Chem-Bio Counter-Terrorism in Britain: A Distinctive Approach

by Edward M. Spiers
Professor of Strategic Studies
University of Leeds

At a time when President Bill Clinton and his leading officials are repeatedly warning about the threat of terrorist attack in the United States involving the use of chemical and biological materials, and the United States is testing, reviewing and overhauling its counter-terrorism machinery, the British planning for a response to a similar threat could hardly be more different.

Admittedly the two countries have experienced rather different terrorist problems in the recent past. While Britain is clearly relieved by the diminution in terrorist activity emanating from Northern Ireland, despite the political fragility of the Good Friday Agreement, the United States is all too aware that it has been the target of major terrorist attacks from an array of different sources and the victim of major bombings at home and overseas - the World Trade Center in New York, the Alfred P. Murragh Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es Salaam.

Yet if any European ally of the United States is about to feel the wrath of contemporary terrorists, it is likely to be the United Kingdom. During the 1990s Britain has proved a conspicuously loyal ally of the United States in the diplomatic and military action against Iraq, especially in Operation Desert Fox (December 1998) and in the bombing of the Serbs in Kosovo (1999). Terrorism could also evolve from disaffected groups within Great Britain: numerous groups appear to be alienated from the prevailing political norms and express their antipathy towards the police and other symbols of authority in the direct action.

Whether terrorism will erupt as a consequence, and, if it does, whether it will involve the release of chemical and biological materials is a matter of conjecture, but British contingency planning is conducted in a manner quite different from that in the United States. The range, scope and requirements of counter-terrorism are not matters of public (or even parliamentary) debate in Britain. The training of first responders and medical strike teams is not receiving anything like the public scrutiny that it is in various US cities, and the organisation of military support has a much lower profile than the US Marines' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, the US Army's Technical Escort Unit and the ten National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams.

In 1999 the British Ministry of Defence broke new ground when it published a brief description of the UK's civil response provisions in its Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical Weapons. The booklet confirmed that the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office share responsibility for these provisions, and that the quality of British intelligence is of pivotal importance. The Security Service works with the police and the Secret Intelligence Service to protect the State against acts of terrorism and advises the government on the nature of the threat.

Apparently the possibility of a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological materials is rated as 'low' but the government has devised an integrated response plan. This involves the prevention of an attack, if possible, by employing military specialists and scientific personnel from the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of the Defense Evaluation and Research Agency at Porton Down (and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston if radioactive materials are involved) to disable any hazardous devices. Response plans are reportedly "exercised often and at all levels" and are "continuously developed in light of changing threat assessments".

There are also arrangements to manage the consequences of an attack if one occurs. As a 'significant emergency healthcare and clean up requirement' could follow a terrorist attack, depending on the type of material released and the location of the attack, the emergency services and local authorities are required to prepare integrated local response plans with assistance, if required, from the armed services and various national departments - the Departments of Health and the Environment as well as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Once again assurances are proffered that local plans are 'regularly exercised at all levels' and that the Home Office periodically reviews these arrangements.

Yet none of these exercises receive any public scrutiny or accountability as Britain lacks the equivalent of an investigative arm of Congress (ie. the General Accounting Office) and so lacks regular parliamentary reports on the effectiveness of its civil response provisions. Fragmentary evidence such as the description of the 'Firestorm' exercise in Greater Manchester (November 1995) by the investigative reporters, Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, hardly indicates that the UK authorities have mastered every aspect of responding to biological terrorism, not least when a major airport, motorway and high security prison are downwind of the attack (Plague Wars (Macmillan, 1999), p. 371).

Sceptics might be forgiven for wondering about whether National Health Service hospitals could cope with a sudden surge in demand for beds and treatment when these hospitals struggle to meet the entirely predictable influx of additional cases caused by annual bouts of influenza in Britain, and when the mass production of vaccines and antibiotics does not appear to be a policy option.

Similarly they might wonder how the armed services could contribute to large-scale decontamination when the British forces have never invested in the requisite equipment (and had to purchase decontamination apparatus from the Germans during the Gulf War). They might also fear that sections of public, having received little or no warning about what would be involved in the event of biological terrorism, might not respond too positively to the fitful release of information and all the restrictions on movement that might follow a biological attack.

The only comfort is that potential terrorists may face their own uncertainties and may, if undeterred, experience many of the difficulties that bedevilled the biological operations of the Aum Cult.

We have to hope that none of them get lucky!

Editor's Note: Professor Edward Spiers most recent book Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation was briefly reviewed in ASA 00-3 of April 2000. This book is considered mandatory reading for professionals in this field of WMD and proliferation.

00-3, issue no. 78

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