The U.S. Demil Program is a Public Relations Disaster. Is it a human disaster waiting to happen?

"Enough is Enough"

Reginald Bartholomew

In the 1992/93 time frame, at least one large US corporation submitted, at no cost to the Army, studies on the Army's Demil Program, specifically on the vulnerability of military personnel in the event of an accidental chemical release at these facilities. These bases were the ones taking part in the Army's programs involving storage and/or destruction of chemical weapons. These studies noted that personnel were at risk - serious risk in the event of a problem with the weapons.

If the military personnel were at serious risk, what does that say about the risk to the surrounding civilian communities in the event of a chemical accident? The civilian communities would be facing disaster. Why? (continued on p. 22)

To begin with we must recognize that a 'controlled' evacuation at alarm, i.e., no advance warning, is just not feasible. To achieve a controlled evacuation from a ten mile area surrounding ground zero, one must have immediate warning, a coordinated plan for evacuation and the detailed planning and practice that entails. You also need immediately available equipment, both individual protection equipment (IPE) and collective protection equipment(CPE). And this is not the case at even one of the storage and/or destruction bases. The Demil hierarchy does not seem to understand either their own shortfalls or their responsibilities to the communities involved. Where is the disconnect?

1. First, there is a basic conflict of interest. Issuing IPE or installing CPE in the surrounding communities would imply existence of a threat, and, this is contrary to the current public relations surrounding the Demil Program. The Army does not admit there is a threat. Therefore, there is no threat. Right?
2. The Army does not want to discuss the possible threat because this might incite the crackpots and even the community leaders who are genuinely concerned with the safety and well-being of their citizens.
3. In the event of an emergency the Army really does not want to transfer control of an emergency situation to civilians. With this in mind, the Army has consistently rejected automatic warning to civilians even though an automatic warning system would be the only means to give timely warning to the surrounding communities.
4. The Demil Program really does not want to fund something that might not happen. Think of all those wasted dollars. But in a worse case scenario, think of all those wasted lives. All recommendations for equipment and dollars, such as was pointed out in "On the Street" in ASA 00-3, have been reduced to a point so as to be effectively nonexistent.
5. An adequate warning for the possible threat does not exist. For proper warning the Army instruments must be able to detect in real time and these instruments must be fully deployed and in sufficient density to detect a real plume. This density must be in both depth and breath and must be automated to such a degree that there is immediate warning to the base and to the surrounding communities. This capability does not exist anywhere. A fully automated warning system would take the Commander and the Army out of the loop and that will not happen; even though not fully automating the system from the chemical release to the local communities results in unacceptable delays in warning times.
   

The frustrations of the local communities surrounding the planned destruction facilities are almost legendary. The ASA Newsletter 00-3 which was published and distributed on June 30, 2000 carries in its "On the Street" columns, several documented examples of these frustrations. The demil hierarchy must, as a minimum, intelligently listen to what the citizens are saying. Although local officials may not be important in the overall scheme of things for demil, it is to these officials the citizens will turn - not to the Army demil folks and that is a guarantee.

Lt. Mike McCullough is a prime example of citizen frustration. He is resigning after 22 years on the Oregon State Police Force in protest over what he describes as mismanagement of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) for the Army's Umatilla chemical weapons storage (and eventual destruction) facility. He had been appointed as State Director of the CSEPP - a program formed in 1989 to protect residents of Umatilla and Morrow counties in case of a chemical accident at the Army depot, which stores nerve and mustard gas in 89 low-slung concrete bunkers. He said he was trained to respond to emergencies, and that training left him frustrated over the CSEPP's track record.

McCullough, 46, said he was frustrated by delays in federal financing and the emergency equipment provided to police and firefighters. He also was angered by cumbersome management that hampers communication between agencies. An ASA note is that the Army and FEMA now plan to further reduce funding for emergency preparedness at Umatilla from $3.9 million next year to about $2.7 million by 2006 and this is in spite of a GAO report which does point out serious equipment shortfalls for Umatilla. US Senator Ron Wyde has said "This GAO study makes clear that critical equipment for the Umatilla Depot to respond to a possible chemical weapons emergency is not in place," and "I sincerely hope that the Army and FEMA don't cut back assistance when the counties need it most."

McCullough said "The chemical preparedness program is so convoluted with politicians, and layers of government, and turfs and agendas. It's insanity." He also said that emergency plans should be formulated by the local fire chiefs and law enforcement officials who will have to respond to an emergency. "My approach to emergencies is that you need to have a broad, basic plan that is very fundamental," said McCullough.

He maintains that the CSEPP's plan was so complicated, there was no way for emergency workers to actually use it if there was ever an accident at the depot. He said "There are a lot of people from a lot of different political entities with varying agendas that are formulating emergency plans." Nobody is coming out and asking fire departments or law enforcement, 'What are your capabilities? What can you do? What do you think?' It angers me because this process could be so simple, so basic."

McCullough said "I hope every elected official and bureaucrat involved in this whole process understands that this state trooper gave up a $72,000 a year job to make a point," and "The entire process is an insane merry-go-round. It's about damn time somebody stood up and said enough is enough."

00-4, issue no. 79