NATO Advanced Research Workshop:
Maximizing the Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology

Graham S. Pearson

Piestany, Slovakia: 18 - 20 May 2000. A NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) entitled "Maximizing the Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology" was held in Piestany, Slovakia from 18-20 May under the co-directorship of Dr Cyril Klement, State Institute of Public Health, Slovakia, and Professor Graham Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies in the University of Bradford, UK. It was attended by 40 individuals, of which 28 came from 9 NATO countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom and United States) including representatives from the European Commission (EC), the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and one from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 11 from 4 Partner countries (Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine) and one from Sweden. Nine of the experts, from 8 countries, attending the Piestany workshop are members of the delegations attending the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva.

The workshop was designed to focus on how the benefits to security from international cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology might be maximized under Article VII "Scientific and Technological Exchange and International Cooperation" of the Protocol being negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in Geneva to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The Workshop brought together a wider range of different clusters of experts, many of whom met for the first time at the Workshop. Indeed, the Olympic symbol visually indicates the way in which the different clusters of experts -- in microbiology, biotechnology, biosafety, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Protocol on the Biological Weapons Convention -- came together very effectively to share their ideas and experience on issues relating to the Workshop theme. The presentations and discussion really moved forward our collective appreciation as to how indeed security benefits could be maximised through technical collaboration in microbiology and biotechnology in a world that is increasingly looking for safety, improved health and greater prosperity.

The Piestany ARW was structured to enable discussion of the issues relating to international cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology in such a way so that the experience gained under ongoing technical collaboration could be analyzed so as to address how the benefits to security might be maximized in the context of Article VII of the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The workshop had five main sessions:

Session I
Security Implications of Microbiology and Biotechnology. The first session set the scene for the workshop by outlining the background to the ongoing negotiations of a Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and showing how there was close relevance to international developments in both biosafety and Good Manufacturing Practice. The potential dangers from developments in microbiology and biotechnology was then examined and the way in which the Pathogens Initiative programme had reduced these dangers in institutes in Russia was addressed by presentations covering a Russian and a USA perspective.

Session II
Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology. Overviews of ongoing international collaboration in microbiology and biotechnology were provided by presentations by participants from Germany and the ICGEB. Particular attention was given to biosafety with a presentation on the ongoing Netherlands programme to implement biosafety frameworks in the pre-accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe and a presentation by a representative from the Russian Federation. In addition, Good Manufacturing Practice for licensed pharmaceutical and biological products was examined with presentations by participants from Romania and the Russian Federation.

Session III
Implementation of Article X of the BTWC which promotes technical cooperation between the States Parties. The opening presentations in this session addressed the importance of urgently strengthening the Convention given by a participant from Hungary and the role that technical cooperation to aid the development of States Parties could have within the Protocol in improving security given by a participant from the UK. These were then followed by a series of presentations about international collaboration in the field of microbiology and biotechnology between developed and developing countries in which the lessons learnt from such collaboration were identified; these presentations were made by participants from the UK, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland.

Session IV
Maximizing Security Benefits. An overview presentation examined how the security benefits under the BTWC Protocol might be maximized by technical cooperation given by a participant from the Netherlands. This was followed by presentations on infrastructure, regulations and procedures by participants from the UK, Slovakia and France, on databases, communications networks and clearing houses by a participant from the USA, on the OPCW experience of international cooperation and assistance by a participant from the OPCW and finally a presentation on transfers of microbiological materials by a participant from the USA.
Session V. Maximizing BTWC Protocol Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation. The final session was a summary presentation by one of the co-Directors of the Workshop in which a personal appreciation of the outcome of the Workshop in regard to its theme of maximizing security benefits through international collaboration in microbiology and biotechnology was presented.

Overall, the Workshop was extremely timely as it enabled the participants who brought a wide range of expertise in different areas to have an outstandingly informed discussion about the contribution that scientific and technological exchange and international collaboration in the context of Article VII of the future Protocol can make towards the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The participation of representatives from the ICGEB and the OPCW in the Workshop was especially valuable as it provided the opportunity for all participants to gain a first hand insight into the work of these organizations and the way in which their work is evolving.

The workshop brought together experts engaged in a number of different areas:

• International technical cooperation in microbiology and biotechnology;
• Implementation of the biosafety aspects of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UNEP International Guidelines on Biosafety, and the very recently finalized Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
• Good Manufacturing Practice of pharmaceutical and biological products;
• Implementation of international cooperation and assistance under the OPCW; and,
• A Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Overall Conclusions
The following overall conclusions emerged from the Piestany NATO workshop on "Maximizing Security Benefits from International Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology" held on 18 - 20 May 2000:

1. There is already an immense amount of ongoing international collaboration in the fields of microbiology and biotechnology. It was evident that those engaged in such collaboration have a great deal to contribute to building safety, health, prosperity and security around the world although many have individually little awareness of the Biological Weapons Convention or its Protocol. For an effective and enduring strong Protocol regime it will be important to reach out to and engage this community. Such engagement will over time contribute directly to greater understanding between developed and developing countries and the easing of tension between these countries as global safety, health, prosperity and security increase.
2. It was evident that there are major initiatives to improve biosafety standards around the world involving the building nationally in each country of the necessary infrastructure for a competent national authority and inspectorate. There is a very well coordinated initiative to do this within the preaccession countries to the European Community. Improved biosafety standards also bring benefits regionally and internationally as neither pathogens nor GMOs recognise boundaries.
3. Likewise, the companies engaged around the world in production of pharmaceutical and biological products are introducing GMP to internationally validated and inspected standards so as to manufacture licensed products which can be sold on the global market. With the expiry of patents, there is a particular opportunity for companies in the developing world who have lower production costs to make bigger profits provided that their production is to internationally inspected GMP standards.
4. The establishment of national infrastructures with competent national authorities and inspectorates in both the areas of biosafety and GMP directly contribute to the improved transparency and the building of national public confidence in the countries concerned which lead to international safety and security.
5. As the future Protocol organization is expected to have an overall strength of some 200 staff and an annual budget of around US $30M (less than half the annual budget of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), it is unrealistic to expect a budget in the Protocol organization for international cooperation of more than a few million US $. Consequently, the organization will need to evaluate the various alternatives for international collaboration so as to focus on those for which the Protocol organization is best fitted to do and which will benefit the States Parties to the Protocol.
6. The international collaboration priorities for the future Protocol organisation, as I summarised it at the end of the Workshop, are:

   
   

7. Implementation of the Protocol
   
8. Assist States Parties in assessing their national needs for infrastructure in their country to promote safety, health and prosperity which will bring security.
   
9. Assess these national needs in the round -- considering biosafety, GMP and the BTWC Protocol.
   
10. Focus on training and maintaining skills within States Parties so as to:

• build capacity and capability
  
• enable States Parties to obtain and recognise tangible national benefits
  
• develop a public awareness programme to develop popular support
  

1. Develop a web based electronic data-base and clearing house mechanism with "route-map" links to other reputable quality websites to enable States Parties to find good quality data.
   

00-4, issue no. 79