BTWC
Ad Hoc Group Gains Political Momentum
by Graham S Pearson
Introduction
In the Action Plan for the Ad Hoc Group (ASA 98-1,
February 12, 1998) I concluded that "what is needed
is the political momentum to complete the
negotiations" as the goal of an effectively
strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) is in sight and achievable. There have been
encouraging political developments since then that augur
well for the Ad Hoc Group (AHG).
First, President Clinton in his State of the Union
address to the US Congress on 27 January 1998 set the
scene by saying that "On the eve of a new century,
we have the power and the duty to build a new era of
peace and security....To meet these challenges, we are
helping to write international rules of the road for the
21 st century, protecting those who join the family of
nations, isolating those who do not." He then said
"I also ask Congress to join me in pursuing an
ambitious agenda to reduce the serious threat of weapons
of mass destruction.... Together, we also must confront
new hazards: chemical and biological weapons which could
be used against us by outlaw states, terrorists and
organised criminals." He went on to say "Now,
we must act to prevent the use of disease as a weapon of
war and terror. The Biological Weapons Convention has
been in effect for 23 ye ars. The rules are good, but the
enforcement is weak -- and we must strengthen it with a
new international inspection system to detect and deter
cheating."
A Whi te House Fact Sheet issued on the same day said
"Under the new initiative announced by the President
today, the United States will seek to complete the
framework of a strong BWC protocol by the end of
1998." thus
reiterating and reinforcing statements made by President
Clinton to the United Nations General Assembly in
September 1996 that the BTWC should be given the means to
strengthen compliance and that "we should aim to
complete this task by 1998."
Second, the United Kingdom in its role as President of
the European Union (EU) announced on 9 March 1998 a
common position that is legally binding on not only the
EU Member States but also the 14 Associated Countries.
This commits a total of 29 States to &quo t;actively
pursue decisive progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Group,
with a view to concluding the substantive negotiations by
the end of 1998, so that the Protocol can be adopted by a
Specia l Conference of States Parties early in
1999."
Third, Australia in a statement to the AHG on 9 March
1998 said the Australian Minister of Foreign Af fairs had
a week earlier announced, as part of Australia's response
to the recent Iraq crisis, an Australian initiative to
strengthen the BTWC. This initiative is "aimed at
fast-tracking the negotiations on a verification system
for the Biological Weapons Convention by: - calling for
the convening of a high level meeting to inject into the
negotiations the necessary politica l commitment for
urgent action,...to help secure early conclusion to the
negotiations." It seems likely that a meeting may be
held at Foreign Minister level in New York during the UN
Gen eral Assembly meeting in the autumn to give the
political impetus to complete the negotiation of the
Protocol.
However, a note of caution was sounded by the Non-Align
ed Movement and other Countries in a statement to the AHG
at the end of the March 1998 meeting. They noted that,
"having reviewed the progress achieved so far at the
Ad-Hoc Group, noted that certain issues remain to be
adequately addressed and...affirm as follows: (i) They
remain committed to and have confidence in the work of
the Ad-Hoc Group which is being conducted in ord er to
fulfill the important objective of strengthening the
BTWC. They will contribute fully to this work in order to
promote consensus on key issues which will facilitate the
conclusion of th is undertaking in a manner acceptable to
all States Parties and be conducive to the
universalisation of the regime to be established."
This statement goes on to note the decision of the Fourth
Review Conference urging completion of the AHG
negotiation, as soon as possible, enjoys consensus
support from all States Parties and that alternative time
frames should be avoided.
A second sub-paragraph stresses that the mandate needs to
be fully implemented and the NAM "express their
concerns at attempts to reduce the scope and importance o
f issues related to Article X of the Convention ...
Substantive progress in strengthening the application and
full operationalisation of Article X is crucial to the
conclusion of a universall y acceptable and legally
binding instrument designed to strengthen the Convention.
They reaffirm readiness to work with other delegations in
order to achieve an appropriate balance in the Pro
tocol." The final sub-paragraph stresses "that
there is no alternative to negotiations and the promotion
of agreements and consensus on specific issues within the
AHG. Therefore, ne gotiations should be conducted within
the AHG and on the basis of the existing rolling
text."
Analysis
There is consequently a sense in Gene va of real purpose
and seriousness in the negotiations. All the
participating States are engaged in formulating consensus
language and removal of square brackets from the text.
The EU common position commits the 29 States "to
work together to promote agreement in the negotiations on
the following measures, including verification measures,
which are b oth central and essential to an effective
Protocol to strengthen compliance with the BTWC:
-- Declarations of a range of facilities and activities of potential relevance under the Convention, inter alia so as to enhance transparency;
-- Provision for visits to facilities in order to promote accurate and complete declarations and thus further enhance transparency and confidence;
-- Provision for rapid and effective investigations into concerns over non-compliance, including both facility and field investigations;
-- A cost-effective and independent organization, including a small permanent staff, cap able of implementing the Protocol effectively."
It is encouraging that there is much common ground with the US position ind icated in the White House Fact Sheet of 27 January 1998 which said the US "will work closely with US industry to develop and reach international agreement on the following tools:
Declarations: BWC Parties would be required to submit annual declarations to the BWC implementing organization about facilities and/or activities especially suited for possible BW purposes, such as facilities...that send or receive international transfers of dangerous pathogens, such as anthrax.
Although the common ground is
encouraging, there are several details in the US position
which would benefit from further consideration and
modification. When the firm position that the US and UK
rightly took earlier in 1998 in requiring that Iraq meet
its ob ligations under UN Security Council Resolution 687
(1991) and other Resolutions is considered, it will be
recognised that a concept of "voluntary visits...at
the discretion of the facili ty concerned" would not
be acceptable to the US in regard to any of the 8
countries listed in the Chapter (VII) of the ACDA Annual
Report under the heading of "V. Other Nations Comp
liance with Multilateral Agreements, A. The 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention". However,
there are circumstances in which voluntary visits could
help to increase transparency and build confidence; for
example, in visits to check declarations, a voluntary
visit to other parts of the
facility or activity would be valuable.
As for challenge investigations, these need, as the EU
common position recognises, to be rapid and effective.
The difficulties of investigations at some time after an
alleged event are clearly shown in the recent Cuban
allegation (see ASA 97-5 and 98-2). Furthermore, the US
experience in the confrontation with Iraq earlier in 1998
showed the difficulties of building an internat ional
consensus even in a case where the evidence was as clear
and internationally accepted as that of Iraq. The US
should recognise that there are good grounds for the BTWC
having a similar "red light" filter mechanism
to that of the Chemical Weapons Convention where a
majority of States parties have to vote to stop an
investigation. As both the BTWC and the CWC rightl y
cover toxins, thereby ensuring no gap between the
Conventions, it would not be beneficial to have two
significantly different mechanisms under the two
Conventions.
The NAM statement shows a welcome commitment to the
strengthening of the BTWC through the completion of the
negotiations as soon as possible. They quite
rightly point out the importance of addressing key issues
that will help to conclude the work of the AHG in a way
that is acceptable to all States Parties. They then go on
to state that substantive progress in strengthening the
application of Article X of the Convention is crucial to
the conclusion of a universally acceptable Protocol. The
remarks relating to Article X appear to have resulted
from moves in the March AHG meeting to constrain the
scope of the Article VII of the rolling text; in the
January rolling text (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/39, 2 February
1998) Article VII has the title "Scientific and
Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and
Technical Cooperation" which has no square brackets,
whilst the version resulting from the March meeting has a
title reading "[S cientific and Technological
Exchange for Peaceful Purposes] [Implementation
Assistance] and Technical Cooperation". The effect
of this change with its square brackets and introduction
of the term "[Implementation Assistance]" is to
cast doubt on the intention to address the element of the
mandate requiring the AHG to consider inter alia:
"Specific measures designed to ensure effective and
full implementation of Article X, ...".
The need to consider measures relating to the
implementation of Article X has been recognis ed as an
issue of particular importance to the developing
countries. Although it will be important to avoid
duplication of activities such as those under Agenda 21
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, it is
becoming apparent that there are common goals in respect
of both international security and public health and
environmental safety that can complement the moves being
taken by the AHG to increase transparency and build
confidence. Two Briefing Papers prepared by the
Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford
setting out buildi ng blocks for Article X were presented
and distributed during the March 1998 AHG meeting.
These show that there is already considerable
international effort to harmonize national and
international regulations relating to pathogens that
present danger to public and animal health and to the
environment. It is evident in that in many countries, for
public health and environmental safety reasons, national
authorities are already establishing regulations,
collecting relevant information about facilities and
activities and inspecting these facilities and
activities. As the BTWC Protocol is likely to contain
declarations and inspections of facilities and activities
together with national implementation measures, as well
as measures to i mprove implementation of Articles III
and X of the Convention, there is potential for a two way
synergy between the strengthening of the BTWC and the
strengthening of national procedures for the handling,
use and transfer of harmful pathogens for public health
and environmental safety. Consequently, in regard to the
strengthening of the implementation of Article X of the
BTWC, th ere appears to be scope for measures to
facilitate the harmonization of national, regional and
international safety rules for pathogens involving both
the collection of data and the inspectio n of facilities
thereby enhancing both national public confidence as well
as regional and international security.
Conclusions
There is a real opp ortunity for the AHG to make progress
this year. The next political indication will be in May
with the communique of the G-8 meeting. In June 1997, the
G8 communique -- and the subsequent NAT O Heads of States
and Government communique a month later in Madrid -- said
"Recognizing that enhancing confidence in compliance
would reinforce the Biological Toxin Weapons Convention,
we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as
possible through negotiation a legally-binding and
effective verification mechanism." The G-8 in May
1998 can be expected to parallel the commitment of the EU
Common Position.
The AHG can and should make real progress towards a
Protocol this year. It behoves all concerned with the
strengthening of the BTWC, whether government, industry
or academia, to address the remaining issues, to
formulate solutions and to finalise the text of the
Protocol. This is an achievable goal and one that i s
indeed well worthwhile. Let us all put our shoulders to
the task of completing an effective protocol and so
reducing the danger that deliberate disease may be used
as a weapon of war.
Editor's Note: Graham Pearson is
Honorary Visiting Professor in International Security,
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford,
Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK and previously Director
General and Chief Executive, Chemical and Biological
Defence Establishment.
University of Bradford: BTWC Project
The Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford,
has a project to strengthen the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention which is preparing Briefing Papers
addressing key issues relating to the strengthening of
the BTWC for presentation and distribution to the States
Parties. Thus far,
some seven Briefing Papers have been produced:
1. The Importance of On-Site Investigations... July 1997
2. The Necessity for Non-Challenge Visits ...September 1997
3. Discriminating Triggers for Mandatory Declarations...September 1997
4. National Implementation Measures...January 1998
5. An Optimum Organization....January 1998
6. Article X : Some Building Blocks...March 1998
7. Article X : Further Building Blocks...March 1998
These Briefing Papers are all available
on the project web
site which is constantly being updated with the
Proced ural Reports and Working Papers of the Ad Hoc
Group.
A project objective is to make available on this website,
the papers presented at meetings of the Ad Hoc Group as
well as other papers relating to the BTWC such as the
Final Report of the Fourth Review Conference held in
November 1996. This web site is a joint CBW project with
SIPRI.
98-2, issue no. 65