ASA Newsletter 00-3

June 30, 2000
Issue Number 78


The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Harvard-Sussex Program of CBW Armament and Arms Limitation:

A CBW Colloquium with: Ambassador Rolf Ekeus

Iraq: The Conundrum
(Part I of II: A background on Saddam and UNSCOM)

by Reginald Bartholomew

(Note: The following information was derived from the comments of Amb. Ekeus and guests at the subject colloquium as well as from the extensive archives of the ASA Newsletter, various intelligence reports and the excellent reference/source document: Iraq-A Country Study by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.)

23 May 2000, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
At this last meeting for the current school year, Stephen Black, CBW Colloquium Moderator, invited Amb. Rolf Ekeus to talk on the UNSCOM experience and disarmament efforts in Iraq.
Amb. Ekeus said that UNSCOM was in effect the UN's pilot scheme for Arms Control and in the long run proved itself to be a serious Arms Control organization and one that Iraq had to deal with. Iraq at first did not understand this and thought it could go both ways, i.e., deny all allegations on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and still get the sanctions lifted. Iraq's attitude changed over time as the UN Security Council at least initially backed the UNSCOM on every occasion. It is interesting to note that during this period, according to Amb. Ekeus, UNSCOM destroyed more CB weapons than did all of the Allied bombing during the actual conflict.

Full Article


The Ad Hoc Group Protocol is within Reach

by Graham S Pearson

The Ad Hoc Group: Continued Progress (ASA 00-1) reported on the seventeenth Ad Hoc Group (AHG) session in September/October and the eighteenth session in January/February 2000. It was clear at the nineteenth session in March 2000, at which a number of States Parties made political statements to mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force on 26 March 1975 of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), that the political will is there to complete the negotiation of the Protocol to strengthen the Convention. This article reports on the outcome of the three week session held on 13 to 31 March 2000. In addition to formal meetings as usual, chaired by the respective Friends of the Chair, there has again been an increase in informal consultations enabling views to be sought on unresolved issues.

Chem-Bio Counter-Terrorism in Britain: A Distinctive Approach

by Edward M. Spiers
Professor of Strategic Studies
University of Leeds

At a time when President Bill Clinton and his leading officials are repeatedly warning about the threat of terrorist attack in the United States involving the use of chemical and biological materials, and the United States is testing, reviewing and overhauling its counter-terrorism machinery, the British planning for a response to a similar threat could hardly be more different.

Admittedly the two countries have experienced rather different terrorist problems in the recent past. While Britain is clearly relieved by the diminution in terrorist activity emanating from Northern Ireland, despite the political fragility of the Good Friday Agreement, the United States is all too aware that it has been the target of major terrorist attacks from an array of different sources and the victim of major bombings at home and overseas - the World Trade Center in New York, the Alfred P. Murragh Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es Salaam.

Full Article


PhRMA/FAS and the BWC:
A joint paper and press release

The following is a joint paper and press release written by representatives of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). It has been distributed to US officials and to negotiators of a Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). PhRMA and FAS have often been thought to stand at opposite poles regarding verification measures for the BWC. However, they have been meeting privately and productively for a number of years to discuss their concerns and to seek means for protecting industry within an effective BWC compliance regime.

The joint paper has gone through a rigorous approval process at both PhRMA and Merck, before release. The willingness of the US pharmaceutical industry to cooperate with the declarations, non-challenge visits and investigations that may be adopted under the Protocol is now clear, provided that the United States agrees to include specific safeguards for industry in legislation to implement the Protocol. FAS concurs with the proposed safeguards and considers them to be appropriate, just and of critical importance for both US industry and the progress of the Protocol.

Full Article

Next                       Contents ASA 00-3                  Previous  


For the Professional in Government and Industry with an interest in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense, Disarmament and Verification; Emergency and Disaster Medical Planning; Industrial Health and Safety; and Environmental Protection