Biological and Toxin Warfare: Lessons From History
by John Ellis van Courtland Moon

          What can be learned from studying the history of biological and toxin warfare [BTW] in World War II? What light does history cast upon the current dilemmas and difficulties posed by arms control and disarmament in this field? My current reflections were inspired by the concluding chapter of the SIPRI book, Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use: from the Middle Ages to 1945, a chapter drafted by Erhard Geissler, Graham Pearson and myself. The debt that I owe to my two colleagues, who shared their knowledge and experience with me, remains immeasurable.
          The history of biological and toxin warfare is obscured and complicated by false allegations, unfounded suspicions and the difficulty of separating what is true from what is false. This task, especially daunting in regard to pre-twentieth century biological warfare attacks, is a continuing problem today due to the difficulty of securing documentary evidence, the unreliability of witnesses and the fallibility of human memory. Moreover, the prevalence of naturally occurring epidemics, which accompany warfare, makes it difficult to distinguish deliberate intent from natural outbreaks. Only a few cases of biological warfare can be verified as having actually taken place. We do know that in World War II, Japan was the only major belligerent to use BTW in both sabotage and field operations. Although charges were made by the Germans that BTW sabotage was carried out by Polish and Russian resistance groups in occupied territory, and other allegations were made against the Poles by the Soviets, it is impossible to gauge whether these attacks took place.
          We can derive a number of conclusions from the BTW World War II experience: conclusions which distinguish between the major roles played by policy, intelligence, leaders, the overall strategic situation, preparedness, and the minor roles played by the norm, and deterrence. These conclusions will lead us to reflect more generally on how the past can illuminate the future.

• Policy: The policy of all the major belligerents, except for Japan, was retaliation in kind. Once most of the major belligerents [the US, UK, Canada, and the USSR] accepted the feasibility of biological and toxin weapons, they committed themselves, in varying degrees, to a secret BTW arms race. Internal forces and personalities now played a key role in reinforcing national efforts. At the initiation of the BTW programs, government biologists realized that defensive research and development could not be carried out without comparable offensive research. This offensive defensive nexus meant that most national BTW programs were as extensive as resources and time allowed. Ironically, Germany, due to Hitler's opposition, did not develop an offensive program.
• Uncertainty: Except for Japan, the major belligerents did not try out biological weapons in field operations. Therefore, they remained uncertain throughout the war as to how effective these weapons would be on the battlefield. Even the Japanese could not be sure since their use was sporadic rather than systematic.
• Intelligence: Available intelligence, usually inaccurate and incomplete, encouraged the launching of BTW programs and at times even accelerated the pace of their development. Faced with a virtual black hole, intelligence experts were bound to conclude the worst regarding the BTW efforts of their foes; and policy makers could not afford to ignore this potential danger. Throughout the war, Allied councils were dominated by the conviction that Germany was totally mobilized and had the advantage of having begun total mobilization after Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Actually, Germany did not attempt total mobilization until after the Battle of Stalingrad. Without accurate intelligence, however, the Allies were guided by their evaluation of the nature of the regime confronting them. Surely, the ruthless Nazis and the Japanese militarists would develop every possible weapon of frightfulness. That judgment was the safest assumption. Moreover, it was reinforced by the belief that what the Allies were doing, the Axis were also doing. Mirror images dominated in a world where intelligence mislead rather than illuminated. Without solid information, what other judgment could intelligence officers come to? Could they afford to gamble and ignore the possibility that such regimes had such programs? Intelligence officers and policy makers could not grasp the problems of rearmament priority with which the German military had to struggle after 1933.
• The Role of Leaders: Leadership played a crucial role in determining what nations would pursue a BW program. Hitler squelched any development of a German offensive capability. Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin pushed biological warfare preparedness forward. Ishii was the true believer who initiated the Japanese program; and then, with the support of his superiors, developed it. We have here two models of leadership. In the case of the Allies the direction came from the top down; in the case of the Japanese, it was initiated on a lower level with at least the cognizance and support of the General Staff.
• Lack of Preparedness: Lack of preparedness at the beginning of a war hinders and delays the wartime use of any weapon system. If a military program is adopted after war is declared, time delays will invariably retard its development and implementation. However, if a new program is accorded high priority and pressure is applied to accelerate its progress, even bureaucratic lethargy can be overcome. Acceleration is often spurred by two contradictory assumptions: the belief that your opponent is ahead of you or by the conviction that your opponent is so unprepared for a particular form of war that you can gain a significant advantage over him by pressing forward with your program.
           As far as we now know, the United States, in cooperation with its allies, and Japan carried out the two most extensive BTW programs during the war. Japan, dominated by a militaristic regime, was unfettered by military ethics and international law. The Japanese carried out sabotage operations and field tests against the poorly prepared Chinese, but there is no proof that they used these weapons against the western allies. But, despite its utilization of BTW, Japan suffered a disastrous defeat. In contrast, although not bound by the Geneva Protocol, the United States respected the prohibitions of customary and international law. However, it did lay the foundations for a formidable future BTW program. If the war had continued into 1946, the US would probably have achieved considerable biological and toxin weapons capability.
• Overall Strategic Situation: The decision to use any weapon depends largely upon the overall strategic situation. Would it be to the strategic advantage of a belligerent to use a certain weapon against another power? The answer would depend on a multitude of variables: geographical position, delivery systems, political impact, evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of your opponent, existing war plans, etc. If the political and military leaders believe that the use of a weapon will gain them a significant advantage over their foe, the temptation to use it may triumph over established restraints.
• The Norm: By 1939, the norm against the use of chemical and biological weapons was established in customary and international law. The Geneva Protocol (1925) condemned "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and extended this ban "to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare". Because the protocol was a contract and because many national ratifications were conditioned upon mutual restraint, the convention, ratified by all the major belligerents except the United States and Japan, was essentially a prohibition against first use. There was no international ban, therefore, on the development of BW programs. The norm against its use had an impact but it was not a determining influence in preventing biological warfare. In one case, Japan, the Geneva Protocol actually encouraged the development of BW since it convinced its military that the use of biological weapons in war could give Japan an advantage over its technologically advanced opponents. In contrast, the inter-war disarmament discussions, which had highlighted the immorality of chemical and biological warfare, made the western allies highly sensitive to the issue and to public opposition to the use of these weapons. The norm was, therefore, a conditioning, rather than a determining force. Although taboos are neither irrelevant nor ineffective, the historical record dramatizes their frailty: every taboo of war has been violated at one time or another. Nations will be tempted to violate an inconvenient taboo if their national survival is at stake. The strength of any taboo depends largely on its ability to survive violations, to come back after it has been discarded in the intensity of war.
• Deterrence: The World War II experience does not provide arms controllers with a clear cut deterrence case. BW deterrence was more implicit than explicit. Unlike the case of chemical warfare policy, where Roosevelt and Churchill tied use of CW to an immediate and massive retaliation in kind, no announcement was made regarding biological warfare retaliation. The reason is obvious: you do not announce that you have a particular capability if you want to keep a developing program secret. Thinking about the uses of this novel weapon had not developed beyond a vague "retaliation in kind" assumption. But retaliation in kind for the Western Allies was not within reach during the war. As concerns rose prior to the cross-channel invasion that the Germans might fill their V-weapons with biological or chemical agents, General Eisenhower made it clear to his government that the only available response to biological attack was chemical retaliation.

          Let me conclude with some general reflections on the relationship of time and accident to non use and disarmament.
          An historian learns to view all events in the medium of time. In the case of biological warfare, the unpreparedness of most of the major powers for BW at the beginning of World War II was insured by what happened in the interwar period when existing programs remained limited and tentative. If offensive preparations for a weapon system are neglected in peacetime, this neglect delays its development in wartime. The arms control lesson from BW history is evident. The more baffles that can be put in place while peace prevails, the greater chance an international community has to prevent the use of a weapon it considers abhorrent. Once war breaks out, controls slip. A case in point is the strategic bombing campaign against cities. At the beginning of the war, the belligerents promised to refrain from targeting civilian populations. Tactical and strategic considerations led to the abandonment of that pledge. Expelled from the continent in 1940, the British found that attacks against German cities were the only direct means of striking at their main enemy. A situation could arise in a future war where BTW became an attractive option for a nation which could not otherwise attack its foe or for a nation in the last throes of desperation. The longer the war lasts, the greater the pressure to break initial bonds of restraint in the hope of victory. As Clausewitz stressed in his image of conflict as a struggle between two wrestlers, each exerting more and more force as he seeks to overcome the other, war has a dynamism which can lead to extremes.
No matter how well statesmen plan during peacetime to avoid the threats posed by future weapons in war, no matter how many safeguards are in place against the use of weapons of mass destruction, there are no final guarantees that these weapons will not be used in war. As noted above, contingencies may arise when a nation decides that the use of these weapons is desirable or necessary. A study of the BTW case leaves the historian with a deeply unsettling realization. The failure to develop a usable BTW capability was partly the result of accident. What if Himmler, who pursued biological experiments behind Hitler's back, had been the German leader during World War II? What if some of the biological warfare enthusiasts in the western allied countries had occupied positions of power and had steered their countries towards more energetic biological warfare programs at an earlier stage, replacing a policy of overall neglect with one of active encouragement? What if German intelligence had identified the magnitude of the existing Allied program and had decided in turn to devote prime attention to its development?
          Although a study of BTW activities before 1945 provides some guidance for the prevention of a new BTW arms race, and although progress has been made since World War II in arms control and disarmament, history also raises a number of warning signals. Transparency is the child of tranquility, trust and openness. Closed societies cultivate secrecy, inspire suspicion and breed instability. Even democratic societies, when threatened, close up to protect themselves. In situations of armed conflict, moreover, worst case scenarios understandably mold decisions and actions that are dominated by intelligence evaluations and security chimeras. Once in place, the national programs develop their own momentum spurred on by individual enthusiasts and reinforced by an emerging organization. It is frequently more difficult to stop an ongoing program than it is to start it in the first place. A sober analysis of the lessons of the period 1939-1945 ultimately demonstrates the need to strengthen the powers of the existing regime banning biological and toxin weapons, thereby reinforcing the norm against their use and increasing the national and international stability upon which all arms control and disarmament measures ultimately depend.
          The difficulties of acquiring accurate and complete intelligence provide sobering warnings. These difficulties reinforce existing insecurities and spur the personal and organizational forces that drive national military programs. Strengthening international norms against biological and toxin warfare is vital in an age haunted by the specter of weapons of mass destruction, but it alone will not prevent a biological and toxin weapons race in the future. The only lasting solution lies in effective international controls against biological and toxin activities. But international controls must also be bolstered, as Professor Matthew Meselson of Harvard University has so eloquently argued, by a treaty law which targets individuals guilty of use, production, possession or trafficking in poisonous weapons. Violators of this law would be subjected to arrest and trial.
          New factors have altered the arms balance. The axiomatic commitment to retaliate in kind has been considerably modified. It is now almost inconceivable that the treaty parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would retaliate in kind to a chemical or biological attack. Indeed, several nations have renounced the right of retaliation in kind in regard to chemical, biological and toxin weapons. For those nations, deterrence and retaliation against the use of chemical or biological weapons will take other paths.
          Deterrence, however, must be reinforced by the international will to act against proven violators either by the imposition of sanctions or ultimately through conventional military intervention. Treaties alone are insufficient to deter potential violators unless they are reinforced by a credible penalty. The question of the effectiveness of the overall deterrent will depend, of course, on the willingness of the state parties to enforce it. Bureaucratic lethargy bedevils decision making. Too often decisions are the captives of contingency. There is always an excuse not to act.
          An historian can recall Henry Adams' grim judgment: "My own conclusion is that history is simply social development along the line of weakest resistance, and that in most cases the line of weakest resistance is found as unconsciously by society as by water." We cannot afford to repeat the passive reaction of the world community to the gross violation of existing international law demonstrated by the massive use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War. The challenge of such violations must be forthrightly met by nations determined to prevent the use of these weapons of mass destruction in any future war. Only the will to act will make deterrence credible, thereby reinforcing the norms which the international community is striving to preserve and strengthen against the anarchy of our world.

Editor's Note: John Ellis van Courtland Moon was the co-editor, along with Professor Erhard Geissler, of SIPRI's most recent addition to the mandatory reading list for CBW professionals "Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use: from the Middle Ages to 1945. Professor Moon, a very highly respected historian, has long been noted for accuracy and clarity in writing in this most important area of nuclear, biological and chemical documentation. And much to the chagrin of those who would rather stretch than adhere to the truth, Professor Moon has demanded from all who would write in this field, that same degree of accuracy and depth of research that he demands of himself. He has publicly taken those who would place their cause ahead of truth, to task for their inane, inaccurate and sometimes dangerous pronouncements in the name of history.

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