ASA Newsbreak Service
ASA NewsBreak #196, Added BWC information
Date sent by e-mail: 26 July 2001
Date posted on ASA website: 20 August 2001
ASA Subscribers,
The following article and comments provide additional information on the BWC protocol and the US position.
1. a. U.S. Explores Other Options on Preventing Germ Warfare, NYT, Judith Miller A senior administration official said that although the White House rejects a draft agreement, it remains committed to strengthening a 1972 treaty banning biological weapons and has already begun exploring alternative ways of enforcing the ban and deterring and punishing cheaters. Though hesitant to discuss in detail the alternatives, the official said in an interview that the administration might seek to strengthen export controls on the sale of sophisticated, germ-production equipment and technology. The United States might also pursue "international legal instruments" that would prevent terrorist groups or countries from getting and misusing dangerous germs and toxins. He and other officials said the administration had decided that it was not feasible to verify whether states were abiding by the germ weapons ban given the rapid advances in biotechnology and the ability of cheaters to hide illicit activities. "You can't apply traditional arms control thinking to biotechnology," one official said. "You need out-of- the-box solutions to stopping the spread of this kind of weapon because it is unlike any other." b. Please add to ASA Newsbreak 195, 25 July. Ambassador Mahley said in a later news conference "... Let me re-stress that we do not believe that the absence of this particular protocol in any way undercuts the efficacy of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The prohibitions in the BWC remain the solemn obligation of the 143 states parties to the BWC. Not having a protocol does not relieve any of those 143 states parties of the obligation they have undertaken, both not to have biological weapons and to create domestic structures that will punish anyone who does biological weapons activities in their territory. ..." (1a&b above have been edited by ASA for length)
2. Comments
a. (AP) Tibor Toth, the Hungarian diplomat who chairs the BWC negotiations, said he would not comment on the U.S. position until he had read (Donald) Mahley's speech to the BWC more closely.
b. (AP) Professor Graham Pearson of Britain's Bradford University, said he feared the United States was making a big mistake and would eventually have to reconsider.
c. ASA's editorial position is that the U.S. is correct in its rejection of the protocol. The old adage of a flawed treaty (protocol) is better than no treaty at all - is 'dangerously flawed' at best. Some 'flawed' comments coming out of the Washington area include: "What does this say to cheaters about the U.S. commitment to enforce the (BWC)?" and "If the Bush administration does not support the protocol, how would it deter other nations from developing biological weapons?" A reality check tells us that if an entity were cheating, that entity's position, vis a vis the BWC, would have already been established. Would the entity really care about the US position on the BWC protocol? If an entity really wanted to develop bio weapons, would U.S. support for a possible protocol really change that entity's ambitions? The protocol/BWC must from its start be airtight with sanctions and/or retribution immediate and total. Anything less - well, history is replete with miscalculations on the effectiveness of flawed treaties, protocols and understandings. ASA does welcome our subscriber' comments on the above. --