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The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
and the Harvard-Sussex Program of CBW Armament and Arms Limitation:
A CBW Colloquium with: Ambassador Rolf Ekeus
Iraq: The Conundrum
(Part I of II: A background on Saddam and UNSCOM)
by Reginald Bartholomew
(Note: The following information was derived from the
comments of Amb. Ekeus and guests at the subject colloquium as
well as from the extensive archives of the ASA Newsletter, various
intelligence reports and the excellent reference/source document:
Iraq-A Country Study by the Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress.)
23 May 2000, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
At this last meeting for the current school year, Stephen Black,
CBW Colloquium Moderator, invited Amb. Rolf Ekeus to talk on
the UNSCOM experience and disarmament efforts in Iraq.
Amb. Ekeus said that UNSCOM was in effect the UN's pilot scheme
for Arms Control and in the long run proved itself to be a serious
Arms Control organization and one that Iraq had to deal with.
Iraq at first did not understand this and thought it could go
both ways, i.e., deny all allegations on weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and still get the sanctions lifted. Iraq's attitude changed
over time as the UN Security Council at least initially backed
the UNSCOM on every occasion. It is interesting to note that
during this period, according to Amb. Ekeus, UNSCOM destroyed
more CB weapons than did all of the Allied bombing during the
actual conflict.
Full Article
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The Ad Hoc Group Protocol is within Reach
by Graham S Pearson
The Ad Hoc Group: Continued Progress (ASA 00-1) reported on
the seventeenth Ad Hoc Group (AHG) session in September/October
and the eighteenth session in January/February 2000. It was clear
at the nineteenth session in March 2000, at which a number of
States Parties made political statements to mark the 25th anniversary
of the entry into force on 26 March 1975 of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), that the political will is there
to complete the negotiation of the Protocol to strengthen the
Convention. This article reports on the outcome of the three
week session held on 13 to 31 March 2000. In addition to formal
meetings as usual, chaired by the respective Friends of the Chair,
there has again been an increase in informal consultations enabling
views to be sought on unresolved issues. |
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Chem-Bio Counter-Terrorism in Britain:
A Distinctive Approach
by Edward M. Spiers
Professor of Strategic Studies
University of Leeds
At a time when President Bill Clinton and his leading officials
are repeatedly warning about the threat of terrorist attack in
the United States involving the use of chemical and biological
materials, and the United States is testing, reviewing and overhauling
its counter-terrorism machinery, the British planning for a response
to a similar threat could hardly be more different.
Admittedly the two countries have experienced rather different
terrorist problems in the recent past. While Britain is clearly
relieved by the diminution in terrorist activity emanating from
Northern Ireland, despite the political fragility of the Good
Friday Agreement, the United States is all too aware that it
has been the target of major terrorist attacks from an array
of different sources and the victim of major bombings at home
and overseas - the World Trade Center in New York, the Alfred
P. Murragh Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es Salaam.
Full Article
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PhRMA/FAS and the BWC:
A joint paper and press release
The following is a joint paper and press release written by
representatives of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA) and the Federation of American Scientists
(FAS). It has been distributed to US officials and to negotiators
of a Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). PhRMA and FAS have often been thought to stand at opposite
poles regarding verification measures for the BWC. However, they
have been meeting privately and productively for a number of
years to discuss their concerns and to seek means for protecting
industry within an effective BWC compliance regime.
The joint paper has gone through a rigorous approval process
at both PhRMA and Merck, before release. The willingness of the
US pharmaceutical industry to cooperate with the declarations,
non-challenge visits and investigations that may be adopted under
the Protocol is now clear, provided that the United States agrees
to include specific safeguards for industry in legislation to
implement the Protocol. FAS concurs with the proposed safeguards
and considers them to be appropriate, just and of critical importance
for both US industry and the progress of the Protocol.
Full Article |
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