodefence programmes
3. Past offensive and defensive programmes
4. Vaccine production facilities

It is also evident that the BTWC Protocol has in many aspects been developed from the CWC although the BTWC Protocol is much more elaborated throughout. The protocol also has provisions which are not in the CWC such as measures to ensure the submission of declarations, declaration clarification procedures, provision for ad hoc investigation specialists, immunity waiver provisions for the Director General and for the Organization together with a much more extensively developed Article (VII) on technical cooperation.

The key elements in the BTWC Protocol were identified as being:

• Implementation -- Organization and National Authorities
• Compliance Measures
• • Declarations and Declaration Follow-Up Procedures
  • Field and Facility Investigations
• International Cooperation and Assistance
• Need to inform the relative constituencies
• Awareness raising and outreach

The Workshop had therefore been structured to address each of these in turn, in successive sessions. These sessions were generally structured so as to start with a presentation on the Protocol provisions and then for presentations addressing the implications for government and industry drawing upon relevant experience, such as, that of the OPCW or of CWC National Authorities. The questions being addressed by the Workshop were:

• Any lessons from prior experience?
• Will the Protocol provisions be effective?
• Any unforeseen difficulties?
• How to optimize effectiveness and efficiency?
• How to achieve effective implementation?

The oversight of the experience of the OPCW in implementing the CWC was especially valuable as it was focussed on lessons for the BTWC Protocol. It was evident that there were many lessons from OPCW experience and whilst some have been taken into account by the Ad Hoc Group there are quite a few which have not. Some of these are appropriate for the PrepCom phase for the Protocol. A point noted was that it is important to determine what needs to be addressed now, what in the PrepCom phase, what after entry into force and what is best never resolved. There is significant benefit to be gained from having a longer period than the six months (180 days) in the CWC between the trigger point and the entry into force of the Convention as once the trigger point is reached, there is then a scramble by a large number of States to ratify prior to the entry into force. The Protocol would benefit from a longer time between the trigger point and the date for entry into force.

Further observations related to the importance of being able to develop declaration formats in the light of experience. Under the CWC, routine inspections were vital for declaration quality. The OPCW also recognised the significant benefits of an evolving inspection manual which was not a document adopted by the Executive Council. In respect of providing information to States Parties about ongoing inspections, the OPCW had developed the Verification Implementation Report approach rather than providing copies of individual inspection reports. The VIR approach increased transparency and built confidence between States Parties. In respect of clarifications, it was noted that there are advantages in the Technical Secretariat initiation of clarifications concerning declarations, as this was much less political than if such clarifications are initiated by a State Party. It was also observed that there were inconsistencies in the national implementing legislation between States Parties to the CWC that would need to be addressed. A recent OPCW joint initiative with the Caribbean States, which had little if any chemical industry, had identified the potential value of an integrated approach to legislation that addressed both toxic chemicals and pesticides and the implementation of the CWC. A similar integrated approach could well be attractive for similar small States in respect of the legislation required to implement both the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the future BTWC Protocol.

In regard to the Organization, it was important to have sufficient flexibility to enable the Director General to run the organization. Micromanagement by the political organs of the Organization needs to be avoided. Another requirement was for the Organization to have managers to run the various Divisions and not political appointees; ideally, the Director General should have a selection of candidates for the top posts from which he/she can select those most able to perform the required duties. Finally, a career Organization is needed in order to attract good quality staff.

Overall, the analysis of the CWC and the OPCW indicates that:

• the BTWC Protocol is overprescriptive
• flexibility is the key to success
• the Organization must be able to develop in the light of experience

The next presentation addressed the experience of a National Authority in implementing the CWC nationally. It was noted that the BTWC Protocol National Authority was likely in several States to be colocated with the CWC National Authority. And, indeed, the presentation was given by the Head of one CWC National Authority, who was already the BTWC Protocol National Authority designate. Overall, the analysis of the CWC National Authority indicated that there were real potential benefits from the colocation of the CWC and the BTWC Protocol National Authorities because:

• trust had already been established with industry in the implementation of the CWC
• there was considerable direct read across from CWC implementation experience to the Protocol implementation as both regimes have similar architecture,
• both the CWC and the BTWC have General Purpose Criteria which largely fall to National Authorities to implement,
• both the CWC and the BTWC cover toxins and bioregulators,
• pharmaceutical industries are already subject to Scheule III/DOC inspections and could be subject to CWC challenge inspections.

Concluding Remarks
A summary presentation addressed the outcome of the Workshop in regard to its theme of the scientific and technical implications of the implementation of the BTWC Protocol for government, biodefence facilities, academia and industry. The following overall conclusions emerged from the Warsaw NATO Advanced Research Workshop on "Scientific and Technical Implications of the BTWC Protocol for Civil Industry" held on 2 - 4 November 2000:

1. There was nothing to suggest that an effective Protocol cannot be achieved before the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC in November/December 2001.
2. There was nothing to suggest that the Protocol could not be implemented effectively.
3. The key for success in implementation is planning and flexibility.
4. Caution was expressed that overprescription could strangle an effective Protocol.

Editor's Note: Graham Pearson is Visiting Professor of International Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, UK and previously Director General and Chief Executive, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down.

00-6, issue no. 81